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 Water and people’s co-evolution has been marked upon the landscape by 
visible stream diversions to massive hydroelectric dams, while more reclusive 
impacts like water table levels are beneath the earth’s surface. Both actions have 
reconfigured the hydrological ecosystem, creating spatial patterns and social 
relationships centered on water. Accessing water emerges as a dominant catalyst for 
economic development on the U.S. Great Plains. I examine the co-evolution of 
people and water on the U.S. Great Plains with a socio-hydrological profile that 
focuses on three irrigation districts in the Republican River basin.  
 The socio-hydrological profile consists of several elements. One, historical and 
legal aspects of water detail how they impacted its use and management. Two, a 
policy implementation assessment dissects the challenges presented by the 
governing 1943 Republican River Compact and supporting 2002 Final Settlement 
Stipulation agreement. Three, streamflow scenarios for simulated and observational 
data illustrate the river’s changing character through time and space. Four, 
interviews with irrigators, managers, and other important stakeholders illuminate 
how they are keenly interested in water’s value and management. 
 As the first socio-hydrological profile of the irrigation districts and the basin, 
my findings present a holistic representation of the co-evolution of people and water. 
The profile identifies four periods — droughts and floods, science and technology, 
litigation, and future adaptation and interpretation — that have and will shape the 
basin’s social and water relationship. I suggest that current socio-hydrological 
research add thematic categories to the values and norms component of the socio-
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THE REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN AND ITS SOCIO-HYDROLOGY 
 
 The U.S. Great Plains is simultaneously beautiful and harsh. A slow, 
undulating landscape unfurls beneath a distant horizon that stretches in every 
direction. Those vast horizons can signal hope and fear in the form of well needed 
rains that water crops and fill streams or tornadoes, droughts, and blizzards that call 
for shelter and endurance. For those who farm and ranch in the Plains, climate is 
both friend and foe, requiring adaptation and adjustment.  
 Perhaps more than any other factor, water is the critical component to 
survival and success in a place where it can be scarce and unreliable. Precipitation 
ranges from 10”-15” (25-38 cm) in the west to upwards of 25” (63.5 cm) or more at 
the region’s eastern side (Bleed 1993; Bicek 2002). As a result, many streams are 
intermittent and overall stream density is low as compared to the eastern half of the 
U.S. Some Plains’ streams are fed by dense mountain snow pack and others are 
prairie or flashy streams that depend on seasonal precipitation events. 
 For much of the region’s history, competition for water was generally limited. 
As westward migrations to the Great Plains began in the mid-1800s, water demands 
by people increased. Surface water in streams is the most readily available on the 
Plains. Stream diversions and canals became a common practice for farmers; later 
municipalities and industries also would put demands upon that water. If 
groundwater was easily accessed, it was used, too. Depending on conditions and 
people’s access to water, winners and losers were inevitable. During periods of 
prolonged drought, competition and conflict occurred between surface water users. 
Solving these disputes eventually led to territorial and state water practices, such as 
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‘first in time, first in right,’ a prior appropriation system that developed in the 
California gold fields and diffused eastward. Individuals or groups who first claimed 
a stream’s water had first rights of use during shortages. Those and other practices 
eventually became codified as state statutes, where water belongs to the state’s 
citizens and beneficial use is allowed.  
 As part of the U.S. federal system, states have sovereign control over their 
internal affairs. Water is a transitory, non-human, and non-political entity that pays 
no heed to socially imposed borders. However, once water is commodified and takes 
on a market-culture value, exploitation and conflict are inevitable (Sherow 1990). 
Addressing water conflicts that cross socially imposed political borders is legally 
challenging. Further aggravating the situation are hydrological borders that counter 
the political. Because streams typically cross state lines, transboundary conflicts 
between states over a stream’s water eventually came to the fore, and so did a 
solution; interstate river compacts. 
 The first interstate river compact was the 1922 Colorado River Compact 
between seven U.S. states. The Upper Basin (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New 
Mexico) cannot deplete streamflow to the Lower Basin (Arizona, Nevada, California); 
to do so is to risk legal action. Six more interstate river compacts followed by 1950 
(Table 1.1). The first three — the Colorado, LaPlata, and South Platte — owe their 
genesis to the vision of Delph Carpenter, a Colorado lawyer who saw a need to 
minimize water lawsuits between states and offered interstate compacts as a means 
to do so (Tyler 2003; Rettig 2017a). 
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Table 1.1. U.S. Interstate River Compacts, 1922-1950 
YEAR COMPACT AND STATES 
1922 Colorado River (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Nevada, California) 
La Plata River (New Mexico, Colorado) 
1923 South Platte River (Wyoming, Nebraska) 
1939 Rio Grande (Colorado, New Mexico, Texas)  
1943 Republican River (Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska) 
Belle Fourche River (Wyoming, South Dakota) 
1948 Upper Colorado (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, 
Arizona) 
1949 Arkansas River (Colorado, Kansas) 
1950 Yellowstone River (Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota) 
 
 While compacts offer a legal means to ensure that each party receives its 
annual allocation, the actual water quantity can fluctuate significantly. Both annual 
precipitation variability and technological advances impact surface streamflow and 
groundwater quantities. Since the advent of those initial compacts, developments in 
hydrology and engineering have confirmed the hydrological connectivity between 
surface water and groundwater. The 1950s introduction of submersible groundwater 
pumps offered a drought-proof alternative to inconsistent surface water irrigation 
during the growing season. However, groundwater pumping can adversely impact 
surface water flows, diminishing its volume. 
 As a result of its climatic and hydrological conditions, water on the Great 
Plains is not reliable or accessible without technology. Human interference in the 
hydrological relationship between surface and groundwater along with other factors 
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including climate change and farm practices has altered the region’s waterscapes 
since the 1940s. A devastating flood in the midst of the 1935s Depression killed over 
100 people in the Republican River basin and wrecked havoc on its infrastructure 
and economy (Manley 1993). That event, combined with the 1930s Dust Bowl, and 
the need for reliable agricultural water motivated the residents of Colorado, Kansas, 
and Nebraska to create the 1943 Republican River Compact (hereafter Compact). In 
conjunction with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (hereafter Reclamation), large-
scale infrastructure projects were developed that provided flood control, created 
irrigation districts, and supplied each state with an equitable water allocation from 
the Republican River. 
 The Republican River begins in eastern Colorado, flows through a corner of 
northwest Kansas, and then along the southern portion of Nebraska before again 
moving into north-central Kansas (Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). Its “virgin waters undepleted 
by the activity of man” (Republican River Compact Article II) are shared among the 
three states. Initially, surface flows were able to meet the needs of the basin’s federal 
irrigation projects, the Reclamation’s Bostwick and Frenchman Creek Divisions, as 
long as there was not a drought. With the advent of intensive groundwater pumping, 
surface flows began to diminish even during normal precipitation periods. 
Eventually the surface flow losses forced Kansas in 1998 to sue its upstream 
Compact partners, Colorado and Nebraska. Surface flow losses also encouraged local 
Nebraska surface water users to challenge groundwater users and state agencies. 
Despite legal rulings, the larger conflict of a changed socio-hydrological relationship 
continues amid the basin’s water market-culture. 
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Figure 1.1. The Republican River Basin (Bauer 2017). 
 
Figure 1.2.  The Republican River near Cambridge, Nebraska (Knapp 2015). 
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 My dissertation research is focused on three Republican River basin irrigation 
districts — the Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District, the Nebraska Bostwick 
Irrigation District, and the Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District. It examines how the 
socio-hydrology of the Great Plains is reflected in the Compact, its associated 
irrigation districts, and the waters of the basin. 
 How do the basin irrigation districts and their members value water, and 
why? How do they interact with other water users and agencies, both within their 
community and outside their state? What do they foresee for water’s future in the 
basin? These questions and others are worth exploring and are best done so through 
the field of socio-hydrology. Socio-hydrology examines the relationship on the 
landscape between people and water from a hydrological perspective. Geographers 
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often describe this relationship as hydro-social, but the essence of both is the 
inescapable role of water in people’s lives and society. 
 I construct a socio-hydrology profile that tells the districts’ story through time 
and space. It includes a description of the basin and its development, water law and 
policy, a policy analysis of the Compact and the Final Settlement Stipulation (FSS), 
an analysis and comparison of the river’s streamflow from three sources, and 
interviews with irrigation district stakeholders. By synthesizing these factors into a 
profile, I offer a more holistic picture of the basin that includes both its agricultural 
community and its water, its socio-hydrology. Further, I suggest policy 
implementation assessment additions and historical socio-hydrological thematic 




 The remaining dissertation chapters are first placed within the context of 
earlier scholarly work, and are followed by chapters that present the socio-hydrology 
profile elements individually; they are integrated in the conclusion. 
 Chapter 2 places my research within the larger scholarly discussions of the 
history of nature, contemporary explorations of nature and water, and socio-
hydrology. A trajectory of dynamic as well as static responses to nature and water 
can be drawn illuminating how water has been perceived and acted upon by human 
agency through time. Since it is virtually impossible to separate people from water, 
knowing how scholars have studied and reported on society’s relationship with water 
anchors my research to a larger discussion of nature. 
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 Chapter 3 describes the study area’s physical and social attributes along with 
infrastructure details of the irrigation districts. These details give an overview of the 
basin that ties its physical characteristics to human agency’s historical interaction 
with the basin’s hydrological cycle. Further, it sets the tone for later water conflicts 
between users, states, and agencies. 
 Water history, law, and policy are the focus of Chapter 4. Detailed 
explanations are provided that define different types of water and water laws. It gives 
a historical overview of each states’ water law development from territorial to 
contemporary policies, and explains how interstate river compacts came to be a 
means for addressing interstate and trans-basin water conflicts, including the 
Republican River. It is important to understand how water law evolved and how the 
states responded to their waterscapes through legislation, so that the current conflict 
between the states and surface and groundwater users are placed in a historical and 
legal perspective. 
 Because the basin is under the governance of the Compact and the subsequent 
FSS, I conduct a policy implementation assessment using Mazmanian and Sabatier’s 
(1981) policy process theory in Chapter 5. My assessment focuses exclusively on how 
the language of the legal documents molds the responses to and success or failures of 
the Compact and the Final Settlement. Most particularly, I examine what is and is 
not stated, and how those inclusions and omissions color actions and responses by 
the states and the irrigation districts. 
 Surface water streamflows are the lynch pin of the irrigation districts and the 
Compact; declining flows are causes of intense concern for the irrigation districts. In 
Chapter 6 I present three different streamflow scenarios from three different sources 
 9 
to explore how water management decision-making over time and space has 
impacted the river’s hydrological cycle and surface flows for the irrigation districts 
and their users. One source offers an alternative simulated streamflow scenario, 
while the other two present observational streamflow scenarios. Water management 
decisions are clearly represented in the observational data, attesting to the human 
impact on streamflow and human agency in the basin. Solutions to the declining 
flows are controversial and contingent on legal, political, economic and hydrological 
realities. 
 Key basin stakeholders share their perspectives of the basin’s water and legal 
landscapes through semi-structured interviews in Chapter 7. Few studies to date 
have examined how surface water users feel about water, the legal boxes in which 
they function, and their relationships with other water users and agencies in the 
basin. Knowing what their viewpoints are advances context about past conflicts and 
current challenges are an opportunity to better understand the social ramifications 
and interactions of people. 
 The conclusion, Chapter 8, presents a historical socio-hydrology profile 
composite based on the individual components that offers a more cohesive setting 
for the basin.  I expand the socio-hydrological organizational framework by 
suggesting the addition of thematic categories for socio-hydrology to pursue that 
include social factors, values, and norms in hydrological modeling. Thematic 
categories better define and conceptualize how future research may be approached. 




NATURE, PEOPLE, AND WATER 
 
 Civilizations reflect a group’s social and cultural values, and water is central to 
their long-term viability. Consider the spatial distribution of major civilizations like 
the Egyptians, Romans, or Mayans where agricultural irrigation canals diverted 
water to fields for food production, aqueducts transported water to far away cities, 
and seaside ports meant ships could ply the oceans for trade. Societies and cultures 
can flourish and grow with water; without it they wither and disappear. Water has 
been and continues to be the lifeblood of survival at multiple scales from the 
personal to the economic because people need it every day. It can be in abundant 
quantities, severely limited, of high or low quality, and provides sustenance. It is 
used on farms and in factories to produce goods and services, and is delivered by 
rain, snow, or a kitchen faucet. People and water have co-evolved across time and 
space. 
 My research explores the relationship between people and water on the U.S. 
Great Plains and how people have spatially leveraged surface water to promote 
irrigated agriculture. I use three irrigation districts in the Republican River basin to 
examine the human-water relationship that includes water management, 
governance, and conflict. I apply a socio-hydrological lens to assess the interaction. 
 Over time many scholars have questioned and sought answers to explain how 
they and nature are connected, their spaces and relationships, and how one has 
shaped the other. Scholarly work on early environmental history, social 
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constructions of water and nature, and water research hybrids that explore the 
social-nature interactions including socio-hydrology are presented in the chapter.  
 
EARLY APPROACHES TO NATURE 
  Clarence Glackens’s Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in 
Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (1967) is 
the authoritative text on the relationship between nature and people up to the 1800s. 
Early ancient writers and thinkers wrestled with explaining and understanding 
humanity’s place in and relationship to nature in an attempt to create a holistic view 
of nature, laying the groundwork for the recognition and acceptance of human 
agency as well as ecological theory (Glacken 1967). Today the scientific community 
agrees that people are a geographic agent imposing environmental changes through 
open pit mining, deforestation, and increased CO2 levels, to name but a few 
examples.  
 Scientists, philosophers, and geographers of the Renaissance and Age of 
Discovery showed an increasing recognition of global environmental change. 
Intellectual resources and interpretations gained depth and breadth with secular 
environmental theories that physical systems have their own functionality, and 
nature its own history separate from people. Immanuel Kant in particular felt that 
people should be considered in the study of physical geography and environmental 
change, a precursor to modern ecosystem services and socio-ecosystem services 
relationships (Glacken 1967). Count Buffon, the 18th century French natural 
historian and first Western scientist to focus on human impacts, subscribed to the 
idea that people’s agency and power was equivalent to the agency of geography and 
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geology. People impose social systems upon and into natural systems from simple 
dwellings to complex drainage projects that reconfigure ecological and hydrological 
relationships.  
 How people have altered the Earth and how the environment influences social 
development remain persistent questions and were marked upon the mid-1800s 
American landscape with George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature (1864). His 
discourse on human agency and its relationship with nature explored how to both 
exploit resources in the present and preserve them for the future. Geographers 
Alexander von Humboldt, Karl Ritter, and Arnold Henry Guyot advocated studying 
the physical world’s role and influence on social life and the progress of people 
(Marsh 1864; Lowenthal 2000). That echoed earlier ideas that relationships found in 
law, human society, and moral causes could be traced to relationships with the 
physical world (Glacken 1967). Later critical geography border scholars note how 
societies create borders based on current needs, desires, and perceptions (Buchanan 
and Moore 2003) as well as the inclusion of ethics (Brunn et al. 2005). These border 
constructions are reminiscent of earlier ideas of the role of nature in social and 
political development.  
 Scientists Charles Lyell (the classic Principles of Geology, 1835) and Mary 
Somerville (Physical Geography, 1848, the definitive text into the early 1900s), and 
anarchist and French geographer Elisee Reclus (1873) readily acknowledged human 
agency and environmental impacts (Goudie 2013). Mary Somerville astutely said 
“Man dexterously avails himself of the powers of nature to subdue nature” (in 
Goudie 2013, 4), and Reclus wrote that “the action of man may embellish the earth, 
but it may also disfigure it; according to the manner and social conditions of any 
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nation, contributes either to the degradation or glorification of nature” (in Goudie 
2013, 5). These observations ring true today in the Republican River basin, where 
substantial water control infrastructure projects have attempted to wrestle water 
into subservience to irrigation districts and their water users at a cost to the streams 
and hydrological system. 
 In the 20th century, two philosophies appear, the inspirational and the 
economic (Lowenthal 2000). Those who followed the inspirational path believed 
that nature and wilderness had an intrinsic value greater than resource use. Those 
focused on economic returns continued with modification via human agency like 
“the fantasy that tree planting would water the plains, even convert the Great 
American Desert into a well-wooded land” (Lowenthal 2000, 7). Contemporary 
responses call for integrating social values and technical solutions, but social values 
have always played a role in how the environment has been studied, perceived, and 
used. 
 As an environmental historian, Lowenthal offers contemporary approaches to 
nature including its social construction and nature as an everyday affair, where non-
academics and ordinary people are engaged with decision-making. Scholars study 
nature’s social constructions and how people interact with and contribute to water 
resource decision-making at multiple scales with theoretical and practical 
applications. On the other hand, basin actors are engaged in water management 





THE 20TH CENTURY 
 The environment’s influence on man and man as a geographic agent continue 
to be relevant themes in Post Modern geography and theoretical thought. Gold 
(1984), Swyngedouw (1997), Fitzsimmons (1989), Proctor (1998), Castree (2001, 
2005), Demeritt (2002), Inkpen and Wilson (2013), and others have explored the 
questions, “what does it mean to be human?” and “what is nature?”  
 Gold (1984) reminds us that during the Renaissance and Age of Discovery, 
emerging capitalism had a role in burgeoning scientific inquiry because it was a 
means to explain the how and why of nature. Science allowed people to examine the 
outside world from the atom to the celestial to gain an understanding and 
appreciation of systems, parts, and their interactions singly and in concert. Space 
exists regardless of a human presence, but how it is defined and used by people 
determines its value to individuals and society at large. For people living in the 
Arkansas River basin of Colorado and Kansas, water came to have a market-culture 
value to irrigators and corporations that have challenged how social and natural 
space are defined (Sherow 1990). 
 Fitzsimmons (1989) argues that everything is urban, that all environments are 
socially constructed, and therefore there is no such thing as a purely rural area and 
there is no nature apart from human beings. A pristine, untouched wilderness is 
unrealistic according to Cronon (1996), especially as people have migrated, settled, 
and penetrated ever more remote areas. Nature has been and continues to be 
perceived and manipulated to serve specific social goals that include economics, 
science, philosophy, and agriculture. Nature and all its elements is not apolitical 
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because its use and designation are identified with a group’s particular worldview 
(Fall 2011). 
 
NATURE AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WATER 
 Studies of the world and its phenomena endeavor to control and define 
spaces, whether social or natural. Furthermore, both spaces are inherently 
politicized and imbued with power (Glacken 1967; Gold 1984; Braun and Castree 
1998; Castree 2001, 2005; Castree and Braun 2001; Braun 2002; Demeritt 2002; 
Fall 2005; Bakker and Bridge 2006). Constructs define parameters for objects and 
experiences that lead to a common group understanding. They vary among groups, 
over time, and through space, allowing societies to define themselves as well as 
others (Buchanan and Moore 2003; Cloke and Johnston 2005; Montanari 2015). 
These social constructions have tended to create binaries that identify and mark 
spaces, such as earthly-heavenly, global-local, frontier-homeland, or human-nature.  
 In geography, the primary binary was human-physical, although the history of 
geography shows that this was not always the case and that it came about only in the 
mid-20th century (Castree 2005). In the last few decades Haraway (1991), Latour 
(2007, 2011), Whatmore (2002), and others (see Braun 2006; Cloke and Johnston 
2005) have criticized these binary constructions by proposing that they oversimplify 
reality. They suggest a better representation would be a relative relationship between 
different phenomena in the guise of cyborgs, Actor Network Theory, and hybridity 
that connect binaries thereby demonstrating the porosity of these artificial and 
socially constructed borders. Additional discussion revolves around how society has 
inserted itself into nature (Swyngedouw 1997, 1999; Whatmore 2002; Giglioli and 
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Swyngedouw 2008). As a binary, human-nature does not adequately describe people 
and the inhabited world. The Republican River basin irrigation districts’ slogan is 
“Water is Life” (Figure 2.1) and spotlights water’s central role in their social-water-
agriculture nexus. 
 
Figure 2.1. Bostwick Irrigation District, Red Cloud, Nebraska (Author). 
 
 Furthermore, binaries or even dichotomies are no longer adequate 
representations because they largely ignore the symbiotic, interactive, and 
interconnected socio-nature system (Swyngedouw 1997). Instead, the former spatial 
and social distinctions have become integrated in socio-ecological systems that are 
supported by ecosystem services, blurring even further any borders between people 
and nature. Socio-hydrology can be one means of minimizing the socio-nature 
binaries, and I do concede that the name itself is suggestive of a binary.  
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 The remainder of the chapter addresses philosophies about the human-water 
cycle, the hydrosocial and socio-hydrology. First, I provide a broad overview of water 
and its social context as a resource and potential conflicts that can arise over its 
abundance, scarcity, and location. Second, I summarize the language and research 
paradigms associated with the two positions based on work by Wesselink et al.  
(2017). Third, I offer Erik Swyngedouw’s work (1997, 1999) as an example of 
hydrosocial research. Fourth, I highlight ecosystem services and socio-ecological 
systems as a transition to socio-hydrology. Finally, I discuss socio-hydrology, noting 
early and recent support for its work, as well as its ambitious goal to include 
dynamic, qualitative data into hydrological models that are used in water 
management decisions. 
 
WATER AND WATER HYBRIDS  
 Water easily bridges the social-nature divide. As part of the hydrological cycle, 
water undergoes movement and transformations of state while being used for 
personal and economic needs. Greater or lesser precipitation means more or less 
water for streams and its downstream users, ecosystems, agriculture, and 
municipalities. Water excesses and shortages present challenges, but it is over-use 
and over-allocation in conjunction with natural deficits and water scarcity that claim 
the most attention. In the Republican River basin, it is both. 
 The abundance-scarcity cycle is a planning challenge for individual users and 
water management decision-makers, where often complex and competing policies 
can pit public and private actors and ecosystems against each other. Because it can 
occupy multiple political spaces and have numerous types of users, usage practices, 
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and historical policies, water is a contested resource space (Popelka 2004; Horne 
2010; Smedley 2011). “Fair and equitable allocation” is an oxymoron for many who 
deal with water disputes that cross boundaries, as each actor tends to privilege 
themself, while nature and its systems often lose (Brunn et al. 2005; Bear and Eden 
2008; Craig 2010; Ioris 2013; Ward 2013). Water within a single political unit may 
pose fewer allocation conflicts than water that crosses jurisdictional boundaries from 
international to inter-state, but power relations inevitably color the boundaries those 
allocations represent (Dellapenna 2007; Schlager and Heikkila 2009; Fall 2011; 
Garrick et al. 2013; Meehan 2013; Ward 2013). Space itself has networks and 
hierarchies of scale, yet space is continually molded, distorted, and reconfigured by 
people. 
 Through both natural cycles and social activity, water development and its 
extraction vary with regard to resource conditions, eliciting questions such as: Has it 
been a wet, normal or dry year? Has the recharge rate kept pace with extraction 
rates? Has technological change reduced or increased water use? or Has agricultural, 
industrial, and municipal demand changed?  Subsequently, water is in a state of near 
constant flux due to human activities, weather and climate conditions, and local 
geologic and hydrologic conditions. Researchers take various approaches to 
answering these questions. Those in human geography term theirs hydrosocial and 
those in hydrology term theirs socio-hydrology. I explain the differences below. 
 
LANGUAGE CHOICE IMPLICATIONS:  HYDROSOCIAL, HYDRO-SOCIAL AND SOCIO-HYDROLOGY 
 Language is important philosophically when studying the human-water cycle. 
Socio-hydrology is a relatively new term and field that emphasizes the spatial 
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organization of people around water. Hydro-social or hydrosocial has a long 
geographic history and different meanings with and without the hyphen. With the 
hyphen people and water are seen as more independent actors, while the hyphen-
less version is indicative of a hybridized relationship. Wesselink et al. (2017) have 
written an excellent paper, “Socio-hydrology and hydrosocial analysis: toward 
dialogues across disciplines,” which disassembles each of the ideas, their legacy, and 
history drawing upon recent and long-standing publications. They offer a lucid 
analysis of the research paradigms associated with each idea, clearly delineating 
their advantages and shortfalls. They do so to answer three pragmatic questions for 
human-water systems:  What is learned with different approaches? What rationales 
for action are suggested? and is complementarity between them possible? 
 Hydrosocial systems can be traced to critical human geography through 
human-water and social-nature power relations (Wesselink et al. 2017). 
Ontologically the hydrosocial world is built on two conditions: decision-making 
powers and the impacts they have on inequality, and the relationship between people 
and water as an internal one, making water and social power (or society) hybrids. As 
a result, water and social power are not separate entities, telegraphed by the lack of a 
hyphen. Wesselink et al. (2017) note that researchers have used Latour’s Actor 
Network Theory because the human and non-human actors are equivalents having 
equal significance. Researchers also identify specific (social) objectives they want to 
champion including democratic parity, unlike socio-hydrologists who claim a more 
objective and solution oriented stance. While the authors find hydrosocial case study 
narratives rich in detail and texture, they lack an appreciable equivalent of time 
spent on physical systems and how they work, as opposed to socio-hydrology. They 
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note the possibility of collaboration between geographers and hydrologists via 
Castree (2016) and others’ calls for critical physical geography and social contracts 
that can address ongoing global changes. Those two groups will have to overcome 
different paradigms, prestige inequalities, and power dynamics within their 
respective fields to successfully collaborate on human-water issues. Wesselink at al. 
(2017) suggest narratives or stories as a means to moderate the differences between 
geographers and hydrologists, since narratives help impose order on random events 
through the use of a plot’s logical structuring. Narrative use is based in part on 
Phillips’ (2012) identification of eight basic narrative styles that are employed to 
communicate earth science results including cause-and-effect and emergence. 
Because both groups ontologically agree that the world is complex, narratives could 
serve as a bridge between their differences, for socio-hydrology acting as an input, 
and for hydrosocial acting as an output. For an overview of the two research 
paradigms see Table 2.1.  
 
A HYDROSOCIAL EXAMPLE 
 Erik Swyngedouw, renowned Marxist and hydrosocial geographer, researches 
political ecology with a special emphasis on water resources, focused on melding 
social and physical systems or processes into a “politically progressive socio-natural 
theory” (University of Manchester n.d.). Such an approach works to intertwine 
society and nature as one, whose systems and networks are incomplete without the 
other. He has written extensively about society’s internalization of water beginning 
with his work on water and urbanization in Ecuador (Swyngedouw 1997). He 
interrogates the social power necessary to domesticate water and push water’s 
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ecological frontiers farther when urban development overruns it. That is, water is 
brought directly within the social urban sphere with little to no regard for its spatial 
production source, local ecological and social impact, or social and hydrological 
sustainability. For example, a pipeline that moves water from an undeveloped rural 
drainage basin to another within an urban development moves water outside one 
ecological niche into a socio-ecological niche. Swyngedouw observes that any 
transformation between urbanization and water is reliant on economic capital and 
social power relations among different agents of the hydro-social cycle, that in turn if 
not overcome, at the least join together the political, socio-economic, and ecological 
to minimize the social-nature binary. 
 
Table 2.1. Hydrosocial and Socio-Hydrology Research Comparison 
 HYDROSOCIAL RESEARCH SOCIO-HYDROLOGY 
PARADIGMS Constructivist, critical theory Positivist, Post-Positivist 
ONTOLOGY Holistic; parts constitute each 
other and cannot be 
separated 
Objectivist; holistic; parts can 
be separated, interaction gives 
emergent properties 
EPISTEMOLOGY Subjective Objective 
MAIN 
METHODOLOGY 
Historical materialist analysis Quantitative Modeling 
STARTING POINT Society (and technology) Natural System 
KEYWORD Power Interaction 
AXIOLOGY Critical or interpretivist; 
researchers cannot be and 
should not be neutral 
(Post) Positivist; researchers 
are and should be neutral 
(Wesselink et al. 2017) 
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 His work on the Spanish waterscape (Swyngedouw 1999) furthers the thesis of 
water politics and the hybridity of water overcoming the social-nature divide. Is 
water a hybrid? Simply placing it at the crossroads of society and nature does not 
automatically confer hybridity. Being able to function within two different spheres or 
realms is contingent not on the sphere in which the actor finds itself, but on the 
actor’s ability to meet the socially constructed expectations designated by people. For 
him, questions remain about control, action, and power in the production of a social-
nature and the repercussions that are created. Swyngedouw stresses the urgency of 
scholarly work in tackling how social power is differentiated into economic, cultural, 
and political realms, and perhaps importantly whether or not they are democratic. 
Those realms are integral to water management because they help to create unique 
socio-environmental organization (Swyngedouw 2009). These approaches contrast 
with that of socio-hydrology where the physical is foregrounded over the social. 
 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
 Collins and Evans (2002) note that scientific practices are socially 
constructed, those constructions need to be acknowledged, and science’s privileged 
role in decision-making practices reassessed. Few argue that science is value-free or 
completely objective, since the simple act of choosing variables has some degree of 
implicit bias. In short, data are never free from the theory that leads to their 
selection and interpretation. Transparently incorporating society and its values into 
science’s research and management decision-making is difficult, and can risk social 
alienation and potentially greater environmental crises depending on the chosen 
value inclusions. 
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 Gordon “Jeff” Fassett, current Nebraska DNR Director echoed those ideas to 
some extent in his confirmation hearing before the Nebraska Natural Resources 
Committee. He testified to committing to better science-based decision-making at 
the Nebraska DNR by helping the public understand water science through better 
communication efforts (talking and listening) that validates their concerns and 
priorities about how to manage water (N-NRC 2016). However, values can differ 
among groups and over time, and state statutes require adherence to specific 
behaviors. Simply listening to constituents and educating the public about water 
science is no guarantee of acceptance or value adherence. 
 Water is an ecosystem service (ESS) particularly from an economic 
perspective. Ecosystem services may be the ultimate in the commodification of 
nature. In large part, they are the benefits people derive from ecosystems 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), usually at a cost to an ecosystem. ESS is 
part of the larger socio-ecological system (SES). Machlis et al. (1997) first described 
SES as a human ecosystem for organizing and managing ‘natural’ ecosystems. SES is 
dynamic and adaptive with spatial and functional social, biological, or geographically 
defined boundaries. It integrates bio-geo-physical and social elements with regular 
and sustained activity across time and space at multiple scales, for example, corn, 
climate, soil type, and commodity pricing. These social and ecological systems are 
themselves social constructions. Hydrologists have turned to socio-hydrology as 
means to examine people and water (Sivapalan et al. 2012). Wesselink et al. (2017) 
suggest that socio-hydrology could be construed as a new iteration of SES that places 
water at the system’s forefront as opposed to the social. 
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 From a geographic and spatial perspective, socio-hydrology is one means to 
address and explain the porous human-nature border for water. Hydrologists and 
modelers have begun to explore how dynamic social values can be incorporated into 
hydrological models, so that they adequately represent this relationship. They 
recognize that largely static hydrological models do not fully convey the symbiotic 
nature of people and water, particularly in light of increased water demands, climatic 
changes, and a human influenced water cycle (Elshafei et al. 2015; DiBaldassarre et 
al. 2015; Wheater and Gober 2015; Ceola et al. 2014; Ceola et al. 2016; Pande and 
Sivapalan 2017). Water and people cannot be untangled. Socio-hydrology provides 
an opportunity to delve into how social behaviors impact water, and how the 
hydrological system drives social perceptions of water, its use, and its management. 
 
SOCIO-HYDROLOGY   
 Socio-hydrology is an emerging field of hydrological study that considers the 
social and spatial organization of people around water in the landscape; further it 
envisions a co-evolution of people and water that uses observations, understanding, 
and prediction to blend two complex and dynamic systems into a single, elaborate 
coupled model (Sivapalan et al. 2012; Sivapalan et al. 2014; Troy et al. 2015). Early 
research included theoretical discussions, critiques, modeling trade-offs, water 
management, community preferences, globalization, climate, and other factors that 
contribute to water demands and water management via hydrological modeling 
(Lane et al. 2013; Lane 2014; Blair and Buytaert 2016; Mount et al. 2016; Pandi and 
Sivapalan 2017). While there is an acknowledged need to incorporate water 
management decision-making and social preferences (Troy et al. 2015; Chen et al. 
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2016; and Cosgrove and Loucks 2015), actually including those scenarios within 
hydrological computational models is difficult, so proxy data such as population 
growth or land use have sufficed to date. Troy et al. (2015) support the basic 
hypothesis of socio-hydrology as a system of two-way feedbacks, where actions in 
one realm, hydrology, directly impacts the other realm, society, and vice versa-
thereby creating a co-evolution system. Sivapalan et al. (2014) support 
interdisciplinary collaboration with a use-inspired science approach to address water 
problems that utilizes two-way coupling or feedbacks. 
 According to Sivapalan et al. (2014, 226), socio-hydrology has three goals: 
(1) analyze multiscale, space-time patterns and dynamics of socio-hydrologic 
processes and interpret them in terms of underlying structural features of 
biophysical and human systems and their interactions;  
(2) explain and interpret socio-hydrologic responses in terms of outcomes 
relevant to human well-being, and discern possible future scenarios of their 
evolution; and  
(3) understand the meaning and value of water as a culturally, politically, and 
economically embodied resource necessary to human life, and to do so in a 
manner that explicitly accounts for biophysical and human interactions. 
 
They further envision the goals as a three-part organizational framework of structure 
and dynamics, outcomes in terms of well-being, and values and norms (Figure 2.2). 
Sivapalan et al. (2012) argue for the inclusion of social components like economics, 
technology, and norms to explain water sustainability problems that remain 
unsolved without social inputs.  They advocate three approaches for future research: 
historical socio-hydrology (time), comparative socio-hydrology (space), and process 
socio-hydrology. Historical approaches examine past practices both near and far that 
provide insights about governance and technologies. Comparative approaches look 
at similarities and differences between places emphasizing climate-landscape-
 26 
human controls in order to understand process and temporal dynamics. Process 
approaches would emphasize causal relationships as a compliment to historical and 
comparative research. It is an inquiry focused on the human-water co-evolution and 
emergent patterns. My research falls within goal three and historical socio-hydrology 
for the Republican River basin irrigation districts, since I am focused on 
understanding the human relationships that shape the water perception and 
management landscape. 
 
Figure 2.2. Socio-Hydrology Organization Framework. Based on Sivapalan et al. 
(2014, 226) (Author). 
 
 One challenge to any socio-hydrology model is predicting system response 
times — in other words, how long does it take for the hydrological or the social 
system to respond to a change, and what will that response be. Response times have 
temporal and spatial components. Some are long periods of time with expansive 
areas such as increasing daily minimum temperatures, while other responses can 
occur quickly at a smaller scale like localized flooding. System responses can be 
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simultaneously both known and unknown such as a slope’s angle of repose 
(DiBaldassare, Brandimarte, and Beven 2016). If, as the socio-hydrology hypothesis 
suggests, there are two-way feedbacks, calculating an algorithm and designing a 
model to represent those relationships is no easy task because each system interacts 
and responds to the other (Troy et al. 2015). Furthermore, social decisions and 
responses can happen quickly and may be hard to predict. 
 
ATTENTION AND RESEARCH 
 Hydrosociology, coined by world-renowned hydrologist Malin Falkenmark, is 
part of the human-water co-evolution dynamic. It clarified the need for a more 
diverse approach to water planning and management in both the social and water 
realm (Falkenmark 1979). She and co-authors developed and defined issues that 
have continued and expanded as research avenues such as water scarcity, blue 
(liquid) water and green (moisture in soil) water, the Falkenmark index (or water 
stress index), and policy implications for land-water-ecosystem nexuses 
(Falkenmark 1977, 1979; Falkenmark, Lundqvist, and Widstrand 1989; Falkenmark 
and Rockstrom 2004, 2006; Rockstrom et al. 2009). As a member of the U.N. 
Millennium Project for 2002-2006 she was noted for work that tied climate, water 
use, technology, and water management to the number of people a society can 
support (U.N. Millennium Project 2006).  
 Bellie Sivakumar (2011) highlights water conflict and cooperation with the 
intent of drawing attention to resolving current and future water crises in light of 
increasing water demands and inadequate management practices. Developing new 
methods and techniques for planning and management that compliment effective 
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practices are critical particularly in light of water consumption and transboundary 
river basins, for example. Better water education and laws, political and economic 
factors, and strong communication tools that use accessible language for 
stakeholders, particularly those outside the scientific community, are necessary to 
resolve water conflict and improve water cooperation. 
 Those proposing interdisciplinary inclusion for addressing and managing 
solutions to water demands in diverse regions, climates, and societies include Malin 
Falkenmark and partners for water scarcity and ecohydrology among many others 
(Falkenmark 1977, 1979; Falkenmark, Lundqvist, and Widstrand 1989; Falkenmark 
and Rockstrom 2004, 2006; Rockstrom et al. 2009), Elinor Ostrom and colleagues, 
who use a polycentric governance approach (Dietz et al. 2003; Cox et al. 2010; 
Ostrom 2010a, 2010b), Kate Brauman and collaborators, who use an ecosystem 
services approach (Brauman et al. 2007; Foley et al. 2011; Brauman, Siebert, and 
Foley 2013), and resource management and law perspectives from Tanya Heikkila 
and Edella Schlager and peers (Matthews 2005; Dellapenna 2007; Harse 2009; 
Heikkila et al. 2011; Katz and Moore 2011; Rose 2011; Schlager and Heikkila 2011; 
Schlager et al. 2012; Ward 2013; Agrawal 2014).  
 The International Association of Hydrological Sciences (IAHS) called for a 
scientific decade, “Panta Rhei — everything flows” for 2013-2022. It emphasizes 
developing hydrological models that can account for human impacts in drainage 
basins, encourages hydrologists to examine more closely social system impacts on 
hydrology like socio-economics, and sets scientific targets such as estimation and 
prediction, with the aid of key scientific questions that include where are our 
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knowledge gaps for hydrologic change, among a number of other goals (Montanari et 
al. 2013; Mount et al. 2016).  
 The American Geophysical Union’s Water Resources Research group followed 
up the IAHS call and presented five articles, “Debates — perspectives on socio-
hydrology” (Montanari 2015) that began addressing Panta Rhei goals. The 
centerpiece is an article by DiBaldassarre et al. (2015) that examines social choice 
relative to flood hazards and specific methods to predict future behaviors — a socio-
hydrological approach. Responses to their proposed methods come from Loucks 
(2015), Gober and Wheater (2015), Sivapalan (2015), and Troy et al. (2015) who all 
address the need for social inclusion, while at the same time noting the difficulty 
associated with including human behavior, social choice, and values. My research 
emphasizes identifying the social variables that influence water management 
decisions in the Republican River basin, and more broadly for other regional 
applications.  
 DiBaldassarre et al. (2016) follow the previous work and discuss the role that 
lack of knowledge, or uncertainty, plays in human-water dynamics with three 
categories: known unknowns, unknown unknowns, and wrong assumptions. They 
posit that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to clarify human-water 
interactions with known unknowns (we know we don’t know) and wrong 
assumptions, using numerous studies for floods, agriculture, drought, and irrigation 
that have employed interdisciplinary tactics. They point out “that the study of 
human-water systems should first aim to understand and simulate how the human-
water systems actually work, including spontaneous social dynamics, informalities, 
values, and norms” (2016, 1753). Technically they propose a methodology through 
 30 
the use of differential equations that couple social and hydrological data for 
hydrology, demography, technology, and society. They utilize green and technical 
societies to describe social responses, and engage model development that can reflect 
local customs and responses. Green societies are generally responsive to changing 
conditions, exhibiting the adaptation effect, while technical societies use 
technological fixes like dams, as their responses demonstrating the levee (Ciullo et 
al. 2017). In the Republican River basin, residents practice both strategies. After the 
deadly 1935 flood, they employed a technical fix with the construction of dams and 
reservoirs to provide flood protection; associated irrigation districts supplied reliable 
water (Manley 1993). As surface water allocations for irrigation have decreased in 
concert with declining basin streamflows, districts and users have incorporated 
green fixes buy adapting no till field practices and center pivot irrigation to cut costs 
yet maintain productivity. 
           My research is placed in a socio-hydrology rather than hydrosocial perspective. 
Hydrosocial research includes a researcher’s bias towards existing power dynamics 
within a system. Socio-hydrology focuses on interactions and systems with a more 
neutral or objective positioning that I believe better frames my research. My 
dissertation’s purpose is to explore elements of the social environment and how they 
connect to the hydrological environment without pursuing a specific political or 
power agenda, although they are endemic to the basin’s social structure. I do that by 
exploring how Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska use the Republican River Compact’s 
legal guidelines and groundwater model without inclusion of social indicators, such 
as economics that directly impact the irrigation districts. My socially oriented 
research adds a contextual narrative and description of the basin, suggestive of the 
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types of social data and methodology that will be needed for realistic socio-
hydrological representations. It also supports the call for collaborative problem 





THE REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN AND IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 
 
 
 Chapter 3 describes the physical and socio-economic setting of the basin, the 
irrigation districts and their governance, and how Reclamation and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers contribute to the basin’s socio-hydrology. These characteristics 
and actors are windows into the basin’s environment and early development and are 
necessary for understanding the basin’s evolving socio-hydrology.  
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 The basin’s population of over 92,000 people (circa 2016) is expected to 
decline and age, and only 20% age 25 or older have a Bachelor’s degree or more 
(RRCA n.d.c.; U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.; Table 1.1). Because the basin and its 
counties are rural, agriculture is prevalent. The economic impact of those rural 
counties, however, is important to their region and their state. In 2016, Nebraska 
ranked 5th ($7,254 million), Kansas 11th ($4,608 million), and Colorado 27th ($2,294 
million) for agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting’s contribution to their state’s 
GDP according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce 
n.d.; Figure 3.1). Without water economic viability and agricultural production 
would largely cease to exist. There are 2.7 million irrigated acres in the basin; 1.6 
million in Nebraska, 550,000 in Colorado, and 435,000 in Kansas (Brookfield and 
Wilson 2015). Any hydrologic change such as decreased surface water flows ripples 
into legal, economic, and social spheres affecting the basin’s socio-hydrology 
relationships. 
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% POPULATION CHANGE 
(EST. APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 
1, 2016) 
0.6 -2.4 -3.0 -5.6 4.7 
% 65 YEARS AND OLDER 
(JULY 1, 2016)  
18.7 22.6 19.6 27.8 15.2 
BACHELORS DEGREE OR 
MORE, AGE 25+ 
21.5 22 17.7 20.0 29.8 
MEDIAN INCOME 
(2011-2015, 2015 $) 
43,105 55,893 42,931 40,449 53,889 
% PERSONS IN POVERTY 14.1 10.1 11.8 11.2 12.7 
(U.S. Census Bureau Quick Facts n.d.) 
 
 
Figure 3.1. GDP for Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting by U.S. State, 2016 





 The Great Plains of North America rise over 6,500’ in elevation from 1,100’ in 
the east to 7,800’ in the west (USGS n.d.). The Republican River begins at around 
5,000’ in Colorado and terminates at just over 1,000’ when it joins the Smoky Hill 
River to form the Kansas River (USGS n.d.). In Nebraska, the Republican River 
descends from an elevation of 3,600 – 1,400 feet west to east (Condra and Hall 1907, 
8). Proportionally 30% of the basin is located in Kansas, 31% in Colorado, and 39% 
in Nebraska with a total area of 25,018 square miles (NDMC 2010; Figure 3.2). Its 
stream length is 453 miles, the drainage basin area is 16 million acres (NDMC 2010; 
USBR 2016) and the streambed is 200 - 400 feet below the uplands that define the 
valley (Condra and Hall 1907). The basin watershed discharges 395 cubic feet per 
second of surface water near Hardy, Nebraska at the Kansas border (N-NRC 1976). 
Eolian sand, loess, sand and gravel, shale, chalk, and limestone can be found 
throughout much of the region (USDA 2006). 
 Climatologically, the Plains of western Kansas and Nebraska and eastern 
Colorado for the Republican River basin are a combination of B, C, and D climates 
based on temperature and precipitation. The headwaters and far western half of the 
basin fall within a B climate (classed as semi-arid and arid), while the mid- and 
lower-basin fall mostly within a C climate (classed as humid sub-tropical); D 
climates (classed as humid continental) are possible (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.2. The Republican River Basin with the 100th Meridian (Bauer 2017). 
 
 The Republican River is considered a flashy-stream or prairie stream because 
it relies on annual and seasonal precipitation for its streamflow. Other atmospheric 
and climate factors that can impact precipitation and subsequent streamflow include 
dominant air masses, jet stream patterns, oceanic circulation, and atmospheric 
oscillations as part of a teleconnected system. These large-scale conditions create 
climatic and physical borders at the local scale that impact the basin’s agricultural 
economy. 
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Figure 3.3. U.S. Köppen Climate Zones (NOAA n.d.b.). 
 
 The remainder of the chapter describes the irrigation districts, their 
governance, and the role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter Corps) and 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, relative to the three irrigation districts. Reclamation 
and the Corps oversee large areas of the Great Plains and its watersheds that include 
the Republican River. These two federal agencies have a vested interest in 
infrastructure, policies, and regional water decisions. The Nebraska and Kansas 
Bostwick and Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation Districts are part of Reclamation, so 
its development is an important component of the basin’s socio-hydrology. 
 
THE IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 
 The Nebraska and Kansas Bostwick and Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation 
Districts inhabit a near contiguous narrow strip of the river valley and bottoms that 
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are conducive to surface water irrigation (Figure 3.4). Socially they are rural foci for 
the basin’s regional identity, offering steadfast agricultural characteristics and 
economic stability (Griggs 2017). The three districts’ infrastructure and functionality 
are a social adaptation to the basin’s environmental conditions of its climate, soils, 
and hydrology. For the agricultural growers of the basin, the districts are water 
commodified and water’s market-value culture (Sherow 1990). 
Figure 3.4. Republican River Basin, U.S. Highway 34, west of Cambridge, NE, 
irrigation canal in the foreground (Author). 
 
FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE DIVISION 
  Located in southwestern Nebraska, the Frenchman-Cambridge Division 
(FCID) is the western most district. It began in 1947 under the Pick-Sloan Plan; its 
dams and canals were completed by 1964 (USBR 2017b; Figure 3.5). It was the first 
completed Nebraska Reclamation project. There are a total of four major storage 
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dams on tributaries and the Republican River’s main stem. The division includes 
three irrigation districts: Frenchman Valley, Hitchcock and Red Willow (H&RW), 
and Frenchman-Cambridge (USBR 2017b). Reclamation maintains water storage use 
permits at its reservoirs for the district, and FCID contributes to the maintenance of 
the dams (Brad Edgerton FCID Manager pers. comm. 2016; USBR 2017b). 
The district is largely linear for 110 miles varying in width from one to three 
miles (Bell n.d.). Its four major canals travel 156 miles helping subsurface water 
return flows for Harlan County Lake (HCL) and to stabilize groundwater (FCID 
n.d.). The four major dams located west to east — Enders, Swanson, Hugh Butler, 
and Harry Strunk — provide water for up to 66,090 irrigated acres along the 
Republican River and Frenchman and Red Willow Creeks; approximately 45,000 
acre-feet of water (USBR 2017b). The Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District 
holds natural flow irrigation water permits for nearly 46,000 acres and has 41 direct 
flow permits, the oldest from December 22, 1890 to the newest November 13, 1987. 
With those permits the district is able to divert up to 531.5 cubic feet per second of 
natural flow as long as there is streamflow in the river (FCID n.d.); it is equivalent to 
1,054 acre feet/day or 385,044 acre feet/year. If surface flows are inadequate, water 
releases from the Division’s dams go directly into the streams and are then diverted 
to canals (Brad Edgerton FCID manager pers. comm. 2016; USBR 2017b). Some 
growers are able to access groundwater to supplement surface water as needed (Brad 
Edgerton FCID manager pers. comm. 2016). 
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Figure 3.5. Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District (FCID n.d.). 
 
BOSTWICK DIVISION  
 The Bostwick Division occupies south central Nebraska and north central 
Kansas and includes Harlan County Dam and Lake (built by Corps) and Lovewell 
Dam and Reservoir (built by Reclamation; Figure 3.6). The Nebraska portion is 
known as NBID, Nebraska Bostwick Irrigation District, and the Kansas portion as 
KBID, Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District. It contains one diversion dam (Superior-
Courtland), and six pumping plants plus canals, laterals, and drains. The system 
serves up to 86,240 irrigated acres in Nebraska and Kansas with another 18,000 
potential acres primarily in Kansas. System construction repayment plans by 
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irrigation districts and their members were in place by 1951, and projects were 
completed by 1957. Water for the division is stored in HCL and Lovewell Reservoir. 
HCL has a 193,000 acre-feet irrigation capacity, and Lovewell’s 24,930 acre-feet 
conservation pool provides irrigation water for KBID; both districts use water from 
HCL (USBR 2017b). NBID was the second completed state Reclamation project for 
Nebraska, and KBID was Kansas’s fourth completed state project (USBR 2017b). 
Figure 3.6. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Bostwick Division. Nebraska and Kansas 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 1957). 
 
 NBID has up to 20,492 irrigation acres, and includes two units (Franklin and 
Superior-Courtland). The Kansas portion has up to 62,000 acres for irrigation and 
one unit, the Courtland Canal (USBR 2017b). However, the number of actual 
irrigated acres is lower due to state water rights and certified permits (Tracy Smith 
NBID manager and Jared Giles KBID manager pers. comm. 2017; Table 3.2). 
Reclamation holds the water storage use permits for both districts at HCL and 
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Lovewell. It has contracts with both NBID and KBID to deliver irrigation water as 
needed when there is not enough natural flow (USBR 2017b; Mike Delka NBID 
manager pers. comm. 2016; Tracy Smith NBID manager and Jared Giles KBID 
manager pers. comm. 2017). 
 
Table 3.2. Pick-Sloan Program, Republican River Divisions 
 BOSTWICK 
NEBRASKA 





22,455 43,500 45,669 






Enders, Swanson, Hugh 
Butler, and Harry Strunk 





~97 miles ~260 miles ~421.7 miles 
*Not including Frenchman Valley or Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Districts. 
**On an annual basis districts may irrigate fewer acres. (U.S. Supreme Court 2012; Brad 
Edgerton FCID manager, Jared Giles KBID manager, and Tracy Smith NBID manager, 
pers. comm. 2017) 
 
 There is an improved understanding of the basin’s hydrology since the 
Republican River Compact’s origination along with improved technology. Both 
districts continue to use surface flows and stored water from HCL and Lovewell, but 
some NBID members are able to access groundwater sources because they occupy 
hydrologically advantageous locations over portions of the High Plains Aquifer 
(Figure 3.7). The KBID location at the far eastern end of the basin does not have the 
same groundwater access and the division is totally reliant on surface water flows 
from Nebraska (Jared Giles KBID manager pers. comm. 2016). At times those 
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surface flows may be augmented from Nebraska’s N-CORPE project, but are not 
available to NBID because they are used by Nebraska to meet their Kansas Compact 
water obligation (Mike Delka NBID manager pers. comm. 2016; RRCA n.d.c.). N-
CORPE is a Nebraska augmentation management plan developed for surface flows in 
response to Kansas’s litigation. Western and up-basin Nebraska groundwater 
pumping and subsequent declining tributary surface flows means less inflow to HCL 
and potentially less Compact water for either Bostwick districts. KBID’s share of 
water in the Courtland Canal comes from HCL, so they are at greater risk of 
diminished quantities (U.S. Supreme Court 2012; Griggs 2017; NDNR n.d.). 
 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT GOVERNANCE 
 Notably there are nine direct agencies or actors connected with water 
management, delivery, infrastructure maintenance, and operations, and surpluses 
and deficits for the three irrigation districts. Depending on environmental and 
political circumstances, their influence and power can be amplified or muffled by 
other actors and agencies. As an example, technical innovation gave rise to 
groundwater access and pumping in the basin beginning in the 1950s with rapid 
expansion into the 1970s. The growth of groundwater access shifted political 
influence away from surface irrigators and the Bureau of Reclamation and to 
groundwater irrigators (Aiken 1980). Surface water irrigators make up only 10% of 
the basin, tipping political power to the 90% of groundwater irrigators (Figure 3.8). 
In Nebraska, Natural Resource Districts and their governance boards regulate 
groundwater and appear to have greater influence than do the surface water 
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Figure 3.7. The High Plains Aquifer and the Republican River Basin. The Kansas 
Bostwick Irrigation District is in the only area without access to the High Plains 
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irrigation districts with their federal Compact affiliation (Frenchman-Cambridge 
Irrigation District v. Heineman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1264, D. Neb., No. 12-00445). A 
simplified relational diagram is found in Figure 3.9. These relationships are 
important because they contribute to an understanding of the basin’s socio-
hydrology. The relationships move backwards, forwards, or jump over actors to 
achieve desired outcomes, thereby spotlighting the basin’s governance complexity. 
 
Figure 3.8. Nebraska Irrigated Acres, Republican River Basin (NDNR 2017). 
 
 
 All the irrigation districts are political subdivisions of their states. Each has a 
district manager or superintendent, a three-member Board of Directors elected on a 
rotating basis, and landowner irrigation district members. Directors and district 
members must own classified irrigable acres within the district. The superintendent 
has management authority for service and personnel, and advises the board. 
Districts are funded by assessed levies for classified irrigated acres that are paid with 
property taxes. They hold the surface water rights, and deliver irrigation water to 
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their members when requested (Kansas Statutes Chapter 42, Nebraska Revised 
Statutes Chapter 46). The districts were developed in part to leverage irrigation 
potential within their state and provide economic stability to their agricultural 
communities via Reclamation and the Pick-Sloan Program. The stated mission for 
KBID is clear: “Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District No. 2 is to deliver the precious 
resource of water to our irrigators and agricultural producers in the most cost 
effective, efficient, and conservation minded way possible within the affordable 
limits of available modern technology” (KBID n.d.). 




The Republican River Compact (Federal Statute) 
US Army Corps of Engineers and US Bureau of Reclamation Federal Agencies  
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska State Legislatures 
Republican River Water Conservation District (CO), Division of Water Resources (KS), 
Department of Natural Resources (NE), Natural Resource Districts (NE) 
Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation District; Bostwick Irrigation District, Nebraska;  
Bostwick Irrigation District #2, Kansas 
Advisory Boards: Natural Resource Districts, Irrigation Districts, RRCWD 
Irrigation District Members and Users (farmers) 
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HISTORY AND ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE BASIN 
 Because the Republican River basin is in a semi-arid, water scarce 
environment, Reclamation along with state and local actors developed a regional 
water management plan in the form of irrigation divisions and districts. Those 
projects embody in part John Wesley Powell’s vision of the West and how water from 
public lands should be harnessed for the greater economic good based on physical 
surveys and programs that emphasized community cooperation. He supported 
development in the semi-arid and arid West that took a watershed approach, 
forsaking political boundaries. Land parcels should be larger than 160 acres, but 
irrigated acres limited to 80. By using that metric in a water scarce environment, 
agricultural returns could be maximized. As such, he opposed the irrigated 160-acre 
designation for arid western farms connected to Reclamation dams and water 
believing those large acreages would not receive enough water for mature crop 
development (Stegner 1982; Worster 2001). The Republican River districts 
maintained the 160 irrigated-acre limit for its landowner irrigators (USBR 2017d) 
until the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act (Public Law 97-293) that increased acreages 
to 960 (USBR 2015c). Modern technology has made it easier to water 160 acres than 
Powell’s era, but at a cost to the hydrological system. Knowledge of these historical 
relationships and situations help explain the current socio-hydrological realities of 
the basin in physical and social context. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps 





U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 
 The 1902 Newlands Act established the Bureau of Reclamation as part of the 
USGS and later the Department of Interior (Stegner 1982; Worster 2001; Benson 
2011; USBR 2017d; Otstot n.d.). As the name implies, Reclamation’s intent was to 
‘reclaim’ land throughout the arid and semi-arid west that was considered ill-suited 
for settlement or agriculture, primarily through water development projects and 
management (Stegner 1982; Worster 2001). Reclamation addresses water scarcity 
through its mission to “manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in 
an environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the American 
public” (USBR 2017d). Today it oversees Western water for hydropower, fish and 
wildlife, water quality, recreation, water supply, irrigation, and flood control among 
other projects as it shifts to a water management oriented position and away from 
major construction projects (Benson 2011; USBR 2017d; Otstot n.d.). Reclamation’s 
water projects are intended to benefit local nearby water users. Users reimburse the 
government for facility construction like dams and reservoirs, but the federal 
government retains infrastructure ownership (USBR 2017d; Otstot n.d.); the 
Republican River districts fall within this category.  
 Reclamation has five regional divisions in 17 states that include numerous 
dams, power plants, and projects (Benson 2011; USBR 2017d). The Great Plains 
region is the largest and includes all or parts of nine states. The region extends from 
the Canadian border to Texas’ southern tip (Figure 3.10). Within regional borders 
are area offices, divisions, and units that are part of larger Reclamation projects. 
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Figure 3.10. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Regional Divisions. The Republican River 
is part of the Great Plains Division (USBR 2017c). 
 
 Reclamation’s Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin Program encompasses a large 
area of the Great Plains Region and includes the Republican River basin and its 
projects (USBR 2017a; Figure 3.11). Among the three Compact states, there are over 
80 Reclamation projects, primarily in Colorado. In the basin, Colorado and Kansas 
have one apiece and Nebraska has nine (USBR 2015b). The Nebraska-Kansas Area 
Office contains the Bostwick and Frenchman-Cambridge Divisions and their units 
within the Republican River basin (USBR 2017a, 2017b).  
 
PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI RIVER BASIN PROGRAM 
 The 1944 Flood Control Act, also known as the Pick-Sloan Flood Control Act, 
focused specifically on the Missouri River basin region for water conservation, 
control and use. Its origins lie in the cyclical droughts and floods in the region before 
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and during the 1930s. Initially two plans were developed for Congress. The Corps’ 
Pick Plan, named after Col. Lewis A. Pick, followed Corps directives by emphasizing 
flood control and navigation. The Sloan Plan, named after Reclamation’s William G. 
Sloan, focused on irrigation and hydropower. They were reconciled with the 1944 
Flood Control Act, thereby providing for both navigation and irrigation in the larger 
Missouri River basin region (Knutson 2011; USBR 2015a, 2017d; Otstot n.d.; Rucker 
n.d.). 
 The Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin Program focuses on beneficial surface 
water uses such as power, sediment control, water supply, flood control, and 
irrigation (USBR 2017d; Otstot n.d.; Rucker n.d.). Of the original 5.3 million acres 
identified for irrigation in the Missouri River basin, Reclamation has developed only 
550,000 acres; 2.5 million acres were de-authorized and development of the 
remaining 2 million acres is unlikely (Otstot n.d.).  
 The Missouri River Basin’s Reclamation hierarchy starts with the Great Plains 
Region that directs the Pick-Sloan Program and local area offices, who receive 
program and operational leadership from both. The Republican River basin’s local 
area office is the Nebraska-Kansas office in McCook, Nebraska. The Pick-Sloan 
program includes multiple divisions that are often focused on irrigation or other 
water related activity. It assists two divisions in the basin, the Bostwick and the 
Frenchman-Cambridge Divisions. The Nebraska-Kansas Area Office manages those 
divisions and Reclamation’s project water for ~264,000 farmland acres in the 
irrigation divisions, has ~56,000 reservoir surface water acres, and 75,000 acres of 
public use land (USBR 2017b). 
 50 
Figure 3.11. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin Program 
(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of History 1992). 
 
 Environmental conditions including floods, droughts, and insect infestations 
made economic and social order difficult for residents of the basin, as was true 
throughout the Plains states (Sherow 1990; Worster 2001; USBR 2017b). Reliable 
water was one solution to stability and economic survival. The Pick-Sloan Plan and 
its irrigation projects were a means to achieve it. According to the Nebraska-Kansas 
Area Office (USBR 2017b), project benefits include an agriculturally stable economy 
for growers of row crops like corn, alfalfa, silage, wheat, and hay, the elimination of 
crop failure (with available irrigation water), increased crop yields, flood control, and 
recreation. Compared to Kansas Bostwick, the two Nebraska districts have the larger 
share for basin farmland acres at more than 250,000. 
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U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
 The Corps is focused on flood control, its main mission in the Midwest and 
Great Plains, and is a part of the basin’s political and infrastructure system. The 
Republican River is in the largest of the Corps’ eight divisions, the Northwestern or 
Lewis and Clark Division. It contains over one-fourth of the U.S. land mass and 
covers all or part of 14 states and has 35% of the Corps’ water storage capacity 
(Figure 3.12). More broadly, civil projects and management are based on river 
basins, and reflect its flood control and navigation mission (USACE n.d.b.).  
 The Republican and Smoky Hill Rivers meet in Kansas to form the Kansas 
River, a tributary to the Missouri River. The Kansas River helps to maintain Missouri 
River navigation at Kansas City. Harlan County Dam and Lake on the Republican 
River in Nebraska is part of the Corps’ Kansas City District. It is unique compared to 
the Corps other district projects because HCL contributes to and holds water for 
Reclamation’s Bostwick irrigation projects in Nebraska and Kansas. It is the only 
non-Reclamation dam and reservoir in the Republican River basin. Water storage, 
releases and dam control are coordinated between the Corps and Reclamation. Like 
all reservoirs, waters held in HCL are divided into pools such as the dead pool at the 
bottom, the conservation pool in the middle where irrigation water is held, and the 
flood pool near the top (Hotchkiss 2011; USACE 2015). For HCL in particular, 
Reclamation controls the bottom 3 pools and the Corps the top 2. 
 The Corps can trace its history to the Revolutionary War although its formal 
establishment occurred in 1802. Historically they provided civil and military 
infrastructure, but more recently their mission has expanded to include 
environmental issues, including water resources development. That shift can be 
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traced to the 1964 Wilderness Act that moved the Corps away from large-scale water 
and irrigation projects and towards recreation, at the same time maintaining flood 
control. The Wilderness Act also led local beneficiaries of federal projects, like 
irrigators, to take on more infrastructure and fiscal responsibilities and encouraged 
states and other local actors to play a greater role in development and management 
of water projects (USACE n.d.c.; Sabatier et al. 2005). In the Republican River basin, 
it has meant that irrigation districts and their users are responsible for a percentage 
of the costs required for facilities operations and maintenance (Mike Delka NBID 
manager; Brad Edgerton FCID manager; and Jared Giles KBID manager, pers. 
comm. 2016). 
Figure 3.12. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Northwestern Division. The Republican 










 The number of actors in the Republican River basin provides a glimpse of the 
socio-hydrological complexity of the region and its irrigation districts. Power 
dynamics, perceptions of nature, management, shifting consumer demands, 
unpredictable weather and water delivery each have a role in constructing the basin’s 
socio-hydrological profile. How those perceptions and actions have been formed has 
a long history that can be traced to Western writers and thinkers from the ancient 
Greeks and Romans to later and contemporary scholars such as George Perkins 
Marsh, David Lowenthal, and Erik Swyngedouw. No matter the era, people’s 
relationship to and with water remains central to understanding our social and 
hydrological evolution.  Chapter 4 further explores the components of the basin’s 




WATER, LAW, AND THE REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT STATES 
 
 
 To the uninitiated, water is simple. It rains or snows, is absorbed into the soil, 
and fills up streams and lakes. More than any other natural resource, water is one of 
the planet’s most necessary resources. Powered by the Sun’s energy and gravity, the 
hydrologic cycle globally transports and transfers water for people, plants, and 
animals that depend upon a reliable and predictable water source. When those 
sources decline in quantity, degrade in quality, or delivery becomes less dependable, 
people search out other sources through technological innovations, migration, or 
legal agreements such as interstate compacts that safeguard access to water. 
 Understanding the environmental conditions of the Republican River valley 
and its states, types of water, and the laws and policies that developed in response to 
water availability and use is important for constructing a picture of the socio-
hydrological relationships that exist. Chapter 4 provides the canvas upon which 
those relationships can be placed in temporal and spatial context. The first section 
begins with an overview of the region and basin’s physical characteristics, its 
settlement, and need for water. Second, three different types of water rights and 
their origin are discussed; they can apply to both surface and groundwater. Third, 
because groundwater was not well understood until later, a separate section details 
its history, types of use, and various restrictions. Fourth, each Republican River 
Compact state’s water history and legal evolution is overviewed. Specific details 
about state statutes that inform water policies and practices are found here; these are 
not exhaustive, merely representative of major water events. Fifth, the origin of 
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interstate water compacts is discussed along with how the Compact fits within the 
federalist system while maintaining their Compact commitment. The conclusion 
points to challenges including population changes and governance issues that will 
require the basin states to carefully assess their resources and associated future 
water demands. 
 
HISTORICAL AND CLIMATIC CONTEXT 
 On the Great Plains and in the American West, water plays a significant 
climatic role. Consider the regional precipitation distribution. Weather systems 
travel from the west eastward over the Rocky Mountains, creating lush windward 
regions on western slopes and dry leeward rain shadows on eastern slopes and the 
Great Plains. On the Plains, precipitation becomes less predictable, especially west of 
the 100th meridian, a common demarcation for the 20” (51 cm) isohyet and tilled 
agriculture; the 98th meridian is also used (Bleed1 1993; Schlager and Heikkila 2011). 
The Great Plains western corridor annually receives 20” (51 cm), while the eastern 
corridor’s annual average is 36” (91 cm); in both locations 80% occurs in the fall and 
spring (Bicek 2002). Less than 20” often requires supplemental water often from 
irrigation (Griggs 2012; Figure 4.1). The spatial distribution and large drainage 
basins of major western rivers gives some hint of the region’s precipitation pattern, 
and its impact on Plains and Western water use and law.  
                                                   
1 Ann Bleed served as the state hydrologist, Deputy Director, Acting Director, and 
Director for the Nebraska DNR from 1998-2008. 
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Figure 4.1. U.S. Annual Precipitation, 1961-1990 (National Atlas of the United 
States 1970). 
 
 The 1862 Homestead and 1877 Desert Land Acts encouraged more migration 
and settlement in the Great Plains (Figure 4.2). Migrants brought with them eastern 
agricultural practices, crops, and their water needs. As they traveled onto the Central 
and High Plains and made greater incursions to the mountainous interior, reliable 
water grew scarce. Rivers were infrequent, wells were expensive, snow pack and 
storms were unpredictable, and the climate itself was more hostile that its eastern  
counterpart. Despite claims that the rain follows the plow, the enticement of free 
land, Gilpin’s assertions of effortless agriculture via artesian and underground water, 
plus other beguiling shenanigans (Stegner 1982; Manley 1993; Griggs 2012), settlers 
found the reality somewhat different. William Gilpin, with 25 years of experience in 
 57 
the West and the Colorado Territory’s first governor, was a fervent promoter of 
westward expansion even though much of what he advocated was inconsistent with 
western reality (Stegner 1982). John Wesley Powell was one of the few to refute 
Gilpin’s and others’ claims about the West with scientific data and personal 
experience (Stegner 1982), but for those choosing to materialize the country’s 
manifest destiny, water would be a necessity. Regardless of motivations and desires, 
some habits are hard to relinquish. Agriculturally what worked in the east was not 
going to work in the semi-arid and arid West (Stegner 1982).  
 




 Ioris (2013) argues that it is the socio-natural interdependencies and the 
historical and geographic routes chosen by people that have shaped water valuation. 
People prioritize routes that give them access to water. They convey greater value to 
routes that follow rivers especially in semi-arid and arid regions over those that do 
not. On the Great Plains those routes would include the Oregon, Mormon, and 
California Trails that paralleled the Missouri, Platte, Sweetwater, Snake, and 
Humboldt Rivers that blazed their own trails through the plains and mountains. 
While some migrants would stay the trails’ entire course to their final destination, 
others would find and settle intermediary places near or along tributaries. Those 
choices and results are “a political statement that synthesizes mechanisms of 
cooperation and competition between individuals and social groups for the 
allocation, use and conservation of water” (Ioris 2013, 323). As someone who 
promoted water cooperation, Powell would have supported Ioris’ conclusion. The 
1902 Newlands Act and the Bureau of Reclamation’s establishment applied the ideas 
of water cooperation and competition to help manage the West’s water (Stegner 
1982). The Bureau of Reclamation itself was established in part to turn perceived 
fruitless lands of the Great Plains and West into productive agricultural holdings 
with the help of dependable water from federal water storage and delivery projects 
(Stegner 1982; Manley 1993; Worster 2001). With later exceptions like the 
groundwater boom, communities and Reclamation projects shadow those early trails 
along the rivers and their offshoots. They assign value and power to the region’s 
water, visibly marking the landscape. 
 Great Plains and Western states’ water policies and laws evolved due to one, 
previous experiences in and with Eastern water laws and customs, and two, local 
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circumstances such as climate, water scarcity, and mining that could be at odds with 
Eastern choices. Legal rulings and jurisdictional control could either follow Eastern 
riparian practices or incorporate new practices. For the Great Plains states of Kansas 
and Nebraska, settlement typically occurred on their eastern half first, where water is 
somewhat more reliable. Applying Eastern riparian rights (creating water diversions 
on land adjacent to a water course) seemed logical, as did using the 100th meridian as 
a precipitation border between a wetter east and drier west (Griggs 2012). The 1944 
Flood Control Act used the 98th meridian, and others used a north-south transect 
through Kansas City for political water borders (Dellapenna 2004; USBR 2016). 
However, the western half of the Great Plains states developed a new methodology 
for dealing with water, prior appropriation. Here water rights are prioritized by 
earliest usage date and can be traced to the California and Colorado gold rushes, 
diffusing west to east as the interior became more settled. In some ways, the 100th 
meridian became a border for not just water but water policy. I discuss both riparian 
and prior appropriation water rights in the next section. 
 Today, U.S. states may have a combination of riparian, prior appropriation, or 
other water rights frameworks for both surface and groundwater as property that can 
result in complicated water laws, interpretations, and applications (Zellmer and 
Harder 2007; Craig 2012).  
 
TYPES OF WATER RIGHTS 
 Whether surface or groundwater, water on the earth’s surface is subjected to 
social control through laws and policies and the use of dams, canals, and subsurface 
pumping. Water quantity fluctuates spatially and temporally requiring users to 
 60 
address excesses and shortages, as is the case with contested interstate compacts 
(Zellmer and Harder 2007; Craig 2012; Griggs 2017), as well as among individuals 
and others with conflicting water rights. Understanding how water regulation 
changed from Eastern riparian rights to Western prior appropriation rights is 
important for understanding the Republican River basin’s socio-hydrology. 
 Water and water rights are closely tied to how water is defined hydrologically 
and legally. Except in Texas, groundwater belongs to a state and its citizens, and the 
use of water can be granted to individuals, companies, or municipalities as a private 
property right. State legislatures enact water laws that are implemented and 
enforced by state agencies that issue water use permits under specified guidelines. 
 The U.S. states’ surface and groundwater water laws function under one of 
three systems: riparian, prior appropriation, and hybrid. According to Getches 
(2009), twenty-nine states use a version of riparian rights, nine states are subject to 
prior appropriation including Colorado, and ten states use a hybrid system that 
works toward integrating older riparian practices with newer appropriation 
methods, including Nebraska.  
 
RIPARIAN WATER RIGHTS 
 Riparian rights focus on land adjacent primarily to streams, where owners of 
riparian land have the right to divert water onto the property, use it for beneficial use 
including irrigation, and are responsible for reasonable use. Riparian users cannot 
cause harm to other rights holders regardless of regular or naturally diminished 
flows, upstream or downstream (Aiken 2003a; Peck 2007; Getches 2009; Jones and 
Cech 2009; Craig 2012). Some water storage is possible with small dams and ponds 
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as long as it meets a state’s reasonable use standards (Getches 2009). The courts 
have addressed reasonable use standards (Graham 1992; Dellapenna 2013). 
Watershed limitations restrict transfer of riparian water outside its natural 
boundaries, although states can make exceptions (Getches 2009). Even though 
Nebraska is a prior appropriation state, it is currently pursuing the possibility of 
transferring excess Platte River riparian surface flows during floods into the 
Republican River basin as a means to both store water and have water on hand for 
Kansas (Potter 2017; Raun 2017a). Riparian rights are impacted by population 
increases and associated water demands, affecting change in statutory regulations 
that manage the public’s water interests. Riparian rights can also be lost, but usually 
not from non-use, rather time limits, permit regulations, or eminent domain seizures 
(Aiken 2003a; Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009). While these rights are effective 
in the East, they are not practical west of the 100th meridian with less surface water 
reliability, so a new method evolved, prior appropriation.  
 
PRIOR APPROPRIATION WATER RIGHTS 
 Prior appropriation rights focus on initial time of use, the “first in time, first 
in right” doctrine; the quantity of water being diverted; and actual water application 
for beneficial use. These rights differ from riparian water rights because the property 
receiving water is not required to be adjacent to the stream. Hess (1916) and others 
documented this American practice to the 1848 California gold fields and miners 
who desired some protection for their mineral claims. 
The objects of the codes of the early Californians…were to secure, 
within practical limits, equality of right and opportunity in acquiring 
and operating mines, and to define justifiable property in natural 
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resources. To best accomplish this, he was made first in right of 
property who was first in time of possession, and his utilization of 
that right gave him a valid claim against all others except the nation. 
Discovery, followed by appropriation, was recognized as sanction of 
title, and a specific measure of use or development of the property 
thus acquired was requisite to its retention (4). (Emphasis in the 
original) 
 
Diverted water as a natural resource became part of the mining claim, as long as it 
and the other resources were beneficially and continuously used. Eventually water 
applied for agricultural production came under the same code. The code allowed 
senior and junior rights holders to be identified and resources allocated, setting up 
winners and losers especially during low surface flow periods and extended 
droughts. Water rights owners can sell their rights and buy others that may be more 
favorable, since the water right is not attached to the overlaying property or land. 
The 1877 Desert Land Act, that prioritized state water laws, and California’s 
interpretation that federal land sold to private individuals included the federal water 
rights strengthened prior appropriation practices in western states (Getches 2009; 
Jones and Cech 2009).  
 Like riparian water rights, appropriation water rights can be lost due to failure 
to meet statutory permit requirements. They are generally defined as a property 
right with the following attributes: a priority date, a use quantity, a specific point of 
diversion, a specific place of use, and specific type of use such as irrigation. The first 
two attributes are fixed, and the latter three can be changed subject to state law 
requirements (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; Griggs 2017). In some states 
and instances, riparian rights have been merged into appropriation rights as vested 
rights, that is the riparian rights predate an appropriation rights statute, as is the 
case in Kansas (Getches 2009). 
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 Created water, or water beyond what naturally occurs from precipitation for 
example, can come from pumped groundwater for a trans-basin diversion or 
transfer, for example. Water in excess of natural flow can be used without restriction 
by the entity that generated it. As an example, Nebraska uses supplemental 
groundwater from its N-CORPE project (pumped groundwater) to enhance surface 
flows in the Republican River to meet Compact compliance and make sure that 
Kansas receives its allocation (Hendee 2016; Griggs 2017; N-CORPE 2017). 
 
HYBRID WATER RIGHTS 
 Hybrid water law systems merge riparian and appropriation practices to 
reflect their state’s historical and contemporary water uses. Most states using hybrid 
systems began with riparian rules, but they eventually adapted prior appropriation 
rights to include riparian components, blending the water philosophies together. 
There is no single doctrine for states using hybrid systems. Depending on a state’s 
laws, hybrid systems may or may not work well in places that have climatic and 
physical characteristics that reflect arid and wet regimes within a single political 
border. California, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have hybrid systems based on 
their states’ beliefs about how land and water rights are or are not connected. 
However, Colorado and other states have contended that one, water law is a state 
issue, two, federal patent, or land, has no riparian rights within a state because state 
water law overrules federal practice, and three, land and water rights are conjoined 
with federal land sales, so if federal land is sold it includes the water right (Getches 
2009). The 1866 Mining Act and 1870 Placer Act clarified that vested and accrued 
appropriation rights as state law per local customs and laws were valid. Each state is 
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free to determine how riparian rights can be validated and used before new state 
appropriation statutes take effect (Getches 2009).  
 Hybrid systems face four challenges. First, riparian rights can require 
continuous flow while appropriation depends on water used. Second, courts have 
struggled with hybrid systems during shortages when riparian users are required to 
cut their use, senior appropriators take their full entitlement, and junior rights 
holders carry the loss burden (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009). Nebraska does 
allow for competing riparian and appropriation legal challenges based on 
reasonableness and the 1895 Nebraska Irrigation Act (Getches 2009). Third, senior 
riparian dates are typically earlier than appropriation dates because of newer statute 
implementation dates, putting junior appropriators at the most risk (Getches 2009; 
Jones and Cech 2009). Fourth, riparian rights must be part of a stream’s final 
determination of water rights, including past used and unused riparian rights, 
although states can make exceptions to un-used rights (Getches 2009; Griggs 2017). 
In the Republican River basin, Nebraska has hybrid water policies, while Colorado 
and Kansas use prior appropriation for both surface and groundwater. 
 
GROUNDWATER 
 Groundwater presents a unique situation since it has been difficult to access 
through time, and it is invisible to most people. Because surface water is easily 
visible and easily available, surface water laws developed first. The previous section 
discussed types of state water laws that pertain to surface and groundwater. 
However, groundwater development requires greater scrutiny, particularly as it 
relates to Western water compacts, surface water, and irrigation. 
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 Western federal statues were in favor of groundwater prior appropriation by 
the early 1870s (Hess 1916; Getches 2009). Colorado (1876) and Wyoming (1889) 
included prior appropriation in their constitutions and six other western states have 
either constitutional or statutory elements for it (Peck 1995, 2007; Getches 2009; 
Jones and Cech 2009). Since many of the western states had longstanding local 
practices that endorsed prior appropriation, its inclusion was logical and reasonable 
to ensure and maintain rights currently afforded a state’s residents. 
 Today groundwater in the Republican River basin plays a larger role than it 
did when the Compact was written, when all growers in the basin were primarily 
surface water irrigators or dry land farmers. The three Compact states face problems 
noted by Craig (2012) for unlimited use and storage, proportional use, identifying 
hydrological connections, and exacerbated aquifer depletion. These take the form of 
augmentation plans, reservoir use and storage, Compact allocations, the Republican 
River Compact Administration groundwater model, and groundwater pumping. 
Science and technology have allowed growers to tap groundwater in uplands that 
were once inaccessible or too expensive for drilling irrigation wells. Poorly 
understood hydrological connections are now under scrutiny (Bentall and Shaffer 
1979; Harnsberger and Thorson 1984; Moody et al. 1989; Aiken 2006; McGuire 
2009; Konikow 2013; Castle et al. 2014; KGS n.d.).  
 As a result of these changes and increased water use, tensions between surface 
water and groundwater users exist, as do inconsistent water regulations and 
management. Understanding the origin of groundwater and the laws that govern it is 
helpful for discussing the basin’s past, present, and future water uses. 
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GROUNDWATER SOURCES AND EXTRACTION 
 Two zones, the zone of aeration, basically soil, and the zone of saturation, 
basically rock, have a role with groundwater. Each of the two zones stores water and 
overlaps to some degree with the other; each has varying degrees of porosity, 
permeability, and gravitational resistance. Some groundwater can be in the zone of 
aeration, but the majority is found in the zone of saturation due to gravity; water 
typically percolates down through the zone of aeration. The water table is a 
commonly identified border that marks the point where the pores in the zone of 
aeration or saturation are “full” and the water pressure and atmospheric pressure are 
equal. The water table fluctuates depending on the amount of water in the ground at 
any particular time and the local geology and topography. Aquifers are usually below 
the water table and within the zone of saturation in areas that are permeable. Their 
access depends on location and geologic conditions like an aquiclude that can 
prohibit easy water transport. Water makes it way to an aquifer during its formation 
or by rainfall and snowmelt. In the later cases, those sources recharge the aquifer, 
adding water to it (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; DeBlij et al. 2013; Korus et 
al. 2013; Marshak 2013). If water in an aquifer is extracted by groundwater pumping, 
it can be replaced by water percolating back in over time, or recharging it. Hutchins 
defined groundwater water rights “as all water in the ground that is free to move by 
gravity, is capable of being extracted from the ground, and is susceptible of practical 
legal control. Necessarily excluded from this category is subsurface water that is not 
free to enter wells” (1955, 157). 
 Intensive groundwater well use can negatively impact aquifer volume. Wells 
are used to access groundwater for economic reasons like municipal water use or 
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agricultural irrigation (Figure 4.3). Drilling and maintaining wells are expensive 
operations depending on well depth, ongoing use, and costs. Prior to the 1950s when 
wells were often hand dug to shallow aquifers, the advent of high capacity pumps 
accessing deep aquifers allowed irrigation systems such as center pivots to flourish 
and deliver more water more efficiently than windmills (Manley 1993; Schafer 1993; 
Kromm 2011; Korus et al. 2013).  
 Pumping water from wells creates a cone of depression or influence where 
water is absent until it is replaced. Depending on physical factors, geological 
conditions, and well distribution, cones can impact other users, reduce available 
water, cause subsidence, or salt water contamination (Getches 2009; DeBlij et al. 
2013; Korus et al. 2013; Marshak 2013). How many users have access to an aquifer is 
important because withdrawals may or may not be regulated, and the impact on 
individual users will vary, as will incentives for sustainable use (Figure 4.4). 
 In many states, water falls within the public trust doctrine for its residents. As 
long as they abide by the state’s rules and regulations, people can use the water. The 
challenge presented by groundwater is balancing its sustainability against its use, so 
that the resource is not degraded or depleted to such a degree that it can no longer be 
used as a private property right. In the case of agricultural production and 
groundwater irrigation, less water due to aquifer declines could result in increased 




Figure 4.3. U.S. Irrigation Surface and Groundwater Withdrawals, 2010 (USGS 
2016a). 
 
 Aquifer increases and declines are based on their physical location, geology, 
and seasonal activity. A group of hydrologically connected aquifers is known as a 
groundwater basin. Groundwater basins may be connected to a stream, and 
groundwater withdrawals can affect streamflow. Additionally, the groundwater is 
considered a tributary to the stream (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; DeBlij et 
al. 2013; Marshak 2013). If withdrawals exceed recharge rates, the aquifer’s ability to 
maintain historical levels is compromised, and natural recharge may not be enough 
(Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; Korus et al. 2013). For the Republican River 
and Compact, the hydrological connectivity between streamflow and 
groundwater/aquifer are critical to individual rights, state statutes, and state 
allocations. The RRCA’s Groundwater Model assesses stream base flows and 
connectivity of groundwater withdrawals (RRCA n.d.a.). It provides a means for the 
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states to monitor streamflow and aquifer rates, so that each state can adjust their 
water behaviors appropriately to maintain compliance. Model development was a 
response to the 1998 lawsuit against Nebraska alleging water over use, especially 
groundwater, and the impact it had on surface flows to Kansas for KBID. 
 
Figure 4.4. Cone of Depression Impacts (USGS 2016b). 
 
LAWS, LIABILITY, PERMITS, AND LIMITS 
 Groundwater rights can be one of three types: prior appropriation rights, 
reasonable use or correlative rights, and rule of capture rights. The last two are based 
on land ownership. Groundwater prior appropriation is similar to surface water with 
no injury requirements, permit systems, and reasonable use levels (Aiken 2003b; 
Peck 2007; Getches 2009; Craig 2012). Kansas and Colorado are prior appropriation 
states setting prior appropriation reasonable use levels (Getches 2009; Jones and 
Cech 2009). The second rule, reasonable use or correlative rights are attached to 
land ownership; Nebraska uses this doctrine. Shares of the water can be proportional 
to land owned, and use of the water cannot hinder other owners’ water rights or use. 
In Nebraska, reasonable use limits for groundwater are set by local NRDs (Aiken 
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2006; Gless and Longo 2008; Getches 2009). As a public resource, controls are 
usually through a permit system administered by a state agency, so that states can 
protect competing users and make allocations in the public interest (Getches 2009; 
Jones and Cech 2009). The rule of capture or the English rule, the third rule, allows 
a land owner exclusive and unlimited rights to water underneath their property 
including water in the soil. The rule of capture has been modified by better 
hydrological science and state legislative action (Getches 2009); none of the 
Compact states engage rule of capture rights.  
 Five rules or categories define groundwater liability or causing harm to other 
users according to Getches (2009): 
• No liability. If groundwater is a property right, then a user can pump as 
long as there is no harm to existing users. 
• Prior appropriation/Junior-liable. New users are liable if senior vested 
rights are harmed. States modify appropriation laws to limit protections. 
• Reasonable use doctrine/American rule. If unreasonable use occurs, a 
landowner may be liable; if correlative rights are used, shortages are 
proportional. 
• Restatement (Second) of Torts 858. Liability occurs if withdrawal causes 
unreasonable harm to others, exceeds an individual’s reasonable share, or 
affects a water course, lake or its users. 
• Economic reach. A balance between senior and junior rights, e.g., 
considers economic costs, competing use values. 
A sixth rule or category is prior appropriation/senior-liable or the no injury rule. 
Senior users cannot modify their rights in a way that harms a junior user, since the 
 71 
junior’s rights are based on water conditions at the time the permit is issued (K.S.A. 
82a-708b). States use these rules in groundwater disputes based on their own 
statutes and practices. 
 Economics has a role in groundwater development and use as a management 
tool. Economic costs may be internal where the user carries the burden or external 
where others such as utilities and the public bear the burden (Getches 2009). Those 
costs can be mitigated and shared depending on how laws and policies are designed 
by a state for either permitting or liability. Permits in particular provide a means of 
regulatory development that can embed user rights as well as benefit society. States 
use statutes to define groundwater, how it can be accessed, whether permits are 
required, and when penalties are imposed (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009).  
 Drilling (well) and use (water right) permits are typical for groundwater and 
both may be required. Drilling permits are required in advance of actual well sinking 
with specific prerequisites such as geologic structures, type of use, construction type, 
and location. Use permits are dependent on whether or not a new well will impair 
current users. Hydrological data, value, and political judgments by agencies about 
the merits of a permit, statutes, and policy goals contribute to the decision. 
Successful permits need to be implemented in a reasonable amount of time and 
water beneficially applied. As is the case with surface water permits, they can be lost 
due to inactivity or improper use (Getches 2009). 
 Pumping restrictions are often set to protect current and future groundwater 
uses, usually by state statute. Nebraska NRDs set groundwater withdrawals and 
timeframes rather than a state agency (Gless and Longo 2008; Getches 2009; Bleed 
and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). Depletion levels are set for a “socially optimal” period 
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that represents current policy priorities (Aiken 2003b; Getches 2009; Jones and 
Cech 2009). What is socially optimal will and does change with time and 
circumstances, setting in motion new conflicts. Critical groundwater areas can be 
identified by states. Usually these are locations where depletions are severe and 
recharge rates lag significantly. In those areas groundwater drilling and pumping are 
under strict regulation as is the case in the tri-basin states (Aiken 2003b; Getches 
2009; Jones and Cech 2009). 
 All three Compact states contain critical groundwater areas that are bound by 
aquifers or basins; each has different criteria. In Nebraska’s Republican River basin, 
they have four NRDs that control groundwater use. Statewide, Kansas has 12 
IGUCAs and one LEMA, none of which are in their portion of the Republican River 
basin. Kansas’s upstream Republican River basin is in a portion of the Northwest 
Kansas Groundwater Management District #4 (KDA 2016b; Griggs 2017). Colorado 
statutes call for reductions based on priority (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; 
Griggs 2017). 
 
CONJUNCTIVE USE AND STORAGE 
 State laws across the U.S. often govern surface and groundwater separately, 
even though they may be hydrologically connected. Such practices are shortsighted 
and cause undue confusion for permit holders and users, the agencies that 
administer state policies, and injure the resource itself (Gless and Longo 2008; 
Griggs 2012, 2017). Conjunctive use refers to joint management or use of surface and 
groundwater under hydrological conditions or for maximum efficiency (Aiken 
2003b; Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009). Recognizing the connectivity between 
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surface and groundwater, some states have shifted to a single management system, 
encouraging water rights holders to use both sources if they have access, or by 
regulating vested rights. The 1973 Report of the National Water Commission and the 
1998 Report of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission both 
recommended single system management for effective, efficient, and realistic policy 
(Getches 2009). Colorado and Kansas generally adhere to a single-system practice, 
unlike Nebraska, which uses separate systems for surface and groundwater. 
 In the Republican River basin Colorado and Kansas mostly use an 
appropriation water system for surface and groundwater2, so joint management 
occurs as a matter of course. Nebraska maintains separate surface and groundwater 
systems with some joint projects such as Integrated Management Plans (IMPs) for 
specific groundwater basins like the Republican River. IMPs require the Nebraska 
Department of Natural Resources (NDNR) and river basin NRDs to develop joint 
water management plans. Without conjunctive management, lag times occur for 
streamflow, recharge, and depletions. These become problematic for both users and 
the states. On the ground, conclusively demonstrating hydrological connectivity is 
hard and expensive (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009). Groundwater well 
pumpers do not want to stop pumping if their wells aren’t connected to surface water 
and they hold senior appropriation rights, especially considering streamflow time 
lags and negative crop and economic impact. 
 One solution to lag times is bypass pumping and another is augmentation. 
Bypass pumping is a substitute groundwater supply that can meet the needs of 
                                                   
2 In Colorado, basin groundwater is alluvial (or tributary) and directly connected to the 
stream itself, or it is designated and attributed to other distant streams in the basin. 
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senior rights holders while maintaining surface flow. An augmentation plan typically 
sources groundwater to replace surface water for surface water users. Augmentation 
can take the form of diversions, storage, and new sources (Getches 2009; Jones and 
Cech 2009). In each case, substitute water can be supplied to senior surface-users 
that decrease their surface impacts while letting juniors continue pumping 
groundwater. Bypass pumping has physical limitations, while augmentation can 
allow for storage and later releases, as one example (Getches 2009). 
 Storing groundwater for future use can take place with surface reservoirs or 
pumping water into aquifers. Both systems require technological, infrastructure, and 
management strategies and cause some degree of environmental harm. Surface 
storage structures lose more water than underground ones due to evaporation, 
seepage, and pollution (Getches 2009). In the Republican River basin, augmentation 
pipeline plans have been instituted by Colorado (Colorado Compact Compliance 
Pipeline) and Nebraska (Rock Creek and N-CORPE) to keep both states compliant 
with the Compact and Kansas. The projects pump groundwater and pipe it to a 
designated delivery point in the basin to maintain surface flows to KBID (RRWCD 
2009; N-CORPE 2017). 
 The second part of the chapter highlights each state’s water law and policy 
development through time and places the Compact within those settings. 
 
THE COMPACT STATES AND WATER POLICIES 
 Conflicts were inevitable at multiple scales due to the complex relationship 
between people and nature on the Great Plains with periodic droughts, sometimes 
poor water rights enforcement, water over-use, and over-allocation. At the macro 
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scale, interstate water compacts became a common mechanism to mediate and pro-
actively allocate water among states in the region. The 1943 Republican River 
Compact among Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska is an example. 
 The basin spans different physical geographies and political boundaries 
setting in motion water resource issues, transboundary conflicts, and complex socio-
hydrologic interactions. Water usage today is dependent on past population and 
agricultural uses. Each state has its own water history filled with indigenous, 
historical, and anecdotal chronologies that detail the meandering route water and 
politics have taken in an attempt to navigate murky hydrological relationships. 
 Prior appropriation is Colorado’s water history, while Nebraska’s and 
Kansas’s began as riparian and changed to prior appropriation. Each of the states 
has its own social, climatic, and hydrologic landscape that influences water 
management and policy. Some portions are drier or wetter than others and were 
settled sooner or later than others. Thus, which water practice, riparian or prior 
appropriation, best serves the state and its water rights users is contingent upon 
physical conditions, traditional practices, and current behaviors. In the 19th century, 
John Wesley Powell was well aware of the conflict between the semi-arid and sub-
humid conditions of the larger region. He supported water usage approaches that 
addressed the differences through his promotion of drainage basins as political areas 
rather than the Cartesian methods favored by unfamiliar easterners, legislators, and 
bureaucrats (Stegner 1982; Figure 4.5). 
 A state’s early water experiences shape internal relationships between 
neighbors and external relationships with other states. Public resource management 
is difficult at all scales in time and space. As the Compact states matured, their water 
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laws and policies were re-examined for appropriate modifications and clarifications. 
Each state’s water history and legal development are presented in the following sub-
sections. The discussions are not exhaustive; rather they provide an abridged 
explanation of events that shape their waterscapes. They begin by identifying the 
state’s water laws and their jurisdictional administration in a single paragraph. It is 
followed by a physical description and a more inclusive overview that touches upon 
major events, legislation, and litigation. 
 
Figure 4.5. John Wesley Powell’s Drainage Districts. The far western corner of the 
Republican River basin is in red on the middle right side of the map; it is the 
Colorado portion of the basin. Extending the area east to the arid boundary would 




 Colorado’s 1876 constitution embedded prior appropriation as the state’s 
water law for surface and groundwater; in 1882, it was clarified by the Supreme 
Court as the state’s exclusive doctrine in Coffin v. Left-Hand Ditch Co. Colorado 
makes groundwater distinctions that can be complicated due to hydrological 
relationships, legal language, and rulings. Except for de-regulated groundwater, 
those complications and challenges along with permitting processes are primarily 
the jurisdiction of Water Courts. Water Courts are part of Colorado’s district court 
system and their chief responsibility is to oversee water issues within their water 
district; districts are structured around major river basins. The State Engineer in the 
Colorado Division of Water Resources Office works in conjunction with the Water 
Court on some issues, such as permits and unappropriated water (Schroeder 1991). 
 
COLORADO WATER LAW HISTORY 
 Colorado’s physical geography encompasses much more variety than either of 
its eastern Kansas and Nebraska neighbors. Its geography bisects the state into 
north-south regions with sweeping high plains in the eastern third and mountainous 
terrain in the central and western part of the state; high desert lands, mesas, and the 
Colorado Plateau add another landscape element. The state’s basic physiography 
contributes to another layer that influences the waterscape of the state, the diverse 
precipitation regions. The state’s annual precipitation can range from 0” to over 50” 
(0-127 cm) with the western slope and higher elevations typically receiving more 
than the eastern Front Range and Plains as well as the Western Plateau Region 
(Colorado Climate Center 2107). However, overall Colorado is considered to have a 
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semi-arid climate. These and other diverse physical characteristics contribute to the 
state’s waterscape and influence its water law and policy practices. 
 Colorado’s water policy history is different from that of Nebraska and Kansas, 
primarily due to its more varied physical landscape and the 1859 Gold Rush. 
Successful agriculture depended on irrigation networks. Irrigation projects and other 
water practices existed long before 1859, such as Hispano settlers who adapted 
Spanish and Mexican water laws (Romero 2002). It was Colorado’s gold rush more 
than anything else that presaged Colorado’s 1876 constitutional inclusion of prior 
appropriation water rights. Supporting prior appropriation events include the 1859 
Miners Courts and Claims Club who instituted “first in time, first in right” based on 
California gold mining practices (Romero 2002; Jones and Cech 2009). Two, 
irrigation diversions on all the major streams in the Upper South Platte Basin by 
1861, helped by the Colorado Agricultural Society’s determination to dispel the Great 
American Desert image (Jones and Cech 2009). Three, the 1874 Eaton School House 
meeting between upstream Cache la Poudre Fort Collins users and downstream 
South Platte Union Colony (Greeley) users — they settled without using their rifles 
(Jones and Cech 2009). 
 In 1882, the Colorado Supreme Court in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company 
asserted Colorado’s water law foundation, prior appropriation, to make it clear that 
Colorado was an exclusively pure prior appropriation state. Justice Helm wrote that 
riparian rights were not appropriate, or applicable, to Colorado considering its 
climate and economy and that prior appropriation is the water law of the land 
(Romero 2002; Getches 2009). All riparian rights were ultimately deemed ill-suited 
to Colorado’s realities (Jones and Cech 2009). 
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TYPES OF COLORADO WATER 
 Between 1881 and 1969 the Colorado legislature clarified water conflict 
procedures focused on claim dates and priority listing, since water rights could 
potentially be considered newer than actual usage. Two important acts govern 
current policy: 1) the 1965 Ground Water Management Act that focused on specific 
areas for ground water management but did not consider natural streamflows, and 
2) the 1969 Water Rights Determination and Administration Act that incorporated 
wells that were outside the 1965 areas. Both acts responded to groundwater conflicts 
in the South Platte and Arkansas River basins, groundwater pumping technology, 
and better alluvial aquifer and surface flow science (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 
2009).  
 The 1965 Ground Water Management Act addressed designated groundwater, 
defined as non-tributary water. Basically, it means groundwater that does not act as 
a tributary to a stream’s natural flow (it is physically separated), and it can include 
other water that is not already appropriated for surface water rights (Jones and Cech 
2009; Schroeder 2013). The 1969 Water Rights Determination and Administration 
Act addressed tributary groundwater. Tributary groundwater is water that is 
significantly hydrologically connected through surface streams and alluvial aquifers 
(Jones and Cech 2009). Tributary water is administered with the prior appropriation 
doctrine; a modified prior appropriation is used with non-tributary water (Schroeder 
2013). Colorado’s General Assembly legislated additional clarifications for non-
tributary groundwater in 1985 and 1996 that addressed aquifer withdrawal rates, 
tributary standards, and modifications for four aquifers in the larger Denver Basin 
because of the area’s economic importance (Schroeder 2013). In 2005, the General 
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Assembly enacted the Colorado Water for the 21st Century Act that includes an 
Interbasin Compact Committee (Rettig 2017a).  
 All surface water and underground water that is tributary to all natural 
streams, water seepage, wastewater, return flows, floodwater, springs, mine water, 
and groundwater is the property of the public (Schroeder 2013). A water 
appropriation is for a specific amount of water for beneficial use. It is gained after 
first, a conditional water right is perfected, and second, a water right is granted for 
the use of a specific portion of the state’s water in priority. A conditional water right 
has to show beneficial, non-wasteful use, and as a vested property right is subject to 
forfeit (Schroeder 2013). Both the conditional water right and the water right have to 
be confirmed by adjudication by a district Water Court. The state then awards a 
water appropriation from the State Engineer at the Division of Water Resources 
(Schroeder 2014). Water rights are not generally appurtenant to land with some 
exceptions, once a right has been perfected it can be transferred and its use changed. 
Regardless, it must be beneficial, reasonable, appropriate, and efficient (Schroeder 
2013). 
 Colorado water law has one basic water rule, tributary water, and three 
exceptions: non- and not non-tributary water, designated groundwater, and exempt 
wells. Relevant to this discussion are non-tributary and designated groundwater. 
Tributary water is basically the water in the state that is hydrologically connected, 
whether surface or groundwater. Non-tributary waters are not directly hydrologically 
connected or do not influence a stream; they are spatially distant or their aquifers 
have barriers that prevent hydrological connection. Second, designated groundwater 
is an alluvial aquifer without streamflow (there is no significant hydrological stream 
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connection to the aquifer) (Jones and Cech 2009). These are groundwater areas 
located in the eastern High Plains of the state, and they broadly have no or minimal 
impact at the surface, so a modified prior-appropriation method is employed (Jones 
and Cech 2009). 
 
COLORADO PERMITS AND WATER COURT 
 Colorado has no public trust doctrine, so the state does not hold some of its 
resources in trust for public use over private property ownership. For example, a 
landowner can determine how surface water is utilized if the property underlies a 
body of water or stream; they have the right to control access to surface water for 
recreational use like fly fishing or kayaking. As usual, permitting and challenges need 
to be administered. Challenges in Colorado take place with state district courts or by 
the State Engineer, unlike Nebraska and Kansas that use state district courts. Water 
Courts, as part of the district court, settle disputes through referees and judges in 
one of seven divisions (river basins) with enforcement by the state engineer or 
representative (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; Schroeder 2009; Figure 4.6). 
Water Courts encompass all or part of the counties within the water division. They 
have extensive jurisdiction in their division that range from water and conditional 
rights, augmentation plan approval, and approving water use outside of Colorado. 
The Water Court focuses on overseeing that no harm or injury is caused to other 
parties. Like the other states, water right applications include legal descriptions, 
initiation dates, amount of water claimed and its proposed use; a water referee 
investigates the process (Schroeder 2014). Importantly for water rights cases, well 
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permits are not property and may be amended, but the water decree (claim and 
priority date) is the water right (Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009).  
 
Figure 4.6. Colorado Judicial Districts (top) and Colorado Water Districts 
(bottom). The Republican River is in the 13th Judicial District and the South Platte 
Water District (Colorado Judicial Branch n.d.; CDWR n.d.b.). 
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Executive control for water sits primarily with the Governor’s appointment of a State 
Engineer to the Division of Water Resources. The State Engineer, Division of Water 
Resources (DWR), and the Water Commission administer, distribute, and regulate 
state waters based on statutory authority and in conjunction with Water Courts. The 
Colorado Water Conservation Board coordinates water districts, evaluates water 
projects, develops legislation, and lobbies the legislature (Romero 2002; Getches 
2009; Jones and Cech 2009). The State Engineer and DWR reviews and approves 
well permit applications after Water Court approval, orders the discontinuation of a 
diversion for non-beneficial use or senior priority rights, releases improperly stored 
water, and orders the installation of gauges, meters, and other devices. The DWR has 
also ordered, delivered, and dumped concrete into diversion head gates as reminders 
(Schroeder 2009).  
 
COLORADO LITIGATION AND INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
 The 1907 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Colorado over the 
Arkansas River was the first federal lawsuit where neighboring states, and later the 
federal government, claimed control over Colorado sourced rivers and waters. The 
Court’s ruling asserted the doctrine of equitable apportionment, by which the Court 
has the power to apportion the water supplies of an interstate basin. Although the 
Court did not actually apportion the Arkansas River and dismissed the suit, the 
contentious relationship between the states has continued; it is discussed more fully 
in the later Kansas section. The 1922 Wyoming v. Colorado suit over the Laramie 
River was more complicated because the federal government filed U.S. v. Colorado 
for control of Laramie River water on federal land in Colorado (Romero 2002; Jones 
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and Cech 2009). Federal rights were asserted over state rights for federal land 
(Romero 2002; Jones and Cech 2009). The Department of Interior’s upstream 
embargoes to protect unappropriated water on the Upper Rio Grande River in 
Colorado, on the North Platte River in Wyoming, and the Salt River in Arizona to 
protect later downstream development alarmed upstream states and their ability to 
develop water within their borders (Griggs 2017). In addition, the Reclamation was 
making claims on unappropriated water on the Arkansas River and the North Platte 
River as an additional party to the Kansas v. Colorado and Nebraska v. Wyoming 
cases, respectively (Griggs 2017). It appeared that federal rights trumped state rights 
for federal land (Romero 2002; Jones and Cech 2009); state sovereignty only went 
so far. Furthermore, Colorado sources water for 19 downstream states due to its 
geographic position and the snow packed Rocky Mountains. Colorado’s internal 
water policies will continue to be influenced by other states along with federal 
actions and agencies. For Western and Great Plains states the end result of these 
challenges among each other and federal agencies became interstate water compacts 
as a method to mitigation water conflicts and ensure water to each state. 
 California was the first to adopt prior appropriation in 1855. Colorado’s prior 
appropriation doctrine, the Colorado Doctrine, and its legal choices served as models 
for other western states. Its focus on water rights and laws on security, reliability, 
and flexibility means the state was positioned to adapt over time to environmental 
changes as well as those taking place economically and demographically (Romero 
2002; Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009). On a policy front, Gallaher et al.’s 
(2013) analysis of Colorado water laws and policy recognizes the state’s adaptability 
and development of new policy tools under a variety of changing conditions. 
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However, they also state that the prior appropriation system constrains the adaptive 
capacity of the state, since old and new issues will demand concurrent attention.  
 
KANSAS 
 Since 1945, when Kansas passed the Water Appropriations Act (KWAA), it has 
used prior appropriation water rights for both surface and ground water with a 
vested rights process for pre-1945 water rights holders. From 1861 to 1945, it 
recognized riparian water rights for streams and absolute ownership for 
groundwater (Peck 1995). The Division of Water Resources Chief Engineer, the 
Kansas Water Office, and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment have 
jurisdictional control for water use, development, monitoring, and enforcement in 
Kansas as dictated by legislative action. The Chief Engineer carries considerable 
responsibility for issuing, evaluating, and enforcing water use practices to include 
water rights permits, regulating reasonable water irrigation quantities, certifying 
permits, overseeing conflicts and transfers, and minimum streamflows among many 
other water permit related issues. 
 A more expansive description of Kansas’s water law and policy development 
begins with a short physical description, touches on early differences between 
eastern and western state water practices, and then focuses more fully on legislative 
commissions and the move to full prior appropriation. Also included are challenges 





KANSAS WATER LAW HISTORY 
 The derivation of the name kansas has a somewhat mixed legacy. Frequently 
it is ascribed to the Kansas River and the dominant indigenous group present during 
early periods of exploration. There are numerous spellings, as many as 125, such as 
Kansie, Canzon, and Kau or Kaw (a French option for the indigenous population). 
The different definitions could be “smoky” associated with the Kau or Kaw, another 
for “winds” or “wind people,” and a third, cansar of Spanish origin meaning to 
molest or harass. In the end, it was Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas and author of 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill who thought if fitting to name both states after major rivers 
in their respective states, the Kansas and Nebraska Rivers, even though the 
indigenous members of Nebraska called the river the Platte (Schoewe 1954). 
  Like its northern neighbor Nebraska, the rolling hills, denser tree cover, and 
more humid climate of eastern Kansas, transitions to a flatter plain, expansive 
horizons with scattered tree stands, and a drier climate in the west. 
Physiographically it is part of the United States’ Interior Plain, the eastern one-third 
of the state part of the Central Lowlands and the remainder assigned to the Great 
Plains (Schoewe 1949). “The number and density of streams in Kansas is directly 
related to the precipitation of the state” (Schoewe 1951, 264) and with a range of 40” 
(102 cm) in the southeast to 16-17” (~41 cm) at the state line with Colorado stream 
density should not be surprising (Schoewe 1951; Peck 1995). The range in 
precipitation and stream density also speaks to water usage and practice in those 
contrasting climatic regions, thereby influencing water law and policy through time. 
 Kansas’s legal water history like many states that bridge the Great Plains and 
the West is one where older and familiar methods do not fit into new and different 
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spaces. It begins with the state’s eastern settlement patterns and common law 
riparian rights for stream water, whereby land ownership conveyed water ownership, 
and the courts settled user conflicts. Groundwater policy of this earlier era gave 
landowners absolute ownership to make withdrawals without regard to how it might 
impact neighboring landowners (Peck 1995, 2004; Rogers, Powell, and Ebert 2013; 
Styron n.d.). Many, if not most, water users of the time did not have documentation 
of either their water usage or had made no legal filings that recognized their 
groundwater rights and consumption (Peck 1995). The Kansas Territory had 
accepted riparian rights as early as 1855. By 1866 the territory was using prior 
appropriation in western Kansas. In 1868 it adopted common law for surface and 
groundwater, and legally recognized Western prior appropriation in 1878 (Sherow 
1990; Griggs 2012; Rogers et al. 2013). In 1886, they adopted a weak form of prior 
appropriation requiring users to file their claim and post a sign but without any 
specifics like amount used (Sherow 1990). 
 
TWO WATER SYSTEMS AND THE KANSAS WATER APPROPRIATIONS ACT 
 Western Kansas’s adoption of prior appropriation is in part the result of 
diffusion from Colorado and other western states along with surface water scarcity 
and community values. These opposing policies within Kansas were suitable for the 
climatic conditions each region of the state experienced, and co-existed until the 
1943 Republican River Compact. The Compact helped set in motion full adoption of 
prior appropriation along with the 1944 Kansas Supreme Court’s mandate for a 
special focus on statewide groundwater (Griggs 2012). 
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 James Sherow’s Watering the Valley: Development Along the High Plains 
Arkansas River, 1870-1950 (1990) provides an insightful and thorough analysis of 
irrigation water development in the Arkansas valley, the hydrologic and legal 
relationship between Colorado and Kansas over the river’s waters, the river’s 
ecological niche and response to increasing irrigation diversions, the culture of its 
residents, economics, and the role of law in developing water resources. 
 Dominating nature and market-culture values reinforced the commodification 
of water in Kansas’s early water history throughout the state, and legal developments 
reflected these priorities in prior appropriation, riparian water rights, and later 
interstate compacts. The development in the Republican River parallels that of the 
Arkansas, but at a different scale and with different conditions. Importantly, conflict 
and cooperation between states and users for water was inevitable not just on the 
Arkansas, but throughout the state given that “the prior appropriation system fixed a 
commodity value to river flow” (Sherow 1990, 19), an idea that originated with 
historian Donald Pisani (Sherow 1990). Thus, water laws and policies have reflected 
competing priorities and differing values.  
 The 1891 legislature attempted to divide the state at the 99th West meridian 
into Eastern riparian and Western prior appropriation rights, but the 1905 Kansas 
Supreme Court rejected that argument (Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80P 571 
(1905)), even though common law water rights made a distinction between surface 
water and groundwater (Sherow 1990; Peck 1995). As long as environmental 
conditions are constant, and given the state’s climatic differences, droughts, and 
subsequent water issues including severe southwestern aquifer depletions, the 
earlier dual water rights system may have been just as useful as a single system. 
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However, hydrological connectivity has become much more important with regard to 
streamflow, groundwater, and aquifer thickness, so water laws and a policy system 
that is more comprehensive can be beneficial. 
 The 1917 Water Commission was convened to explore state water issues 
beneficial to the state and its citizens, specifically a shift away from common riparian 
rights to prior appropriation water rights (Sherow 1990; Peck 1995). In 1944, the 
Kansas Supreme Court ruled the Commission had failed in a number of ways 
because the Commission did not recommend amending water laws to reflect 
changing permitting processes (State ex rel. Peterson v. Kansas State Board of 
Agriculture) (Peck 1995). The common-law rule of absolute ownership remained and 
the city of Wichita was denied water rights in the Equus Beds (an aquifer) because it 
was not located over the Equus Beds (Peck 1995). It spurred then-Governor 
Schoeppel to appoint another committee to examine the state’s water laws and 
recommend changes (Peck 1995). The newer group focused on prioritizing state 
water rights, especially stream’s riparian rights laws beneficial to Reclamation’s 
Kansas water projects and other federal agency projects taking place at the time 
(Peck 1995, 2014; Griggs 2012; Rogers et al. 2013). Their invited speakers included 
Spencer L. Baird of Reclamation, Wells A. Hutchins, renowned water lawyer and 
economist from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and John Riddell, the Nebraska 
Assistant Attorney General. Baird and Hutchins in particular were concerned with 
Kansas’s lack of constitutional attention to water rights geographically and 
quantitatively (Peck 2014). The Committee identified the 1917 Commission’s intent 
and made legislative recommendations based on this and other western states’ 
practices that included:  
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• an administrative agency to appropriate water and its use, 
• water use change over time to focus on irrigation, municipal, and 
industrial use, 
• water should be for beneficial use and thereby appropriated and diverted, 
• hydrological connections between surface and groundwater exist, and 
• natural resources need consideration (Peck 1995, Griggs 2012). 
These recommendations culminated in the KWAA that took less than 10 months to 
evolve after the Peterson case and the subsequent committee scrutiny of Kansas’s 
water laws (Peck 1995). These ideas and their ramifications have continued for 
Kansas as they wrestle with past practices, old and new science, growing demands 
from multiple sectors, legal language, and future environmental water uncertainty. 
 The KWAA reads, in part, “An Act to conserve, protect, control and regulate 
the use, development, diversion and appropriation of water for beneficial and public 
purposes, and to prevent waste and unreasonable use of water” (1945 Kansas HB 
322). It further says, “all water within the state of Kansas … to the use of the people 
of the state, subject to the control and regulation of the state” (K.S.A. 82a-702). 
Implicit is that groundwater and surface water are under the auspices of a single 
doctrine and the authority of the State Engineer. Current users at the time of 
KWAA’s implementation had vested rights that would supersede new appropriation 
rights, priority was determined by application date and proof of beneficial use; water 
use priorities would take precedent, and water was pledged to public use (Peck 1995, 
2007, 2014; Griggs 2012, 2017). 
 Pre-KWAA, surface water generally fell under riparian rights and 
groundwater was also landowner controlled. The KWAA did not include a process for 
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applying for and receiving an appropriation right, which meant that people would 
not be legally protected in court over water conflicts. What the KWAA did do was 
create a system for getting and holding water rights. It enforces a single system for 
all regions and all water in the state (Peck 1995; Griggs 2012; Rogers et al. 2013).  
 The KWAA was contested three times before 1963. In 1949, the KWAA was 
contested over a Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District Number 2 plan for a water 
impoundment diversion to irrigate downstream riparian and non-riparian lands 
(State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp 167 Kan. 546). Common law prohibited using water 
on non-riparian land, but the Kansas Supreme Court supported the KWAA because 
they deemed it beneficial use. Additionally, the Act had not imposed any 
geographical boundaries, so diverting water to non-riparian land was valid (Peck 
1995; Griggs 2012). The Court again upheld the KWAA in 1956 when it was 
challenged about vested rights and whether or not a landowner had appropriated 
their water and put it to beneficial use (Baumann v. Smrha 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. 
Kan. 1956)). The Kansas Supreme Court reversed a third challenge to the KWAA in 
1962 (Williams v. city of Wichita 190 Kan. 317) when a lower court denied the city of 
Wichita pumping rights in the Equus Beds and pipeline transfer. The ruling asserted 
that landownership under common law did not automatically confer water rights, 
although the Chief Justice dissented, saying that an established property right was 
now defunct (Peck 1995). The KWAA positioned Kansas to address their water 
challenges in meaningful and reasonable ways by providing directives. 
 The 1944 U.S. Flood Control Act is nearly concurrent with the KWAA. Under 
the auspices of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Flood 
Control Act supported nine federal Kansas water projects to address flood control 
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and irrigation water supply needs until the 1960s (Peck 1995; Griggs 2012). Bostwick 
Irrigation District (located in Nebraska and Kansas) uses water dedicated to the 
Compact and is one of the federal projects. The District is part of Reclamation’s Pick-
Sloan program, and straddles the Nebraska-Kansas border with two divisions 
(Griggs 2012). In 1974 after most of the large Reclamation projects were completed, 
the state enacted the State Water Plan Storage Act to regulate water storage per 
water rights under the Flood Control Act. Part of the plan created a “water 
reservation right” that allows Kansas as a water right holder to store water in 
residence at federal reservoirs and later sell it (Peck 1995). It aligned Kansas's 
practices in a manner beneficial to receiving federal funding for state projects.  
 
KANSAS LITIGATION AND INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
 Interstate compacts play a large role in Kansas’s water history. They are 
engaged in four compacts with three states for three interstate rivers: the Arkansas 
River with Colorado (1949) and Oklahoma (1966), the Republican River with 
Colorado and Nebraska (1943), and the Big Blue River with Nebraska (1971). As an 
interstate river, the Missouri River on the state’s eastern border has yet to come 
under any compact with Kansas (Peck 1995; KDA 2016a). Spatially about one-half of 
the state is part of an interstate compact, as shown in Figure 4.7. Whether upstream 
or downstream, each can be an unenviable position depending on annual weather 
trends throughout the larger region, technology, and water practices over time. 
 People throughout the Arkansas River valley have altered the riparian 
ecosystem so extensively since the mid-1800s with canals, diversions, and wells, that 
the river system itself is reduced to a mere economic input with market values that 
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dominate nature (Sherow 1990). The two states would and have remained rivals for 
the valley’s water for over a century. 
 
Figure 4.7. Kansas Interstate Compact Agreements. Geographic extent of river 
basins (KDA 2016a). 
 
 Litigation with Colorado over the Arkansas River began in 1902 (Sherow 
1990; Peck 1995; U.S. Supreme Court n.d.). The longest running case, Kansas v. 
Colorado, No. 105 Original, took 24 years (1985-2009) to resolve and involved four 
rulings. The dispute required a Special Master in 1995 for allegations that Colorado 
had violated the Compact with post-Compact pumping. The 2009 ruling, again by a 
Special Master, oversaw resolutions to the conflict between the states that included: 
over-drilling, reduced streamflows, a hydrologic model, monetary damages, and 
witness fees (556 U.S.. 98, 2009). It was estimated that approximately 1,700 wells 
were capped in Colorado after the first Special Master’s report. Further, the Supreme 
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Court decision was to deny Kansas’s monetary claim, a $35 million win for Colorado 
(Schroeder 2009).  
 Allocation delivery issues have been a concern on the Republican River, too. 
Kansas has filed two U.S. Supreme Court lawsuits (Kansas v. Nebraska and 
Colorado, No. 125 Original (1998-2003) and Kansas v. Nebraska (2012)). Rulings in 
both cases were in Kansas’s favor. The Compact is discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter. Kansas’s interaction with Oklahoma and Missouri are rather tepid in 
comparison to the other two compacts. 
 From 1945-1957 Kansas was able to develop comprehensive water law in less 
time than other Western states, benefiting from those states’ earlier experiences with 
state water law. It was accomplished by Department of Water Resources (DWR) 
work, legislative action creating the Water Appropriation Act, Kansas Water 
Resources Board reports and recommendations, and other legislative amendments. 
The 1955 Kansas Water Resource Board’s mandate was to examine state law with 
special attention to water resources development. Two well-known Board reports 
resulted from the work of Robert L. Smith and Earl Schurtz. The 1956 Report 
analyzed the Kansas Water Act and proposed amendments with an eye towards a 
state water plan, while the 1960 Report emphasized beneficial water use relevant to 
current law and groundwater definitions in Western states. Legislative changes, for 
example, included defining “water right” to include either vested or appropriation 





CONTEMPORARY WATER PROGRAMS 
 Kansas has developed several newer concepts to address state water (select 
programs are listed). Water Banking lets water rights water be placed into a water 
bank with two use options. Multi-Year Flex Accounts are for groundwater rights 
holders to deposit and store water over a five-year period for later use during that 
period. The Irrigation Transfer Assistance Pilot Project Program (ITAP) and the 
federal Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) both retire water rights 
to help extend the life of the Ogallala Aquifer. Finally, Aquifer Storage and Recovery 
allows for floodwaters to be diverted and artificially recharge nearby aquifers to be 
stored for later use (Peck 2014). 
 Special water districts and areas include drainage, rural water, levees, and 
groundwater concerns. Groundwater Management Districts (GMDs), Intensive 
Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs), and Local Enhanced Management Areas 
(LEMAs) are agriculturally important because they address water management. 
GMDs were created in 1972 and have limited local power over issues as long as 
decisions do not interfere with state policies. Kansas has five regional GMDs, with 
those in central and western Kansas especially influential in the form of local 
regulations, standards, policy, and management plans. Their geographical area 
conforms to the borders of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer (Peck 1995, 2007; 
Rogers et al. 2013; Griggs 2014a). Four sections of the GMD Act were appended in 
1978 and led to the creation of IGUCAs in areas where one or more of five conditions 
are met including significant groundwater declines and preventable waste of water. 
ICUGAs are identified and controlled by the Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer can 
re-assign groundwater withdrawals, deviate from strict prior appropriation, and 
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implement provisions such as closing the area to other water appropriation or 
require rotating use (Peck 1995, 2004, 2007; Kansas Division of Water Resources 
2016b). LEMAs, authored and controlled by GMDs, are an alternative to IGUCAs, 
and encourage local agricultural producers to plan in concert with their local GMDs 
to extend the Ogallala Aquifer’s useful life expectancy. To date, the first approved 
LEMA is in GMD 4, Sheridan County in northwest Kansas with a proposal to go 
district-wide; GMD 5 has proposed a 10-year phase-in program (Kansas Division of 
Water Resources 2016b). 
 As water law and policy evolved in Kansas, the DWR’s role became more 
involved and complex, especially as the number of available water rights became 
more limited and demand for water expanded. It was especially true as the 1980s 
began and water holdings required more enforcement. The Kansas legislature 
connected surface water and groundwater as a single hydrologically interconnected 
system with the KWAA and its amendments, as well as creating a central 
administration with the DWR. Kansas responses may be considered more nimble to 
changing water circumstances than Nebraska where control is split between the 
DNR (surface water) and the NRDs (groundwater). Most recently Kansas has 
developed and is implementing a statewide water plan that addresses its 
contemporary challenges including reservoir infilling and aquifer depletions, plus 
presenting various solutions (Kansas Division of Water Resources 2015). 
 
NEBRASKA 
 Nebraska adopts a quite different approach to water law and policy than do 
Colorado and Kansas where prior appropriation is followed. Nebraska utilizes prior 
 97 
appropriation with its surface water, but a hybrid reasonable use and correlative 
rights doctrine for ground water (Blankenau, Wilmoth, and Bromm 2005; Aiken 
2006; Griggs 2017). In 1895, the state adopted prior appropriation for surface water; 
earlier the state used traditional riparian rights doctrine, and groundwater was 
defined in 1933 (Olson v. City of Wahoo) (Blankenau3, Wilmoth, and Bromm 2005). 
Jurisdiction is also decentralized compared to the other states. Surface water is 
regulated by the Department of Natural Resources (NDNR) (formerly the 
Department of Water Resources), while groundwater is regulated by local Natural 
Resource Districts (NRDs) (Aiken 1980; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015; Griggs 
2017; NDNR n.d.). The NDNR director, equivalent to the chief engineers in Kansas 
and Colorado, oversees most state surface water issues for the entire state, while 
NRDs are charged with overseeing groundwater within their geographic borders. 
Both deal with permits, adopt and enforce rules, and maintain plans among other 
duties. 
 The remainder of the Nebraska section is divided into surface water, 
groundwater, and integration. It follows a largely chronological presentation. 
Irrigation priorities, resource agencies, NRDs, and legislative and legal actions that 
ushered in integrated management plans (IMPs) are included. 
 
NEBRASKA SURFACE WATER 
 Nebraska is a topographically gentle, undulating plain with few highs and 
lows, resulting in streams and rivers with low gradients, whose flows are subject to 
                                                   
3 Don Blankenau served as the former General Counsel, Assistant Director, and 
Interim Director at the Nebraska DNR between 1991-1999. 
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the whims of weather in the south and west, as compared to those in the north, 
central and east that are groundwater fed (Bleed 1993; Manley 1993; Bleed and 
Hoffmann Babbitt 2015). Like Kansas its southern neighbor, Nebraska’s climate and 
precipitation regime is similar with a wet east and drier west (Bleed 1993; Bleed and 
Hoffman Babbitt 2015). Eastern settlers were not used to the treeless plains, semi-
arid and arid conditions, and lack of streams (Mossman 1996; Manley 1993; Gless 
and Longo 2008). Transforming Nebraska into a water-rich environment was a 
challenge just as it was for Kansas and parts of Colorado. 
 Three possibilities presented themselves. Robert Furnas, the state’s second 
governor, believed irrigation was the best alternative. Samuel Aughey believed that 
precipitation was positively correlated with the expansion of westward movement 
and along with J.T. Allen proposed tree planting to increase precipitation (Manley 
1993; Gless and Longo 2008). An 1879 U.S. Congressional proposal to restrict 
settlement west of the 100th meridian was suggested to maximize available water; 
John Wesley Powell supported it and believed settlement would not be agriculturally 
amenable without extensive supplemental water (Stegner 1982; Manley 1993). 
Eventually settlers had no choice but to find viable alternatives to tree planting and 
the westward migration of increased precipitation. It would be irrigation that led to 
state water laws and policies. 
 It began with ditches and canals. The first water law came with the 1877 
legislature’s acknowledgement of irrigation districts as improvements, and in 1914 
vested surface water rights were added (Gless and Longo 2008). W.R. Akers and 
C.W. Ford discovered Nebraska had no water rights laws while excavating for their 
canal near North Platte. They sent a copy of Colorado’s water laws to the state 
 99 
legislature and became the first to register water rights in 1888 (Manley 1993; 
Mossman 1996). 
 In 1880, Guy C. Barton of North Platte, complained to Governor Nance about 
low flows in the South Platte coming from Colorado. By 1887 South Platte 
complaints had increased, emboldening John Wilson to correspond with Governor 
Thayer documenting Colorado’s over-use. Colorado’s Attorney General responded 
with sympathy to Nebraska’s concern, but Colorado had prior appropriation laws 
within its state, and there was nothing he could legally do about the lack of water for 
Nebraska (Manley 1993). Water’s transitory qualities and inability to be bound by 
space are evident (Jones and Macdonald 2007). These actions and documents 
foreshadow later transboundary water conflicts between the two states and 
subsequent compacts and agreements such as the 1923 South Platte River Compact4. 
Spurred on by a proposed dam on the South Platte in Colorado, the first irrigation 
law passed in 1889, the St. Rayner Law. It required water users to post a sign, use 
water beneficially, and begin within 60 days, as well as streamflow apportionment 
during shortages. It did not address priority or usage preferences (Manley 1993; 
Mossman 1996; Gless and Longo 2008).  
 The early 1890s saw similar pushes for irrigation and federal support for 
projects in light of drought and the state’s downstream location on the Platte 
(Manley 1993; Gless and Longo 2008). The 1895 Appropriation and Irrigation Code, 
Aker’s Law identified prior appropriation and beneficial use among other features 
for surface water. It allowed citizens the right to create irrigation districts, levy taxes, 
                                                   
4 Future agreements include the 1997 Platte River Cooperative Agreement between 
Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska and the 2001 North Platte River Settlement with 
Wyoming. 
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and issue bonds, but diversions were not an absolute right (Manley 1993; Schafer 
1993; Mossman 1996; Gless and Longo 2008). O.V.R. Stout and Erwin Hinckley 
Barbour advocated for a comprehensive state water assessment. Barbour also 
addressed the need for proper agricultural techniques focused on soil moisture 
conservation and finite water resources. He and others warned that surface water 
supplies would not be the panacea of the semi-arid and arid West Platte River and 
Republican River estimates were too ambitious; the Platte could be over-allocated; 
dams and reservoirs would be necessities (Bleed 1993; Manley 1993). 
 Nebraska identifies four types of prior appropriation surface water rights: 
natural flow, storage, storage use and instream flow. Five beneficial uses are 
connected to natural flow — domestic, agriculture, irrigation, manufacturing, and 
power generation. Natural flow is water diverted off a surface body (a river or a lake) 
and to a canal, for example, and instream flow refers to the water actually flowing in 
a stream. Storage rights allow for impounding water, but not its use, and include 
underground storage and recovery. Storage use rights are for the actual use of stored 
water (Blankenau 2009). Incidental underground water storage that occurs due to 
irrigation canal seepage is also covered (Blankenau 2009).  
 The NDNR is tasked with supervising and controlling surface water 
appropriations, diversions, and distribution of public water. A prior appropriation 
right is a right of use only and must have a beneficial and useful purpose; it is true 
for Colorado and Kansas as well. Surface water rights/permits5 include the presence 
of unappropriated water, the amount of water diverted, the maximum amount of 
                                                   
5 The Nebraska DNR website uses ‘surface water right/permit’ and makes no 
distinction between a right and a permit. 
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water for beneficial use and purpose of use (such as irrigation), the location of use 
and the diversion works, and the priority date. Junior rights holders defer to senior 
rights holders (Blankenau 2009; NDNR n.d.a.). Interestingly, the NDNR does not 
need to consider how surface flows may be hindered by later groundwater 
development when surface water permits are issued. Thus, surface water users could 
potentially be adversely affected by later groundwater development that decreases 
surface water flows and quantities due to hydrological connectivity. In turn, that sets 
in motion plausible conflicts between surface and groundwater users. Adjudication 
of appropriation rights is overseen by the NDNR as well. Rights are evaluated based 
on reasonable and continuous use but can be cancelled by forfeit, non-use, 
abandonment, and prescription. Challenges are made directly to the NDNR who can 
hold a hearing, and challengers can appeal a NDNR ruling (Blankenau 2009).  
 
Nebraska Groundwater 
 Aiken (1980) describes how groundwater wells changed agriculture, irrigation 
and the subsequent need for law and policy (Table 4.1). From the 1930s to the end of 
the 1970s, the number of wells swelled from 1,900 to over 63,000. Total irrigated 
acreage in Nebraska increased from 500,000 to 3.2 million. Groundwater acres 
outnumbered surface water by a ratio of 3:1. The 1930s Depression and Dust Bowl, a 
drought from 1952-1956, the advent of the turbine pump that allowed for deeper 
wells and easier extraction, sprinkler irrigation systems, and center pivot irrigation 
systems designed to operate on slopes all contributed to groundwater expansion. In 
1975, groundwater irrigation pushed Nebraska to a national number three ranking 
for irrigated acres and groundwater withdrawals. Legislation was necessary and 
 102 
inevitable, given the rate of groundwater use expansion. A withdrawn 1940 bill (LB 
460) that considered a statewide groundwater system with a combination of 
overlying rights and appropriation could have addressed groundwater issues, but 
instead it was delayed. 1957 and 1958 saw legislative action on well registration, 
spacing, and water use preferences. However, details such as enforcement and 
definitions were not included. 1963 groundwater statutes included a permit system, 
but did not include sub-flows, as recommended by a 1962 report (Gless and Longo 
2008). That lack “contributed to retarding development of integrated ground and 
surface water management in Nebraska by thirty to forty years” (Gless and Longo 
2008, 104). 
 Five hundred resource-related entities with murky jurisdictions and 
authorities over water existed in Nebraska by the 1960s. The 1967 Interstate 
Groundwater Transfer Act allowed water transfers and uses between states by 
property owners as long as the neighboring state had a reciprocity clause, so water 
could be from Nebraska and used in Kansas. A 1982 challenge to the statute led to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, where the Court 
identified water as an article of commerce. Nebraska severed the reciprocity clause, 
and Sporhase and partner obtained a water use permit (Schafer 1993; Gless and 
Longo 2008). Just as important was the Nebraska Supreme Court’s recognition in 
the Little Blue NRD v. Lower Platte NRD (1982) that surface water could be 




Table 4.1. Nebraska Irrigation Wells and Irrigated Acreage, Select Data. 
1860 9,000 irrigated surface water acres 
1890 12,000 irrigated surface water acres 
1900 150,000 irrigated surface water acres 
1,000 irrigated groundwater acres 
1920 450,00 irrigated surface water acres 
1,000 irrigated groundwater acres 
1930S 1,900 total ground water wells 
1,000 in 1935 
1940S 4,000+ groundwater wells 
330,000 added groundwater irrigated acres 
500,000 total surface and groundwater irrigated acres 
1950S 16,000 groundwater wells 
2 million total surface and groundwater irrigated acres 
groundwater acres outnumber surface water acres 
1960S Center pivot irrigation systems take hold 
3:1 groundwater acres outnumber surface water acres 
irrigated groundwater acres increase from 1.4 million to 3.5 million 
1970S 29,000 groundwater wells (63,000 cumulative total) 
groundwater acres double 
1979 ~85% of state groundwater irrigated 
1970-1979 irrigated acres went from ~4 million to ~7 million 
1980S 6.2 million groundwater irrigated acres, ~1 million surface water acres 
1990 7 million groundwater irrigated acres, surface acres stable 
2000 ~8.1 million total irrigated acres 
2010 ~8.6 million total irrigated acres 
(Aiken 1980; Dreeszen 1993; Nebraska Energy Office n.d.) 
 
 Groundwater law came last. Groundwater is defined as “that water which 
occurs in or moves, seeps, filters, or percolates through ground under the surface of 
the land” (Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-7-6 (2)). Groundwater rights are property rights, are 
attached to overlying land, and cannot be transferred (Aiken 1980; Mossman 1996; 
Peck 2007); some groundwater right transfers were later made possible (Blankenau, 
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Wilmoth, and Bromm 2005). In 1933 Nebraska’s Supreme Court adopted the 
American rule or reasonable use rule — landowners must use water beneficially, 
resist over extraction, and do no neighborly harm — with a stipulation. If 
underground water is insufficient during shortages, it is apportioned between users; 
these are known as correlative rights in Nebraska (Mossman 1996; Gless and Longo 
2008; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). Nebraska therefore has co-mingled the 
reasonable use doctrine with correlative rights resulting in the Nebraska rule of 
reasonable use. Other rules addressed ownership and conflict, but ignored or 
avoided hydrologically connected systems, at least until the 1966 Omaha 
Metropolitan Utility District (MUD) case. The Nebraska Supreme Court allowed 
MUD to attain surface water rights on the Platte River to protect nearby 
groundwater wells, dismissing objections about negative impacts and riparian owner 
rights concerns (Aiken 1980; Mossman 1996; Popelka 2004; Gless and Longo 2008). 
  Shortly thereafter, Natural Resource Districts (NRDs) were created in 1969 to 
manage local resources including groundwater. They have the power to tax, to 
declare eminent domain, and have broad regulatory authority to allocate water, 
assure use, enforce non-compliance, and create groundwater control areas (Aiken 
1980; Blankenau 2010; Peck 2007; Gless and Longo 2008; Bleed and Hoffman 
Babbitt 2015). Under the statutory framework of the Groundwater Management and 
Protection Act (Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-701 to 753), groundwater quantity is first under 
the jurisdiction of the local NRDs, but requires NDNR approval for management 
plans, and the Department of Environmental Quality oversees water quality (Aiken 
1980; Blankenau 2010; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). NRDs can designate all or 
a portion of its district as management areas and issue cease and desist orders. They 
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have extra authority to regulate quantity and quality, allocate withdrawal amounts, 
institute rotating use systems, well spacing restrictions, require well meters and 
other methods to ensure best practices, and a sustainable access (Aiken 1980; Gaul 
1993; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). NRDs are largely independent of 
centralized state oversight except for those exceptions such as integrated 
groundwater management plans. 
 
INTEGRATION OF SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER 
 Until 1996, Nebraska had avoided incorporating ground and surface water 
laws, instead preferring to keep them separate, in contrast to Kansas (1945) and 
Colorado (1876 and 1882) (Peck 1995; Mossman 1996; Popelka 2004). Nebraska 
began the laborious process of merging and reconciling the laws and statues with 
2005’s LB 108, Integrated Water Management. It was undertaken in light of looming 
threatened legal action by Kansas alleging over-use by water users in the Republican 
River basin in violation of the Compact. Integrated Management Plans (IMPs) are 
the responsibility of NRDs who need approval from the NDNR’s director (Peck 
2007). Jurisdiction can be seen as jointly held between the two agencies, but NRDs 
have veto power over proposed IMPs. IMPs are a planning mechanism to address 
water management and are not regulatory measures. Additionally, a late 1980s 
drought had decimated the western Sand Hills region of the state along with 
depleting groundwater levels (Gless and Longo 2008). Despite the Nebraska 
legislative efforts, Kansas filed suit with the U.S. Supreme Court in 1998, Kansas v. 
Nebraska and Colorado, No. 125 the Original (Popelka 2004); resolution occurred 
in 2002 with the Final Settlement Stipulation (FSS) and development of a 
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groundwater model (Blankenau 2010; Schlager et al. 2012; Griggs 2017; RRCA 
n.d.a., n.d.c.). Groundwater continues to be managed by the NRDs and surface water 
by the NDNR. 
 A 2002 Water Policy Task Force (Legislative Bill 1003) was commissioned to 
investigate integrated water management and make policy recommendations 
including surface and groundwater inequities and how to address them (UNL Water 
2017; NDNR n.d.). The legislative result of the task force’s recommendation is 
Nebraska’s Groundwater Management and Protection Act or LB 962 (Neb. Rev. Stat 
46, 7 (2004)) and is “perhaps the most significant water policy legislation ever 
passed by the Nebraska legislature” according to Don Blankenau, former legal 
counsel, assistant and interim director for the Nebraska Department of Water 
Resources (now DNR) (Blankenau 2009). With their political clout and numbers, 
groundwater users and promoters were able to ascertain protections in their favor, 
while surface water users have fewer protections, but more than previously provided 
(Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). It established cooperative efforts between NRDs 
and the NDNR to further develop water management plans. Those plans are 
designed to promote economic prosperity, including the agriculture sector, for 
hydrologically connected surface and groundwater areas that is equitable and 
optimizes beneficial use; these hydrological relationships need unique management 
strategies (Ostdiek 2009; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). One task given to the 
DNR is to conduct annual evaluations for basins previously undesignated as fully- or 
over-appropriate; these designations refer to the number of wells and available 
water. Nebraska already has nearly 50% of its river basins designated as fully or 
over-appropriated; it includes all or part of 11 NRDs as designated by the NDNR 
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(Ostdiek 2009; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015; Figure 4.8). The NDNR can issue 
stays for new surface or groundwater uses in fully- or over-appropriated basins, who 
are required to have Integrated Management Plans (IMPs) developed by the NDNR 
and NRDs. Affected basins are the Platte River and its three segments, South, North 
and main, the Republican River, the White River, the Hat Creek River, and the 
Niobrara River (Ostdiek 2009; Bleed and Hoffman Babbitt 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Nebraska Fully- and Over-Appropriated River Basins (South Platte 
Natural Resource District. n.d.). 
 
 The most notable legal challenge to LB 962 was the Spear T Ranch v. Knaub 
(691 N.W. 2d 116, 2005). A surface water user (Spear T Ranch) alleged that a 
neighboring groundwater user (Knaub) had dewatered Pumpkin Creek and the 
surface water user’s right was impaired as a result. Spear T sought an injunction to 
prevent further pumping and $4,000,000 in damages because Knaub had injured 
their economic livelihood (Blankenau, Wilmoth, and Bromm 2005; Aiken 2006). 
The district court’s decision that the district court had no jurisdiction and that Spear 
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T should have done more legally was appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The 
Nebraska Attorney General and the Nebraska State Irrigation Association were two 
of five parties who filed amicus (friend of the court) briefs (Blankenau, Wilmoth, and 
Bromm 2005; Aiken 2006). The Supreme Court declined to apply surface water 
appropriation rules to the conflict and suggested that it was a conflict best resolved 
by the Nebraska legislature (Blankenau, Wilmoth, and Bromm 2005; Aiken 2006). 
However, the Court put hydrologically connected groundwater into the riparian 
system; in other words, hydrologically connected groundwater essentially became 
riparian water. It put groundwater well owners and municipalities at risk for liability 
even when they were lawfully using groundwater (Blankenau, Wilmoth, and Bromm 
2005; Aiken 2006). As J. David Aiken so clearly states, 
If groundwater users are not financially liable for the harm resulting from a 
dried-up stream, the message is that protecting streamflows has no value, a 
message that could well doom future administrative efforts to protect 
Nebraska streamflows. Payment…would support the political case that 
protecting streamflows now…is a better policy than waiting for the streams to 
go dry. 
 Nebraska has finally recognized in both its statutes and in its water 
jurisprudence that surface and ground water are hydrologically connected. 
However, just as streamflow depletion from tributary ground water pumping 
has taken decades to become manifest, there will likely be decades of trial and 
error iteration before our HC [hydrologically connected] water policies 
become comprehensive (2006, 996). 
 
 Recent legislative action that addresses Nebraska water challenges includes 
2014’s LB 1098, the Water Sustainability Fund (Nebraska Revised Statute 46-755). 
It has three elements. One, for basins with required IMPs and three or more NRDs, a 
basin-wide management plan must be designed. Two, it created a Water 
Sustainability Fund to meet statewide sustainability goals, and three, it expanded the 
state’s Natural Resources Commission. The basin-wide plans incorporate three water 
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goals: sustainability, compliance, and a 30-year deadline. The Republican River 
basin is the only state basin that must develop a plan and overlap with IMPs in the 
basin is expected (NDNR 2017; Nebraska Natural Resources Commission n.d.). The 
bill is an attempt at funding water management plan development and reconciling 
the needs of surface and groundwater users at the basin level within NDNR and NRD 
legislative directives. NDNR has held on going meetings for the Republican River 
Basin-wide Management Plan since March 2015 and hopes to complete the plan by 
late 2017 or early 2018 (NDNR 2017).  
 Legislative action since the 1990s has clarified Nebraska water policy with 
NRDs by recognizing hydrological connections and requiring annual basin 
evaluations for well appropriation density (Mossman 1996; Peck 2007; Gless and 
Longo 2008), but issues remain. For example, NRDs determine a basin’s water 
status as under-, fully- or over-appropriated, and it benefits them to designate basins 
as fully- rather than over-appropriated, avoiding the annoying hydrological 
connection complications. In simple terms an under-, fully-, and over-appropriated 
basin refers to surface water and hydrologically connected groundwater and the 
quantity of available water in the present and into the future. Fully-appropriated 
implies that those water supplies are equal to but not beyond the amount of water 
available over the long-term. Over-appropriated means that demand exceeds supply, 
and both surface flows and groundwater table levels will decline to such an extent 
that water will become unavailable or be too expensive to access (Ostdiek 2009). 
Nebraska’s Rev. Stat. 46-713(3) and (4)(a) sets out very specific criteria for basin 
identification including whether or not it is subject to an interstate cooperative 
agreement. Over-appropriation explicitly states that the interstate cooperative 
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agreement has to be between three or more states. The only basin in Nebraska that 
meets the criteria is the Republican River with the 1943 Compact. Having such a 
designation can trigger closures in the basin and suspend drilling new wells (NDNR 
2005). To date, the Republican River basin has been designated as a fully-
appropriated basin. 
 Furthermore, surface water remains under prior appropriation rights and 
groundwater has correlative rights through the Groundwater Management 
Protection Act (Mossman 1996). Gless and Longo (2008) observe that “litigation in 
Nebraska has been and continues to be a major method of water policy making“(92) 
and that the court will continue to play an important role in water law and policy 
especially without legislative guidance. 
 Water as a physical entity respects its own boundaries, but people can shift 
those boundaries under political and social demands with diversions, reservoirs, and 
usage allocations in space and in time. Jeff (Gordon) Fassett, current Director of the 
NDNR, acknowledges that border areas are becoming more important, particularly 
where two political borders meet but their physical and policy realities differ 
(NSIA/NWMA 2016). Interstate water compacts are one means for states that share 
a river basin and its waters to accommodate their mutual interests. The next section 
describes the development of interstate compacts and the Republican River Compact 






WATER LAW AND THE REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT 
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
 Interstate compacts owe their origin to Delph Carpenter, a Colorado water 
lawyer who saw an opportunity to solve water conflicts between states that did not 
rely on federal litigation (Tyler 2003). As a native Coloradoan who was raised on an 
irrigated farm in northeastern Colorado’s Weld County near Greeley, he brought his 
intellect and personal experiences to bear on solving interstate water problems in a 
manner that recognized the need for comity over priority or competition (Tyler 
2003; Rettig 2017a). By applying comity for states in an interstate agreement, it 
meant that each state was internally independent from the others, respected the 
other states’ internal decisions, and at the same time adhered to the agreed upon 
compact regulations and rules. Thus, state’s rights were largely protected from 
compact interference and the other states. 
 Two early interstate lawsuits alerted Carpenter to explore alternatives to trial 
court cases: Kansas v. Colorado for the Arkansas River (1907), and Wyoming v. 
Colorado for the Laramie River (1911-1912). These cases exposed Colorado’s 
vulnerability to downstream states’ claims to upstream water that had its origins in 
Colorado (Sherow 1990; Tyler 2003), and in general downstream exposure to 
upstream overuse. In the Kansas v. Colorado case, Carpenter had concluded that 
Colorado was eventually going to have to supply water to Kansas (Tyler 2003). In the 
case of Wyoming v. Colorado, Carpenter was the legal counsel for the Greeley-
Poudre Irrigation District. It was constructing a tunnel to transfer water from the 
Laramie River and basin to the Cache la Poudre River and basin for irrigation use. 
With the filing by Wyoming and their claim to the Laramie River water, Colorado 
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appointed him as lead defense counsel; he argued this case twice (1916 and 1918) 
before the U.S. Supreme Court (Tyler 2003). His initial view that Colorado was 
entitled to all the Laramie River water underwent a transformation to an equitable 
share position. During this period, and along with a suit from Nebraska on the South 
Platte River, it became clear to him and others that Colorado would need to address 
interstate water issues, and that interstate compacts would be more effective than 
litigation (Tyler 2003).  
 Carpenter took the U.S. Constitution’s compact clause (Article I, section 10 
that refers to agreements made between states) and applied it to interstate water 
conflicts (Tyler 2003), meaning congressional approval for such an agreement would 
be necessary. He proposed it in 1920 at a League of the Southwest conference that 
was focused on the Colorado River (Tyler 2003; Rettig 2017b). As a result of his 
ingenuity and desire to protect western states’ control of western water rather than 
federal control from the Department of Interior or the Bureau of Reclamation, 
Colorado became party to nine interstate compacts. Carpenter was instrumental in 
seven, the most significant the 1922 Colorado River Compact (Tyler 2003; Rettig 
2017a). Other states would follow Colorado’s lead. 
 Another important case that influenced Carpenter and interstate compacts is 
the Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co. (U.S. Supreme Court 
1938). The Supreme Court ruled that the apportionment is binding to each state’s 
citizens regardless of earlier granted state water rights. Other pertinent holdings 
established in earlier cases include the waters of an interstate stream must be 
equitably apportioned between states, upstream states cannot divert or control all 
the water to the detriment of downstream states, states cannot internally authorize 
 113 
more water than its share, water use can be rotated between the states dependent on 
conditions, and that the Court retains the jurisdiction to determine the validity and 
effect of the compact (Peck 1995; Griggs 2017; Justia 2017). 
 Additionally, Western water compacts were often negotiated with limited 
streamflow data and an assumed long-term stable streamflow that would 
accommodate use (Schlager et al. 2012). That assumption has critical ramifications 
for surface flows as groundwater pumping has increased, for understanding 
historical and contemporary hydrological connections, changing environmental 
conditions such as increasing temperatures impacting evaporation rates, shifting and 
increasing populations with their accompanying water demands, and peoples’ 
changing water perspectives. These issues are ones that socio-hydrologists, 
geographers, water managers, and legislators are working to address (Michaels and 
Kenney 2000; Barnett et al. 2008; Sugg et al. 2016; Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017a). 
Market-culture values shift as perceptions of water and nature shift. 
 
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT 
 The 1943 Republican River Compact is part of Delph Carpenter’s legacy in the 
tri-basin states. Its eleven articles address among other items efficient use, equitable 
division, comity, beneficial use, flood protection, the river’s virgin water, state 
allocations, and reservoir and diversion construction. The basin itself presents 
physical challenges, since droughts are frequent and surface water is scarce due to 
unpredictable annual and seasonable precipitation  
 Encouraged by various federal initiatives like the 1841 Pre-Emption Act, the 
1862 Homestead Act, the 1873 Timber Act, the 1877 Desert Land Act (only 
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Colorado), and the 1902 Newlands Reclamation Act people migrated to and settled 
in the larger region and the Republican River basin. Their economic base was 
primarily agriculture, dry land farming, and ranching. If they had access to surface 
water, some were able to divert water and irrigate small portions of their claim or 
form mutual irrigation ditch companies (Manley 1993; Griggs 2012). A few were able 
to use windmills and pump easily accessible groundwater (Manley 1993; Schafer 
1993). Successful operations encouraged others to find their way to the remote 
Republican River valley, and eventually small communities found a foothold. Of 
these Acts, perhaps the most important to residents of the valley is the 1902 
Newlands Reclamation Act. With its promise of irrigation water projects from the 
funding of semi-arid federal land sales, Western residents would be able to have 
reliable water (Griggs 2012), at least theoretically. 
 The 1930s saw a nearly decade-long drought in the Great Plains. In the 
Republican valley, it was compounded by a deadly 1935 flashflood that claimed at 
least 100 lives. These two events, the region’s ongoing need for agricultural water, 
local leaders’ demands for help, and the Reclamation’s vision of a comprehensive 
basin plan in an undeveloped location led them to propose a solution. Reclamation 
would assist with flood protection by capturing high flows in nine dams and 
reservoirs and then deliver those excesses via irrigation canals to irrigation districts 
for their use (Manley 1993; Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2012, 2017; RRCA n.d.a.). 
However, in order to receive the benefits of federal assistance, Reclamation required 
the states to participate in an interstate compact to allocate the Republican River’s 
water and reduce potential litigation among them (Griggs 2017). An earlier 1929 
interstate compact attempt was unsuccessful when Kansas declined to participate 
 115 
(Blankenau 2010), but the latter 1943 attempt was successful and the Compact 
became law.  
 Virgin water supplies were divided among the states and defined as “the water 
supply within the Basin undepleted by the activities of man” (Republican River 
Compact). The annual virgin water supply equaled all the gaged flows of the river 
and its tributaries plus the flow amount not impacted by human activity (Blankenau 
2010), for example, water provided from a source outside the river basin that could 
augment flows. The basin’s water was divided as follows: Colorado receives 11%, 
Nebraska receives 49%, and Kansas receives 11% for its upstream portion and 29% 
for its downstream portion to total 40% (Blankenau 2010, Republican River 
Compact). “Virgin water” was defined as “the waters of the basin undepleted by the 
activities of man.” As written at the time, hydrological connections were less well 
understood, but with the advent of submersible pumps, center pivot irrigation, and 
better hydrologic science, conflicts became inevitable between surface and 
groundwater users and the states, lately requiring augmentation projects due to 
Nebraska overuse (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017; Figure 4.9). 
 In 1961, the Republican River Compact Commission (later the Compact 
Administration or RRCA) met to develop policies and procedures for water 
calculations, implementations, and state adoptions; a full 17 years after ratification. 
Kansas requested that groundwater well pumping impacts be part of the 
calculations, but was rebuffed; alluvial wells near the river were already included 
(Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2012). Irrigation usage continued to increase over the next 
few decades, especially with Nebraska groundwater wells; declining streamflow 
became a concern for Kansas. Kansas again requested the RRCA to include non-
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alluvial well impacts as part of RRCAs accounting rules and procedures to which 
Nebraska objected (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017; RRCA n.d.a.; Figure 4.10). 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Colorado and Nebraska Compact Augmentation Projects: Colorado 
Compact Pipeline (CCP), Rock Creek, and N-CORPE (KDA n.d.). 
 
 Without resolution between the two states for adopting non-alluvial well 
procedures, Kansas filed a U.S. Supreme Court complaint in 1998 against Nebraska 
and Colorado, Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, No. 125, the Original (Blankenau 
2010; Griggs 2012, 2017). In the case of interstate water compacts, disputes between 
states falls under U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction. Kansas sought to compel the 
adoption for non-alluvial wells i.e., groundwater wells, and Nebraska filed a petition 
to dismiss Kansas’s suit. In response, the U.S. Supreme Court assigned a Special 
Master who oversaw various reports, exceptions, amendments, and mediations 
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eventually culminating in the 2002 FSS that incorporates groundwater into the 
Compact (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2012, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Republican River Basin Groundwater Irrigated Acres, 1940-2016 
(RRCA n.d.c.; Author). 
 
 The FSS is a 5-volume report with two primary features: one, the joint 
development of a basin wide numeric groundwater model, and two, using a multi-
year average methodology (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017). The groundwater model 
includes hydrological connections and calculating streamflow depletions from 
groundwater (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017). A running mean or multi-year average 
to determine allocations means that low or high precipitation years can more readily 
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predictions and offer an opportunity to construct regulations that ensure compliance 
(Blankenau 2010). 
 Of the three states, Nebraska was the only one who did not already have 
groundwater monitoring procedures in place (Schlager et al. 2012; Griggs 2017). 
Colorado’s response was to create the Republican River Water Conservation District 
to meet its Compact duties. Colorado is committed to retiring surface water wells 
and using a groundwater augmentation pipeline (Jones and Cech 2009; RRWCD 
2009; Deb Daniels, manager RRWCD, pers. comm. 2016; Griggs 2017; Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11. Republican River Water Conservation District groundwater 
augmentation pipeline, Colorado (RRCWD 2009). 
 
 Because the river’s streamflow volumes are unpredictable, presently states 
make predictions based on forecasts that include past use and predicted future 
needs. As an example, see the NDNR’s Forecast of Allowable Depletions in the 
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Republican Basin documents on their website. Based on the forecast, Nebraska as an 
upstream state determines how much water will be available for use and how much 
needs to be sent downstream to meet the commitment to Kansas. Once the irrigation 
season is over, the states use FSS procedures to determine the “actual” amount of 
virgin water that was available and whether or not each state stayed within their 
allocation (NDNR 2016).  
 The states agreed that the actual groundwater model use would begin with 
2006, giving them time to develop and coordinate a complicated hydrological model. 
Concerns arose by 2005 over possible accounting inaccuracies in the model, accurate 
hydrologic connections, and Nebraska over-use (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017). In 
2005 and 2006, Nebraska overused 35,000 AFY each year (Griggs 2017). Kansas 
agreed with Nebraska that inaccuracies existed, but did not agree to rule 
modifications. That meant the 2006 calculations could not be certified or approved 
by the RRCA (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017); they were not certified until 2015 
(RRCA n.d.c.). 
 The two states continued to be at odds, each seeking resolution with non-
binding arbitration. A 2009 arbitrator’s 73-page decision basically rejected Kansas's 
demands to reduce the number of groundwater wells, did not endorse a river master, 
and limited their damages to $10,000. The arbitrator advised Nebraska to institute 
better regulation in light of future drought conditions and agreed that the calculation 
should change, but rejected Nebraska’s proposal regarding model inaccuracies 
(Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017). The decision did not take into consideration over-
use during non-drought conditions (Griggs 2017).  
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 Nebraska did undertake efforts to lessen groundwater pumping impacts by 
modifying its Integrated Management Plans with the NRDs and NDNR (Blankenau 
2010; Griggs 2017). Nebraska’s 1996 LB 108 had required the Republican River 
basin’s four NRDs to take a basin-wide approach, since the basin was under the 
greatest scrutiny (Mossman 1996; Griggs 2017). Neither IMP modification nor a 
basin approach was adequate for Kansas.  
 In 2010, Kanas filed another petition against Nebraska with the Supreme 
Court with three claims. One, that Nebraska was in contempt of the Compact and the 
FSS for 2005 and 2006; two, Kansas wanted damages based on Nebraska’s gain and 
a mandatory shutdown on 170,000 acres of groundwater irrigated acreage; and 
three, fixed penalties for future violations and a river master assigned until Nebraska 
fundamentally changed their groundwater laws (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2017). 
Nebraska challenged Kansas for the accounting procedures and cross-claimed 
against Colorado for water (Griggs 2012). Its counterclaim alleged that because the 
accounting procedures were flawed, the state was being charged for water 
consumption that had originated in the Platte River basin (Griggs 2017). 
 In turn, Nebraska has constructed and begun using two groundwater 
augmentation pipelines (Rock Creek and N-CORPE) to fulfill its obligations at the 
expense of its surface water users and in opposition to Reclamation (RRWCD 2009; 
Knapp 2013; Griggs 2017; N-CORPE 2017). N-CORPE is a $120 million project 
(between the four NRDs in the basin) that uses 30 high capacity groundwater wells 
on the northern edge of the basin adjacent to the Platte River basin. It sends water 
through pipelines to Medicine Creek and began operations in 2014; water can also be 
sent to the Platte River (N-CORPE 2017; Figure 4.12). Rock Creek began operations 
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in 2013 and is operated by the Upper Republican NRD; it has 10 wells and empties 
into the North Fork of the Republican River (N-CORPE 2017). Colorado’s 
preemptive, voluntary, and difficult response to meet Kansas’s water requirements 
was to drain Bonny Reservoir on the South Fork of the Republican River in fall 2010 
into spring 2011, retire surface water wells, and construct a compliance pipeline that 
uses groundwater (RRWCD 2009; KDA 2016a). In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that Nebraska owed Kansas monetary damages for overuse ($5.5 million), but 
did not need to shut down wells or have a temporary River Master assigned to 
oversee basin activities (Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 Supreme Court), but each state 
claimed victory (Hendee 2015; Knapp 2015). An important note, however, is the 
Supreme Court dissent response. It contends that there was no water miscalculation, 
that Nebraska simply wanted full credit for any supplemental created water like 
augmentation or seepage from the Platte into the Republican (Griggs 2017). 
 At this writing, together the three states and the RRCA have taken two 
positions. One, they oppose Reclamation who is charged with protecting the 
irrigation districts (NBID and KBID). Two, the RRCA has allowed Nebraska to 
subvert its Compact duties by receiving 100% credit for groundwater augmentation, 
even though losses occur via evaporation and transport, and epically failing to 
support its Compact surface water farmers by shutting down surface water rights as 




Figure 4.12. N-CORPE Augmentation Project Outlet at Medicine Creek, Lincoln 
County, Nebraska (UNL Water Center 2013). 
 
 A case in point is the 2017 Nebraska Supreme Court ruling in Hill v. Nebraska 
and Nebraska DNR (296 Neb. 10). The suit was filed because both 2013 and 2014 
were Compact Call Years (surface water rights closing notices are issued) based on 
the NDNR’s water forecast calculations, so the Frenchman-Cambridge irrigation 
district and irrigators essentially had no surface water for irrigation. The court found 
that Furnas County irrigators and the Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District 
could not claim that one, the state and NDNR had illegally taken their rights to 
surface water under the Nebraska constitution because the Compact as a federal 
statute supersedes individual water rights, and two, the NDNR, again under the state 
constitution, does not have jurisdiction to control groundwater. In fact, there is no 
central authority that controls groundwater in the state rather it is under local 
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control. The recent ruling points to the dominance of groundwater, the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to more closely regulate groundwater use (legislative 
action), the need to fulfill Compact obligations at the cost of surface irrigators, and 
the fact that surface water irrigators in Frenchman-Cambridge and Nebraska 
Bostwick Irrigation Districts have very limited avenues to address orders and closing 
notices that directly impact their livelihoods. 
 These positions have political, legal, and hydrological ramifications at all 
scales for local growers, the federal courts, state agencies, losing streams, and 
depleted aquifers. Until state citizens and legislatures have meaningful water policy 
dialogues about all of water’s facets, surface water users will be the initial losers. 
Eventually everyone loses when the water is no longer accessible or replaceable. 
 
WATER POLICIES CONCLUSION 
 Water law and policy in all three states continues to undergo transformations 
through amendments, statutes, and repeals. The challenge facing Kansans as well as 
Nebraskans and Coloradoans on the Great and High Plains is not so much a question 
of individual rights, but how those rights fit into a changing environmental and 
demographic reality. For example, Colorado is expected to add 2.8 million people by 
2030, pushing the state population to 7.1 million. Nearly 87% (2.4 million) of those 
people will be in the eastern half of the state requiring an additional anticipated 
630,000 AFY or 205.3 billion gallons of water more per year for municipal and 
industrial use. By 2050 the state population will be 10 million and updated 
projections suggest 538,000 – 812,000 AFY more for municipal and industrial use 
(Jones and Cech 2009; Colorado Water Conservation Board n.d.a., n.d.b.). 
 124 
Agricultural land sales near Front Range communities garner attention more for 
their water rights than for the land itself (Worthington 2016). Growers in the San 
Luis valley have taxed their water use paying $75 per acre-foot pumped water plus 
$8 for each irrigated acre, and reduced their pumping by 30% (Runyon 2017). 
Technological advances in water delivery for agricultural efficiencies such as using 
the same amount of water to produce higher yields and seed genetics that allows 
plants to develop for longer periods of time between receiving water are helpful, but 
water once lost is difficult to replace. Precipitation fluctuates, droughts are 
unpredictable, some aquifers are essentially non-renewable at current withdrawal 
rates, urban demands outpace local water resources, and agricultural economics and 
aging populations mean the face of the Great Plains and its water resources and uses 
will change. There are limits to both surface and groundwater use. Nothing can be 
done about how the Republican River’s water is allocated between the states; it is a 
fixed consumptive value. The Compact has no incentive for water conservation. Re-
negotiation based on newer and better science, changing agricultural and water 
management practices, and shifting environmental conditions could be undertaken, 
although the RRCA could adopt rules that reflect such changes. The likelihood of any 
state voluntarily choosing a “new” compact over known advantages and 
disadvantages is doubtful. How the states choose to face their competing internal 
water demands is up to each state, but there could be ramifications for compact 
compliance. Internally, fair and equitable today may not be fair and equitable for 
future generations. Water rights compensation may be at the expense of urbanites 
and others who pay state and local taxes, and preserving water quantities and access 
may inflict hardships upon current generations to provide livelihoods for later state 
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and plains citizens. Neither solution is easily undertaken, but they highlight 
situations that could arise in the future.  
 Water resources are fluid, necessary and may be damaged by human activity. 
Since water disregards political borders, transboundary conflicts result. In the 
Republican River valley, the political boundaries that form the states, resource 
districts, counties, and irrigation districts override the basin’s physical boundaries. 
Therefore, water is subordinated to an artificial and arbitrary human border. 
Further, the socio-hydrologic relationship is based not only on resource location, but 
human activity in the form of agro-economics and politics, each of which dominates 
the basin’s hydrology. 
 Prominent water resource policy scholars Edella Schlager, Tanya Heikkila and 
colleagues provide insights to interstate compacts, conflicts, and Western water that 
have bearing on the Republican River situation that include reducing economic and 
political costs, polycentric governing as more cost effective for states, and 
adaptability under changing climatic conditions (Schlager et al. 2012; Schlager and 
Heikkila 2011). They suggest that interstate water compacts don’t match the settings 
for which they are devised. Compacts assume streamflow stability for long-term 
sharing, but they anticipate continued downstream versus upstream conflict due to 
changing precipitation, increased use, or both. The largest challenge may be climate 
change and state responses to changing streamflow under restrictive compact 
requirements such as specific flow requirements at state lines (Schlager et al. 2012). 
Solutions to these anticipated problems include renegotiation (unlikely), information 
sharing, accessible conflict resolution, and coordinated water action across state 
political lines (Schlager and Heikkila 2011). In reports from the IPCC and the U.S. 
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National Climate Assessment (IPCC 2013, 2014; Melillo et al. 2014), anthropogenic 
activity has impacted environmental conditions such that increasing temperatures 
and decreasing precipitation is anticipated, further complicating the socio-hydrology 
relationships and feedback loops. These in turn will influence the intensity and 
frequency of potential transboundary water resource conflicts. 
 The basin perspective for water challenges and conflicts has been presented 
with a wide-angle lens, but for the day-to-day users in the basin who work with these 
challenges on a personal basis it is always a micro-lens. Transboundary conflicts and 
depleted or damaged water resources have real and immediate impacts with short- 
and long-term sustainability consequences. Reasonable and workable solutions are 
needed in order to prevent irreparable breaks to people, their livelihoods, and the 
physical and hydrological systems that support them. If either system fails or 
becomes unusable, people fail too, so it behooves managers and decision-makers to 
work collectively with all actors to craft feasible and effective state laws, policies and 
regulations that benefit the state and its Compact obligations. It is the physical 
environment and climate along with economic and social drivers that ultimately 
shaped water law in the West (Hess 1916), their co-evolution in turn defining their 
socio-hydrology relative to the landscape. Understanding the historical context of 
events within the states and those that are directly tied to the Compact may help us 
be better prepared, if not to meet the future, at least see it on the horizon. 
 Chapter 5 continues the theme of water law and policy by assessing the 
Compact and FSS and their likelihood of implementation success. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT  
 
 Policy implementation is not easy; it is dynamic and fluid. The three states 
governed by the Republican River Compact have worked together externally through 
the RRCA to meet and address Compact stipulations while internally designing state 
statutes and regulations to meet those obligations. Adjustments and compromises at 
local and state scales have become necessary, as water use, water access, technology, 
and environmental conditions have changed since the Compact’s 1943 inception. 
 The 1998 Kansas v. Nebraska case saw Kansas challenge Nebraska about 
groundwater impacts. It was the first time one state had challenged another under 
the Compact. The most significant result was the 2002 Final Settlement Stipulation 
for the joint development and implementation of a groundwater model to assist the 
states with their annual water use to remain within Compact limits. The second 
federal challenge was the enforcement of the 2002 FSS in the 2010 case Kansas v. 
Nebraska where Kansas sought damages against Nebraska’s overuse of water in 
2005 and 2006 (35,000 acre feet each year). The 2015 decision was a $5.5 million 
disgorgement from Nebraska to Kansas for accrued financial losses. Second, 
Nebraska did not have to reduce its groundwater irrigated acres by 170,000, since 
the Court felt that Nebraska’s legislative remedies (IMPs) were currently adequate 
(Griggs 2017). Challenges to the Compact’s application are ongoing between agencies 
and actors over water allocations, policy interpretations, power, jurisdiction, and 
legal and Compact intent; in 2016, there were four court filings in Nebraska related 
to the Compact. These legal challenges at the federal and state scales attest to the 
difficulty of implementing statutes under fluid environmental conditions and often 
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times rigid regulatory constraints. It is especially trying with the Compact, as it 
remains in its original form since ratification; the FSS accounting procedures served 
to clarify some Compact expectations. 
 Public policy research highlights the fact that implementation of existing law 
is not a given, even with the limited formal federal challenges to the Compact. Laws 
and regulations can be purposefully designed and structured to maximize the 
likelihood of successful implementation or to maximize delay and a pre-law status 
quo. Further, older laws like the 1943 Compact could not necessarily foresee future 
scientific, technical, or environmental changes that would challenge the character of 
the agreement. Policy implementation theory suggests that a careful exploration of 
the broader context of a statute’s situational position can reveal much about the 
likelihood of a statute achieving its goal. A policy implementation assessment of the 
Compact and the FSS can provide such context. 
 From a legal perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court views both the Compact and 
the FSS as legal contracts between the states. That lens differs from that of social 
science and policy implementation research whose rubrics for analysis may be 
considered functionalist and abstract, since they may not include historical and legal 
context for evaluating a statute or contract. Nonetheless, undertaking an analysis 
with a policy implementation perspective and tools can provide new and alternative 
insights to how statutes are interpreted and applied. 
 Policy process theories focus on different dependent variables like policy 
change, implementation, or statute passage and adoption. Overall effectiveness, 
monetary cost-benefit analysis or policy outputs are common measures whether 
undertaken from an economic, political, policy, research, or corporate position. 
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Approaches can be top-down or bottom-up. In social science, policy process theories 
include Rational Choice and Institutional Rational Choice (IRC), Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD), Common Pool Resources (CPR), Punctuated 
Equilibrium, Advocacy Coalition Framework, and diffusion models (Sabatier and 
Weible 2014). These same theoretical policy process approaches have been applied 
to natural and environmental resources that are subject to geographies of scale such 
as extracting common pool resources or interstate compact success. Air, water, 
timber, fossil fuels, pollution, mining, and fisheries are just a few resources that are 
subject to policy-based regulations. How those policy statutes and regulations are 
written and implemented can determine their success. For example, studies have 
been undertaken for forestry, marine ecosystems, resource co-management, socio-
ecological systems, and wildfires using these policy process theories (see Klooster 
2000; Busenberg 2004; Folke 2006; Cashore and Howlett 2007; Olsson et al. 2008; 
Weible et al. 2010; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). 
 Policy assessment is important because it helps us understand why some 
policy implementations are successful and others are not. It can facilitate crafting 
new or amending old policies to achieve a desired outcome. Undertaking a policy 
assessment of the Compact and FSS in conjunction with their impact on the 
irrigation districts of interest, i.e., the Bostwick and Frenchman-Cambridge, is 
appropriate. The districts are directly impacted by any decisions made by their states 
or the RRCA. Because they are not explicitly named in the Compact, the Nebraska 
DNR can choose to limit the Nebraska Bostwick and Frenchman-Cambridge 
Irrigation Districts’ surface water access at virtually any time as long as proper notice 
is given to the district and their irrigators. By so doing, Nebraska fulfills its water 
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obligation to Kansas at the expense of its own growers. Without specific inclusion in 
the Compact, the districts are essentially shut out of any decision-making process. 
 I employ Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1981) theoretical policy process lens to 
examine the Compact and FSS, specifically how a statute’s or legal document’s legal 
language does or does not provide clarity of guidance for implementation. The 
theory provides a framework that moves towards predicting the likelihood of statute 
success. My findings are important because they offer an additional avenue to 
explore and deconstruct statutes, provide a means to examine transboundary water 
conflicts, and contribute to a better understanding of the Compact’s role in the 
basin’s socio-hydrology. 
 The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. First, I place the 
Compact and the FSS within the context of the basin itself to provide a sense of place 
and to identify some of the socio-hydrological relationships. Second, I describe how I 
adopt Mazmanian and Sabatier’s methodology. Third, I assess statute 
implementation. It is divided into two major sub-groups, the Compact and the FSS. 
The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusion. 
 
SOCIO-HYDROLOGICAL SETTING  
 Most directly impacted by the Compact and its associated regulations are 
three basin irrigation districts — Nebraska and Kansas Bostwick Irrigation Districts 
and the Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District, none of whom are directly named 
in the Compact. The districts are in Bureau of Reclamation divisions for the Pick-
Sloan Missouri River basin project (USBR 2017b). The Compact’s objective is to 
equitably allocate the virgin waters of the basin between Colorado, Kansas, and 
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Nebraska. The Compact’s framers envisioned irrigation development in the basin as 
largely limited to surface water and canals based on streamflow estimates of the time 
and the difficulty of accessing deep groundwater (Ann Bleed, former Nebraska DNR 
Director, pers. comm. 2016). Under those conditions they calculated that there 
would be adequate water supplies for irrigators and growers. However, the later 
development of well-pumping technology and center pivot irrigation allowed 
groundwater to be tapped and mined to irrigate upland and marginal acres of the 
basin rather than remaining concentrated in the flood plain and lower valley, the 
alluvial plain (Schafer 1993; Getches 2009; Jones and Cech 2009; Kromm 2011; 
Korus et al. 2013). Increased groundwater use has led to a lower water table, and in 
some places the fear of severing the hydrological connection between surface and 
groundwater, leading to not only decreasing streamflows, but groundwater 
depletions (Bentall and Shaffer 1979; Harnsberger and Thorson 1984; Moody et al. 
1989; Aiken 2006; McGuire 2009; Konikow 2013; Castle et al. 2014; KGS n.d.). The 
Compact as initially envisioned could not have foreseen the technological 
developments that have changed the basin’s waterscape. Climatic patterns and 
periodic drought have also impacted streamflow and surface water in both short and 
long-term periods most recently in 2000-2005 and 2012 (Burbach and Joeckel 
2006: NOAA 2013; Figure 5.1). Alluvium and groundwater recharge are affected 
when groundwater is extracted at rates greater than it can be replaced plus farming 
practices such as no till, terraces, and farm ponds retain water and can slow 
recharge. These factors and others beyond actual governance play a role in the 
basin’s socio-hydrology, but provide context for statutory implementation. At the 
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same time it acknowledges that theoretical applications may not always be able to 




Figure 5.1. U.S. Drought Monitor, 2002 and 2012 (NOAA n.d.c. 2013). 
 
 133 
 The bulk of the chapter is contained within the next two sections. It begins 
with a methodological description of the theory and the components that I use for 
my policy assessment. Next, two assessments are undertaken, one on the Compact 
and the other on the FSS. For each document’s assessment, tables display statutory 
structural implementation factors, representative descriptions from the documents 
that illustrate the factor, and an individual score or rank for each factor. Each 
document assessment includes factor discussions. 
 
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
 Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, 1989) offer a policy implementation analysis 
framework and methodology that provides insight about the likelihood of policy 
success based on the structure and language used in the statute itself and other 
important variables (Figure 5.2). Theirs is a top-down approach that examines policy 
from a centralized hierarchical position (Alterman and McRae 1983; Goggin 1984), 
expands upon earlier calls for policy implementation theory (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975), and has been empirically tested 
with various policies such as statutory and non-statutory environmental regulation 
(Goggin 1984; Sabatier 1986; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989; Winter 1990; Elson 
2005; Zhang et al. 2011; Wakita and Yagi 2013; Carter et al. 2015). In the case of the 
Compact, the centralized hierarchy and its associated power is the Compact 
document itself because it is supported by federal force, it is a federal law. Local 
forces such as state legislatures and various other agencies have important roles as 
well, but they are subordinate to the Compact’s power. As yet, an examination of the 
Compact with a distinct understanding of its legal power has not been undertaken 
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with a policy implementation assessment lens. My policy research assessment takes 
on that task. 
Figure 5.2. Mazmanian and Sabatier Policy Implementation Analysis. Based on 
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 Mazmanian and Sabatier offer three broad areas under which important 
independent statute or policy variables are identified: “(1) the tractability of the 
problem(s) being addressed; (2) the ability of the statute to structure favorably the 
implementation process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of political and social 
variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives” (1981, 21). All are built 
on the premise that “the implementation process is the rational pursuit by 
individuals of their desires for power, security, and well-being” (1981, 20). Studies 
that include Mazmanian and Sabatier’s independent variables and their factors 
range across disciplines and are not exclusive to their framework, as illustrated in 
the factor overviews that follow. 
  Tractability covers technical difficulty, target groups, and behavior change. In 
particular, tractability can highlight and capture local dynamics that influence 
statute implementation challenges. Target group research is frequent and diverse 
and can include statute implementation studies, since a statute is often designed to 
impact them; ample examples exist and are not needed here. A behavioral change 
study examined intergroup perceptions at three different points over a 17-year 
period to assess how collaborative and adversarial group policy-making perceptions 
changed. One finding was that positive perceptions were more likely to occur after 
collaborative policy-making, and that time was a factor (Weible et al. 2011). 
Numerous other studies exist as well, as they do for technical challenges.  
 Structural implementation covers objectives, causal theory, finances, 
integration, rules, and access. Two studies serve as examples. First, federal 
incarceration outcomes based on cumulative U.S. Supreme Court rulings have shown 
a causal relationship in district courts (Hall 2017). Second, climate change mitigation 
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and adaptation in Dutch cities are less likely outside the four largest cities because of 
municipal decentralization, external initiatives, and regionalization that have shifted 
the hierarchical integration (den Exter et al. 2015).  
 Non-statutory variables contain socioeconomic conditions, constituency 
groups and support, and leadership commitment. For example, oil extraction royalty 
distribution practices for regional development in Italy based on regional governance 
policies have not noticeably changed the socio-economics of the region (Rocchi et al. 
2015). Here a non-statutory factor, socio-economic, is connected to structural 
implementation via financial resources. 
 Research across disciplines and topics incorporate elements of Mazmanian 
and Sabatier’s theoretical framework without formal adoption of the theory itself. 
Regardless, policy variables and factors are studied extensively in order to 
understand the causes and consequences of policy, as these examples have shown. 
Tractability, non-statutory variables, and structure implementation are all 
independent variables that influence implementation stages and the likelihood of 
policy success. Changes in any of the three due to its own internal factors creates a 
ripple that may or may not be offset by other elements and influence statutory 
success, so understanding the context and conditions of any research study is 
important. 
 Likewise, water resources and associated policies can be approached from a 
variety of perspectives. Their policy regulation is difficult because water is spatially 
dynamic and transitory changing from solid, to liquid, to vapor across physical and 
social borders. Water evaporates from soil and the surfaces of lakes or streams and 
with gravity it runs downstream either at or below the land’s surface making it 
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difficult to physically and politically bound water in space. As a result, water’s 
behavior adds to the tractability of the problem. 
 Trans-boundary water studies occur at all scales, covering a variety of 
conflicts from quantity, quality, water rights, legal documents, power dynamics, and 
resolution options to issues of globalization and commodification (Swyngedouw 
1997; Matthews 2005; Bush et al. 2007; Dellapenna 2007; Schlager and Heikkila 
2009; Hathaway 2011; Katz and Moore 2011; Heikkila and Schalger 2012; Mooney 
and Tan 2012; Schalger et al. 2012; Sheelanere et al. 2013; Petersen-Perlman et al. 
2017; Zeitoun et al. 2017). Policies are a part of those conflicts. I give two relevant 
examples. Milman and Ray (2011) studied the Santa Cruz Aquifer that is accessible 
to U.S. and Mexican users who live in the states of Arizona and Sonora, respectively. 
They used hydrological data and interviews with people from both places. The water 
data, management, policies, and regulations for this shared aquifer differ, as do 
perceptions about groundwater availability, longevity, recharge, and other factors. A 
collaborative approach to the aquifer would be advantageous to each location, but 
instead the U.S. and Mexican water managers promote unilateral policies. Although 
this highlights an international challenge, the basics of the situation are applicable at 
any scale or location. Allison Sambol (2010) interviewed residents of the Republican 
River basin after the 1998 Kansas lawsuit to determine how or if opinions varied on 
each side of the Kansas-Nebraska border for this shared water resource. Based on 
interview responses, she concluded that court disputes and settlements were not 
meeting the needs of the basin’s residents, and that they were willing to work 
together to solve water scarcity issues. Although not explicit in either of these 
studies, the legal language, statute structure, and resulting regulations are important 
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drivers for successful policy solutions to water resource conflict, management, and 
users. 
 My research is the first use of Mazmanian and Sabatier’s structural 
implementation approach focused exclusively on the Compact’s parsimonious 
language and the FSS’s more expansive language to examine how it has shaped 
implementation and overall success (or not). By utilizing it, my work broadens policy 
implementation analysis and offers an avenue to discuss transboundary disputes and 
resolutions by specifically deconstructing the Compact’s legal language. Together, 
they contribute to building a socio-hydrological profile of the Republican River 
basin. 
 Since my assessment focuses on structural implementation, a brief 
description of its seven factors is helpful. They are provided in table format and 
include the assessment questions I am pursuing relevant to the Compact and FSS 
(Table 5.1). Questions can be applicable to the documents individually or for each of 
them. Factors are evaluated on a scale ranging from high, moderate, low, and neutral 
based on Mazmanian and Sabatier’s scale, and I define them as follows. High is 
interpreted to mean there are few if any inconsistencies, the language is clear, and 
implementation is likely. Moderate equals some language factor inconsistencies or 
concerns exist that may interfere with implementation or cause delays. A low rating 
implies extensive language obstacles and frequent ambiguous language or directives 
that will noticeably impede or prohibit implementation. A neutral score indicates the 
factor’s language has little or no impact on statute implementation. Statute 
implementation success is most likely when the independent variables and their 
associated factors illustrate moderate to high scores. 
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COMPACT STATUTE ASSESSMENT 
 The Republican River Compact is a simple document that contains 11 articles, 
including its purpose, definition of the basin, and making water allocations along 
with provisions for the Compact’s administration. Ratified in 1943 by the U.S. 
Congress, it sets forth an agreement between the three states over how the waters of 
the basin are to be divided for annual beneficial consumptive use in acre-feet. The 
2002 Special Master’s FSS in its entirety is a five-volume report further specifying 
allocations, timing, and accounting procedures that were not addressed in the 
original Compact (Blankenau 2010; Griggs 2012, 2017; RRCA n.d.a., n.d.c.). The 
main FSS document references 13 appendices that include schedules, maps, state 
laws on well construction, and water year plans. I assess the seven page Compact and 
the 40-page FSS that describes the overarching components of the settlement. The 
statute and agreement once confirmed and ratified required policy implementation 
at spatial and temporal scales dependent on the document itself. Successful 
implementation is not guaranteed and is itself reliant upon the language of the 
statute and its interpretation by government bureaucrats and those actors who must 
design, enact, and enforce the policy. 
 The statute and agreement are assessed with two overarching questions: one, 
do they include a specific service such as infrastructure or regulate a specific type of 
behavior such as equitable water use, if so what and how; and two, does the statute 
and agreement attain their objectives, and if so, how are they achieved (Mazmanian 
and Sabatier 1981). I anticipate that the language and structure of the two legal 
documents will be adequate to facilitate reasonable implementation. I discuss the 
answers in the chapter’s conclusion. 
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Table 5.1. Structural Implementation Factor Description and Assessment 
Questions 
1. CLEAR AND CONSISTENT DIRECTIVES 
• Refers to the importance of the statute’s objectives and goals, can assist agencies 
in their application of the statute, points to potential inconsistencies, and 
identifies the statute’s priority status. 
• Are the statute’s objectives identified and clearly stated? Are they prioritized? 
Do they provide implementation guidance? 
2. VALID CAUSAL THEORY 
• Addresses the connections between government intervention, achieving 
successful implementation, and providing adequate jurisdiction enforcement. It 
has a cognitive component, recognition of the problem and relationships to its 
solution, and a jurisdictional component, focused on assigning appropriate 
power to agencies or officials for implementation. 
• Is there a linked sequence of activities that will lead to statute success?  Is 
jurisdiction assigned to match the scale of the problem?  
3. FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
• Sets initial funding levels that provide for staffing and research. Unless it is 
guaranteed, renewal and appropriations are often up to legislatures. 
• Are there adequate financial resources to support and achieve statute success? 
4. HIERARCHICAL INTEGRATION 
• Refers to the ability of the statute to incorporate multiple agency cooperation. 
Veto points (the ability to overrule or object), incentives, and sanctions 
influence inter-agency cooperation to meet the statute’s goals. 
• Do the instituting groups have decision-making control?  Are there incentives 
and sanctions?  Are they enough to encourage cooperation? Can they be 
monitored and enforced? 
5. DECISION RULES 
• Identifies requirements and guidelines that can assist agencies in achieving 
success. 
• Are decision-making criteria and guidelines included? Are they supportive of 
the statute’s goals and objectives and for successful implementation?   
6. OFFICIALS’ COMMITMENT 
• Refers to administrative persistence and fit, need for program support, and 
ideal assignment to an agency with a similar mission and agenda. 
• Are guidelines for administrative assignment and action provided? 
7. OUTSIDE ACCESS 
• Provides a mechanism for people who are not part of the agency implementing 
the statute to either support or challenge it. 
• Are access opportunities for outsiders identified and included? 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; Carter et al. 2015) 
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 I present a tabulated assessment for the Compact and FSS documents 
individually with representative quotes from the documents themselves or summary 
statements to illustrate how factors do or do not fulfill Mazmanian and Sabatier’s 
policy implementation framework (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). For example, in assessing the 
Compact’s clarity and consistency, Factor One, I describe the language as ambiguous 
and quote “most efficient use of the waters for multiple purposes” to support the 
description, while others may be statements or conclusions like “no clearly identified 
target groups.” A discussion of the factors’ assessment and ratings follows each table. 
Tractability and non-statutory variables are discussed jointly in Appendix A to 
provide a simple assessment of those two independent variables and the larger 
framework. 
 
COMPACT STATUTE ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The Compact scores Low on my adapted Mazmanian and Sabatier’s 
implementation scale, since none of the factors provide enough detail and specificity 
about goals, objectives, techniques, or other elements. The statute’s language and 
intent is simple and focused on then-current 1940s conditions and practices, with 
little anticipation or foresight regarding potential conflict whether it be political, 
socio-economic, or hydrological. However, Delph Carpenter did have the foresight to 
propose interstate compacts (Tyler 2003; Rettig 2017a); without them more 
litigation among states likely would have been more prevalent. None of the factors 
and their variables is fully addressed. All the factors lack specificity and it has 
directly led to conflict between the states, notably the U.S. Supreme Court lawsuits 
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that have addressed the lack of specificity (discussed with the FSS assessment). In 
part it may be attributable to a gap between the nature of the problem and its 
proposed solutions. As a legal contract between the states, standard contractual 
language is embedded further clouding some elements of specificity. The Compact 
recognized the administration of the Compact through each state’s water 
administrator, and the states later formed the RRCA pursuant to Article IX. 
However, the jurisdictional power to impose sanctions on any partner state and 
avoid expensive federal lawsuits is weak. As a result, the states squabble amongst 
one other, since they can veto proposals from the other states and their arbitration 
process is non-binding. Whether or not the veto option was included to undermine 
implementation is difficult to address; it protects individual states but at the expense 
of the others and the basin’s water. See Table 5.2 for each factor’s specific 
assessment and examples. 
 
CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY 
 Article I of the statute sets forth goals that lack clarity and specificity. For 
example, the phrases “remove all causes that might lead to controversy” and 
“promote comity” are undefined. Three federal compact cases at the time could have 
provided substantial guidance in that area. Colorado and Kansas were continuing to 
battle over the Arkansas River (Kansas v. Colorado 1902-1907 and Colorado v. 
Kansas 1943-44) and Nebraska and Wyoming were feuding over the North Platte 
River. (Nebraska v. Wyoming 1945). These cases could have helped to address 
future water controversies. These issues remain unaddressed by the Compact. Goals 
exist as a list without prioritization in Article I. A reader may infer that the first one 
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in the list is the most important, most efficient use for multiple purposes rather than 
the last one, joint action for efficient use and flood control. Thus, each State can 
determine how they want to prioritize the goals, rather than having a single system. 
Without explicit priorities there exists the potential to undermine the Compact’s 
intent of equitable allocation. 
 Equitable division of the basin’s water does receive more attention in Articles 
III and IV. Each drainage basin has a calculated acre-feet based on average annual 
virgin water supplies, sub-divided and allocated to a State proportionally based on 
what percentage of a basin is within its political borders. There is some reference to 
changing physical conditions whether by man or nature and how to adjust 
allocations. Groundwater wells and their impact on surface flows has been the most 
contentious state issue, particularly during droughts and periods of below-normal 
precipitation. All sub-basin allocations are for beneficial consumptive use, one of 











Table 5.2. Republican River Compact Policy Implementation Assessment 
STRUCTURE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
FACTORS AND SCORE 
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT, 1943 
STRUCTURAL IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES 




Ambiguous objective prioritization and clarity 
• most efficient use of the waters for multiple purposes; 
• remove all causes that might lead to controversy; 
• promote interstate comity; 
• recognize that the most efficient use is for beneficial 
consumptive use, although state law provide 
guidance; 
• promote joint action for efficient use and flood 
control. 




Limited and inadequate problem recognition 
• only 3 defined terms:  acre-foot, virgin water supply, 
beneficial consumptive use; 
• no time limits or guidelines because it is considered 
perpetual; 
• no clearly identified target groups; 
• limited non-statutory variable inclusion; 
• limited technical means. 




Imprecise jurisdictional control and authority  
• administered by the State official in charge of public 
(state) water supplies; 
• States have greatest control; 
• U.S. can use water beneficially (under state law) but it 




Absent initial or ongoing appropriations process 
• Facility repair and replacement subject to upper State 
laws; 





Multiple actor veto points 
• requires ratification by State Legislature and U.S. 
Congress; 
• water storage or diversion projects in an upper State 
by a Lower state subject to upper State’s laws; 
• rules and regulations must have unanimous approval 
from all State administrators; 
• States cannot hinder U.S. rights, powers and 
jurisdiction in the Basin, including the ability to 
acquire rights and use water in the Basin. 
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Table 5.2. (continued) 
STRUCTURE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
FACTORS AND SCORE 
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT 1943 








• States can file lawsuits against other Compact States if 
the terms of the Compact are violated. 
o No exercise of power or right that would 
interfere with beneficial consumptive water 
use. 
• No enforcement mechanisms and the rights of the 
U.S. are unclear. 
5. DECISION RULES 
LOW 
Limited guidelines and requirements  
• A state official who is charged with carrying out the 
duties of the Compact; 
• All 3 state officials unanimously may adopt rules and 
regulations; 
• USGS collaborates with states for collection, 





Two references to administrative needs 
• A state official to administer public water and 
associated activities such as data collect; 
• USGS will collaborate with state officials for proper 
Compact administration. 
7. OUTSIDE ACCESS 
LOW 
No identified outside actors or mechanisms for engagement 
Key: High = stronger asset for implementation; Moderate = reasonable asset with 
some potential problems; Low = unlikely asset with notable problems; Neutral = little 




 The relational connections between the problem’s cause and how to solve the 
problem is poorly done; problems have limited explanation throughout the 
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document. Not even the catalyst for the Compact is included in its opening: “The 
States … having resolved to conclude a compact with respect to the waters of the 
Republican River Basin.”  Few solutions are offered through the Compact’s language 
and structure, even some may argue that the allocation is the solution. However, 
without a direct recognition or statement of any initiating events, other than the fact 
that the three states share the basin, it is difficult to see how an allocation can be the 
sole solution to potential problems.  
 As written, the target group appears to be the three states and makes no direct 
mention of other stakeholders in the basin other than a few references to persons or 
entities that could be interpreted to include current and future irrigation districts. 
(Legally such language and presentation is intentional under constitutional law since 
states speak for their citizens.) In this way, the states can be perceived as monolithic 
entities without any checks and balances provided by outside actors whether 
ordinary citizens, interest groups, or irrigators. Consequently, adjustments due to 
shifting demographics, variable economic conditions, new scientific data, and 
changing water quantities due to environmental conditions invite conflict either 
internally or between the states.  
 Nebraska’s Frenchman-Cambridge and Bostwick Irrigation Districts (FCID 
and NBID), as basin stakeholders and potential target groups, have filed multiple 
lawsuits against Nebraska and its agencies. For example, in 2014 four members of 
the FCID sued NDNR for halting the district’s surface water storage and diversion 
permits and letting groundwater pumpers over-use groundwater, claiming that such 
an action was ‘inverse condemnation’ of their water rights. Irrigation users have 
been denied surface water for five years beginning in 2013, each of them a Compact 
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Call year. A Compact Call or Water Short Year occurs when the NDNR determines 
that there will not be enough water moving downstream to Kansas from Nebraska. 
As a result, they issue a closing order to surface water irrigators in the basin (NDNR 
2016, n.d.). The Furnas County District Court dismissed the suit in 2016, and it was 
upheld upon appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court in 2017, who noted that the 
federal Compact takes precedence over Nebraska laws (Raun 2017b). As growers in 
the district say, “We don’t like court, but it’s the only way we’re heard — threat of 
financial settlement. [We] don’t want to spend $5-10 million per year. Get someone 
to fix this. We’ve been forced to do this. Liability gets attention” (Grower 7). “All the 
[Nebraska] senators [pay] attention when money is involved, not just the rural ones” 
(Grower 8). “[The] basin’s represented by one, two, three senators, [we] need Omaha 
senators” (Grower 7). Were any of the irrigation districts specifically included or 
named and therefore protected by the Compact, a different result would have 
occurred and the socio-hydrological relationships of the basin would have taken on a 
different character. Although the quote highlights challenges in Nebraska and not 
the Compact directly, it does not preclude future legal proceedings that could directly 
involve the Compact.  
 Furthermore, new infrastructure projects such as dams, reservoirs, canals, 
and diversion ditches would subject agricultural producers to impacts. Any 
agricultural producer in the basin who used surface flows would certainly have 
qualified as a stakeholder at the time of the Compact’s initiation. At the present time, 
they expect to provide commentary and input for changes that directly impact them. 
However, the irrigators and districts have no real power to ensure that their input 
will become or even influence a management strategy or state policy. Currently FCID 
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and NBID experience more burdens than benefits based on the Compact’s language 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017a). Because it is a 
legal document among the three states, some ambiguity is expected in regard to 
target groups to preserves states’ rights, but it severely limits the likelihood of 
support by on-the-ground users if terms are not defined. Nebraska has been 
especially astute at leveraging the lack of definition for either surface water or 
groundwater, contending for decades that the Compact included only surface water, 
that surface water and groundwater were not hydrologically connected, and granting 
thousands of groundwater permits in their portion of the basin. Strategic target 
groups can be key to a statute’s successful implementation. Nebraska’s strategy has 
resulted in intra-state water user battles among surface and groundwater users, 
Frenchman-Cambridge and Nebraska Bostwick, resources districts, and the NDNR.  
 During the Compact’s initial development, various reports and documents 
were presented at the first four meetings of the Republican River Compact 
Commission by the states, Reclamation, the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. They pertained to equitable allocation, flood 
control, basin projects, irritated and irrigable acres, streamflow, project costs, and 
usability of underground waters some of which made their way into the Compact 
(RRCA n.d.c.). Mr. Burley from Agricultural Economics cautioned about future 
development, surface and underground waters, and potential reductions relative to 
surface water availability (RRCA n.d.b.). 
 While it does include a few more specifics, jurisdictional clarity is as indistinct 
as the relationship between the problem, the solution, and target groups because 
only one Compact enforcement action is included — lawsuits. Even though there is a 
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Compact administration consisting of state representatives who have voting 
privileges, power is not concentrated there. In fact, it took 17 years after ratification 
before the states met to design protocols for virgin water supplies (Blankenau 2010). 
It is reasonable to leave internal organization to the states to preserve their rights in 
the form of water law and agencies. The RRCA can be seen as one means to address 
how the states should interact together for solving basin problems without lawsuits, 
but without unanimous action by state officials lawsuits may be the only recourse. 
State administrators will vary as will their internal duties; they are also subject to 
political winds of change. States retain a tremendous amount of power and authority 
to internally administer the Compact, block partner states from actions that may 
impinge upon them, and assess payment from partner states if a lower state 
constructs facilities in an upper state for the lower state’s advantage (also a financial 
provision). If the U.S. uses water beneficially within a state, say Nebraska, the 
amount used will be charged against Nebraska’s Compact allocation, and potentially 
limit water allocation for its own basin growers who are part of Nebraska 
Reclamation projects. Because the target group isn’t identified beyond the state, 
irrigation districts and growers have limited external power in that they cannot sue 
another state, their home state needs to do so on their behalf. The clearest overall 
jurisdictional control is the Supreme Court, but states can address issues internally 
either legislatively or as the result of legal action. 
 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 Financial accounting procedures are also missing, and streamflow accounting 
is addressed through the allocations, a somewhat inadequate measure. Article IX is 
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the closest to revealing how annual streamflows will be determined. State officials 
are charged with collecting data and administering the Compact for their respective 
State. There is no time frame associated with collecting and reporting data, nor the 
data type that needs to be collected within the basin. From the perspective of 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, it is an important omission because it speaks to the 
specifics of implementation and cooperation. Other components like technology, 
diversity, socio-economic conditions, or leadership can impact financial resources 
and the ability to successfully implement the statute. Since financial resources and 
procedures are lax, a gap is created that allows for multiple interpretations and 
misunderstandings to arise. Good causal theory requires linkages between 
government intervention or policy and the ability to attain program objectives, but 
they are missing. 
 As noted in Table 5.2, inclusion and reference to financial resources are brief, 
essentially confined to exempting the U.S. from State taxes or losses and requiring 
lower states to abide by upper state laws for facility construction, taxes, and 
maintenance. Construction, maintenance and operations typically are the 
responsibility of irrigation districts and States depending on how agreements were 
designed between them and other entities like Reclamation or the Corps. For 
example, $12.3 million of federal funding will fix 6 of 18 radial gates at Harlan 
County Dam that is controlled by the Corps (Potter 2014). Radial, or Tainter, gates 
control the water flow for dams and canals. Operations and maintenance costs are 
not insubstantial for irrigation districts, especially when age and life expectancy are 
included. Ongoing data collection to verify compliance, expert consultation, and legal 
fees are other costs associated with the Compact. Some acknowledgment of how 
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known or potential costs will be apportioned for either inter- or intra-state 
responsibility could clarify financial obligations. In DiBaldassarre, Brandimarte, and 
Bevan’s (2016) socio-hydrological model development, those social factors would 




 Hierarchical integration like all the other areas of the Compact was 
concentrated in state power and the U.S. through state action, but no other 
stakeholders were included, therefore the ability of outside interests to participate 
and shape implementation is virtually non-existent according to Compact language. 
Irrigation districts would need the support of their state in order to partner with 
outside interests and effect change. Other potential outside actors could include farm 
bureaus, agri-businesses, and regional or national environmental organizations that 
would need to find back-channel avenues to shape implementation, in support of, or 
to challenge, Compact compliance. Such actions would be a Non-Statutory Variable 
but could still influence decisions. Veto points are closely tied to the previously 
discussed jurisdictional Causal Theory as well as Financial Resources. Incentives and 
sanctions were limited to one option, lawsuits, specifically were a State to “interfere 
with beneficial consumptive water use” or other Compact violation by another State. 
Inclusion of additional sanctions and incentives beyond the simplistic unanimous 
approval by State representatives would have been helpful in defining the roles 
actors can undertake. 
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 Responses to Compact non-compliance since Kansas’s initial 1998 suit against 
Nebraska and Colorado have included retiring groundwater irrigation wells, using 
augmentation projects (groundwater and pipelines) to enhance streamflows, 
requiring technology like well monitors and annual data reporting, designing or 
revising legislation to integrate surface and groundwater management in Nebraska, 
as well as on-going internal lawsuits in Nebraska between the irrigation districts, the 
Natural Resource Districts, the NDNR, and the Bureau of Reclamation in any 
combination. These actions reflect the Compact’s lack of hierarchical integration as 
well as the states’ subservience to the Compact as noted in the earlier Causal Theory 
discussion. Since there are no explicit incentives or sanctions for state behavior 
codified in the Compact beyond references to state laws, basin irrigation districts and 
users are left to navigate the Compact’s legal waters without a compass, a boat, oars, 
or a life raft. In particular, surface water users are left adrift while groundwater users 
are offered better boats with more protections (Griggs 2017).  
 
DECISION RULES, COMMITMENT AND ACCESS 
 For Decision Rules, Article IX references a rule for state administers to collect 
and collate data for “proper administration” through the public official charged with 
administering each states’ public water supplies, but no specifics as to the type of 
data necessary are given explicitly in the Compact. It may be inferred that it rests 
upon each states’ administrator’s best judgment as to the scope, scale, and time of 
collection. Some latitude is recognized to “adopt rules and regulations consistent 
with the provisions of this compact” by the state administrators’ unanimous action 
(an oblique reference to the Republican River Compact Commission or today’s 
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RRCA), but no specific guidance beyond that statement is given. Thus, it is up to the 
state administrators to jointly agree upon appropriate data protocols. As a titration 
of bulky data, reports, and testimony, a compact document has to convey the essence 
of its purpose, and often that result is less than clear. 
 Officials’ Commitment is recognized as a state responsibility for assigning an 
administrator who can oversee water issues as they pertain to the Compact. In 
Nebraska, it is the DNR director and Colorado and Kansas use their state engineer. 
The USGS is also included to the degree that they collaborate with the states to 
ensure proper administration. I am uncertain how much more specificity might be 
required in this document, since federalism allows states the right of internal 
management thereby creating internal challenges to meet Compact requirements. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) suggest that it takes 7-10 years for (successful) 
statute implementation, but requiring a fixed appointment for an official in a 
Compact would likely be considered onerous by the states. Outside Access is 
completely ignored, as noted above in the Causal Theory section and discussion of 
target group responsibilities and contributions. Potential for misinterpretation is 
possible with all three of these factors. 
 Each states’ individual Compact behavior remained legally unchallenged and 
unclear for as long as it did for several reasons. One, most basin irrigators used 
surface water, so during shortages everyone suffered. Two, submersible pumps, 
center pivot irrigation systems, and other technology developed starting in the 1950s 
took time to develop and be adopted by basin irrigators into the 1970s and beyond 
(Manley 1993; Sheffield 1993; Aiken 1980). Three, the lag effect between technical 
advances for groundwater pumping implementation and subsequent decreased 
 154 
surface flows meant that surface impacts were not immediately noticeable (Figure 
5.3). Once technology allowed efficient access to groundwater, state water statutes 
needed to be re-assessed to account for and regulate the activity if it did not already 
do so. Colorado and Kansas already had a single doctrine for surface and 
groundwater, prior appropriation, but Nebraska did not, using prior appropriation 
for surface water and reasonable use/correlative rights for groundwater. These and 
other associated issues culminated in 1998’s Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado 
(1998-2003), for which only the Compact applied. That result was the 2002 FSS. It 
was challenged in 2010 by Kansas v. Nebraska (2009-2015) and focused on both the 
FSS and the Compact, since the FSS is considered an extension of the Compact.  
 In the next section, I evaluate the FSS with the same factors and assessment 
questions (Table 5.3) that were used for the Compact assessment. Even though the 
FSS is directly tied to the Compact in that it describes annual virgin water accounting 
methods, each document is assessed separately because they developed during 




Figure 5.3. Nebraska’s Republican River Basin Irrigation Wells. 1955 (top), 1970 
(middle) and 2015 (bottom) (NDNR n.d.). 
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FINAL SETTLEMENT STIPULATION ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The FSS’s Low to Moderate overall score on my implementation assessment 
scale indicates improvement in some factor areas while at the same time retaining 
the need for more details. In general, the FSS improves upon and adds to the 
Compact’s purpose of equitable division by being somewhat more specific, but does 
not fully address hierarchical integration or decision rules, for example, leaving open 
the need for more detailed language that will contribute to a better score and full 
statute success. Although the FSS addressed some of the issues associated with the 
1998 lawsuit with the development and use of a groundwater model for measuring 
annual virgin water and state consumption, it was not successful in addressing all of 
them. In 2010 Kansas again filed suit against Nebraska, claiming that the state 
continued to negatively impact Kansas irrigators’ Compact allocations during 2005 
and 2006. Some of Kansas’s frustration can be explained via the Compact and the 
FSS’s language that allows Nebraska to continue groundwater pumping. The FSS’s 
Subsection III Existing Development, Part B Exceptions to Moratorium on New 
Wells includes exceptions for N-CORPE and three NRDs that overlap the basin 
border along with small volume wells. What it does not do is reduce the number of 
groundwater wells or their volume in Nebraska’s portion of the basin. It is left to the 
state to address. Sanctions are again completely missing from the document, there is 
no oversight except for the RRCA that does not have any real power, and the only 
effective recourse for violations is a federal lawsuit. A possible reason for the lack of 
enforcement provisions within interstate compacts could be state over-reach, 
whereby they use their power to interfere with another state’s autonomy. Adopting 
compacts is one way for states to attempt to mitigate future litigation (Tyler 2003). 
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Achieving a better statutory and regulatory outcome for all the states is unknown at 
this time. It may come about from interstate collaboration or additional litigation. 
 Table 5.3 summarizes the ability of the FSS to structure implementation with 
a factor assessment score and representative examples. For clarity and consistency, 
the FSS significantly expands upon the Compact’s goals and objectives (Table 5.2) in 
that there is a clear purpose with imposed deadlines. As a legally binding document, 
the FSS improves the states’ abilities to meet Compact requirements and to some 
degree provides a template for the future. It does not preclude future conflicts that 
may result in litigation, particularly as legal, economic, and physical conditions 
change. Causal theory is also improved and indicates growth in regard to statute 
design as a way to both avoid and address potential problems. For example, the 
scope of defined terms is much broader and inclusive, but the FSS like the Compact, 
does not specifically identify the target group/s. To me it suggests a purposeful 
avoidance on the part of the states in order to preserve their power and internal 
decision-making. Either that, or they truly have not considered other basin actors 
and their role, either cooperatively or confrontationally with the Compact. Should 
water conditions decrease to the degree that an irrigation district like FCID or NBID 
is no longer viable, it leaves the door open for the state and other groups to use the 
state’s water allocation for other purposes, since none of the irrigation districts are 
specifically named. However, politically and economically there would doubtless be 
conditions decrease to the degree that an irrigation district like FCID or NBID is no 
longer viable, it leaves the door open for the state and other groups to use the state’s 
repercussion were they to do so. Whether or not this would violate the terms of the 
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Compact or related documents is not under review here. Rather, my purpose is to 
examine relevant possibilities as to the statutes success or failure. 




FACTORS AND SCORE 
REPUBLICAN RIVER FINAL SETTLEMENT STIPULATION 
SPECIAL MASTER REPORT, 2002  
STRUCTURAL IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES 
 
1. CLARITY AND 




Focused on pending litigation to limit groundwater use as it 
depletes surface flows (Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 
No. 126, the Original)  
• States agree to meet obligations of the Final 
Settlement Stipulation as scheduled; 
• Prior claims are generally waived and dismissed with 
prejudice; 
• States can continue to seek Compact enforcement; 
• The RRCA can modify accounting procedures 
consistent with Compact and FSS; 
• RRCA Groundwater Model provisions and 
enforcement are date and time constrained. 
2A. CAUSAL THEORY:  
COGNITIVE — THE 
PROBLEM 
MODERATE 
Adequate but not comprehensive problem recognition 
• 44 definitions such as computed and beneficial 
consumptive use, dewatering well, imported water 
supply, and unallocated supply; 
• time limits and guidelines are present; 
• target group(s) not clearly identified but assumed to 
be the States; 
• limited hydrological and geological data; 
• unaddressed complex jurisdictional authority; 
• limited non-statutory variable inclusion. 




Reasonable jurisdictional control identified 
• RRCA and States have greatest control; 
• Arbitrator has some control if RRCA and States 
cannot reach agreement; 
• U.S. Supreme Court maintains final authority. 
3. FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES 
LOW TO MODERATE 
Limited initial and continuing costs and appropriations  
• Arbitrator costs shared equally; 
• States and U.S. bear individual costs for legal and 
arbitration materials and preparation; 
• Non-Federal reservoirs and land terracing practices 
affecting water supplies study costs are defined and 
portioned between the U.S. and the States. 
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Table 5.3. (continued) 
STRUCTURE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
FACTORS AND SCORE 
REPUBLICAN RIVER FINAL SETTLEMENT STIPULATION 
SPECIAL MASTER REPORT, 2002  
STRUCTURAL IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES 
4A. HIERARCHICAL 
INTEGRATION:   
VETO POINTS 
LOW 
Multiple actor veto points 
• Privileged material exempt from information 
sharing; 
• Any State may invoke binding arbitration, but 
requires other States’ consent; 
• RRCA action must be unanimous; 
• States and their representatives can skip meetings to 
avoid dispute resolution through RRCA; 
• Disputes settled via RRCA arbitration are 
nonbinding; 








• States can file lawsuits against other Compact States 
if the terms of the Compact are violated. 
 
5. DECISION RULES 
MODERATE 
Partial formal rules and guidelines 
• Each State submits an annual report for well construction 
and denial upstream of Guide Rock; 
• RRCA accounting methodology will be used e.g., 
virgin water supply, allocations; 
• Groundwater modeling committee limited to not 
more than 3 state appointees per State; 
• U.S. may not designate more than 2 modeling 
committee members; 
• States share available data, information and expert 
knowledge and other for completing the model.  
6. OFFICIALS’ 
COMMITMENT 
LOW TO MODERATE 
Commitment largely rests with States and RRCA 
• No specific recommendation for state administrative 
appointments or agency assignments; 
• Defers to Compact. 
 
7. OUTSIDE ACCESS 
LOW 
Narrow access for outside actors 
• Some non-members and State non-member 
representatives can attend, observe and participate at 
Modeling Committee meetings; 
• Modeling committee meetings and works subject to a 
confidentiality agreement between the States and the 
U.S.. 
Key: High = stronger asset for implementation; Moderate = reasonable asset with some 
potential problems; Low = unlikely asset with notable problems; Neutral = little impact 
on implementation. 
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Clarity, Consistency and Causal Theory 
 Perhaps most troubling and concerning for clarity and causal theory is that 
the FSS does not directly address individual well impacts or connectivity, the 
unaddressed jurisdictional authority, and limited reference to non-statutory 
variables such as socio-economic conditions or public support. Non-statutory 
variables can be the catalyst that underpins or undermines the forward momentum 
of a statute. Any one of those three omissions singly, let alone as a package, suggests 
several positions that the states have taken independently, as a group, overtly, or as a 
path of least resistance. My responses and interpretations to those omissions are 
discussed. 
 One, limited scope and focus: The States and U.S. did not want to be side-
tracked or distracted from the FSS’s purpose to neutralize Kansas’s lawsuit (fewer 
Nebraska groundwater wells and a temporary River Master), and approach that 
neutralization with a narrow, limited focus and scope. The FSS allowed the States to 
find an expedient way to address declining surface flows with the Groundwater 
Model, but did not require Nebraska to shut down groundwater wells, thereby 
kicking the can down the road. While not an ideal solution from Kansas’s perspective 
(they would prefer fewer wells), it forced Nebraska to acknowledge that their policies 
and practices had been detrimental to their Compact obligations.  
 Two, geological and hydrological profiles: The States and U.S. did not want 
to expend more time or money to build a thorough, comprehensive, accurate 
geological and hydrological profile of the interconnected surface and groundwater 
systems, thereby delaying the next legal challenge. In part it could be attributable to 
available technology and data along with financial costs in both time and money. 
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Additionally, it allows the Nebraska NRDs to continue to negatively impact 
hydrological connectivity in the basin. Nebraska groundwater advocates and their 
NRDs have significant political power that tempers legislative oversight action. One 
Nebraska manager commented that their district has already begun seeing 
groundwater levels creeping downward in their area as a direct result of an upstream 
district’s groundwater pumping. It places them in a precarious position 
hydrologically, for setting seasonal irrigation water use limits, and meeting state 
expectations. 
 Three, legal challenges to individual well restrictions: The next legal 
challenge per number two above could come from an individual grower, irrigation 
district, or state claiming that the state, RRCA, or other entity can’t prove that an 
individual well directly impacts surface flows. Therefore, an individual well should 
be exempt from well shut downs, rapid response well requirements, reduced 
pumping, or any other restriction. Undertaking such an endeavor is expensive and 
time consuming for all parties, there are likely physical impediments to mapping 
connections, data may be difficult to verify, and technological tools may be 
inadequate at the current time. 
 Four, databases and litigation: Failure to build comprehensive and tri-state 
wide hydrological and geological databases could mean future litigation. It will be 
important to have these databases because accurate and reliable data is critical for 
understanding water mining, surface flow impacts, climatic conditions, and potential 
geological change as a result of groundwater withdrawals. Additionally, ecosystems 
beyond the agriculture sector will be impacted, as will community water perceptions, 
and local and regional economic sustainability. 
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 Five, states rights: Federalism and states’ rights to internal decision-making 
and laws are primary to our governance system. When there is an adverse impact on 
Compact compliance, how a state chooses to balance their interstate obligations 
against their internal priorities is important, as those decisions might have ripple 
effects to the other states. If the RRCA were granted greater enforcement power that 
overrides a state’s autonomy, or a Special River Master was permanently assigned 
oversight control of the Compact and the States’ obligations, states’ rights could be 
infringed upon. Neither of these options is without significant consequences.   
 Six, jurisdiction and NRDs: Currently, one of the largest and most pressing 
legal challenges to Compact and FSS success is Nebraska’s unwillingness to directly 
limit and permanently reduce groundwater pumping in the NRDs. NRDs are 
independent from the NDNR even though they jointly develop water management 
plans (IMPs). During my interviews, at least one manager indicated that they would 
defer to their IMP rather than a legislatively required Republican River Basin-wide 
Plan that is under development with an early 2018 finalization (NDNR n.d.). There 
are insignificant political ramifications at the current time to incentivize NRDs to 
participate in the basin-wide plan, but legally they are required to complete and 
implement an IMP. However, it appears that IMPs are not enough because the NRDs 
aren’t accountable to an oversight agency or official for their water usage decisions. 
It is difficult for NRD boards to limit themselves and their neighbors, since some of 
them are resource maximizers in contrast to those who want to maintain or reduce 
pumping levels to prolong irrigation practices into at least the foreseeable future. In 
interviews with basin stakeholders, it was not uncommon for irrigation boards and 
managers to share their reluctance to make hard choices about limiting water and 
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shutting down irrigation wells. Thus, how can a balance be achieved between NRDs, 
the state, and the Compact, since it is a matter of resource use beliefs and 
perceptions. Obviously, it is a constitutional issue as well, but nonetheless, the 
problem continues, causing problems for FCID, NBID and to a lesser extent Kansas 
Bostwick Irrigation District (KBID). 
 Seven, non-statutory variables: There is limited or missing acknowledgement 
of non-statutory variables such as socio-economic conditions and leadership support 
at the state and regional levels, especially when no crisis exists. These are both 
necessary to avoid and minimize future crises. Continuous support and leadership is 
essential to maintaining a litigation-free Compact especially when it is a wet year or 
period as opposed to a drought event. An array of socio-economic conditions can be 
highly variable and influence success like agricultural commodities and subsidies, 
rural depopulation, trade agreements, crop insurance, and technological costs. 
Further, climatic change will likely impact all sectors and elements. Just as 
important are individual personal experiences that color water perceptions and 
behaviors. 
 While recognizing the intricacy of managing water across boundaries and the 
desire to have some local or regional flexibility, Compact framers risk being too 
ambiguous and unspecific thereby leading to local and regional operational 
uncertainty and potentially costly litigation. Failure to address these important 
compact elements can put the states in a static box due to uncertainty. Schlager and 
Heikkila (2009) reported that although compacts can be seen as rigid and inflexible, 
conflict resolution by commissions can be effective by revising rules; the RRCA 
functions in this manner. Further, they report that other conflicts will need litigation 
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to address entrenched differences between up- and down-stream states and multi-
issue concerns about distribution, models, and water quality. Incentives that 
encourage the diffusion of ideas to minimize risk and increase cooperation need to 
be included, along with sanctions that are unattractive politically and financially to 
the states such as fixed penalties. Three examples suffice. 
 First, Fowler and Castellano (2017) found that multiple sources and 
institutional layers can assist with accountability, enforcement, and reporting for 
compact infractions. Second, Draper (2007) offers organizational design principles 
that are focused on administrative and institutional provisions of governance. 
Although suggested for new compact design, they can be adapted for current 
compacts. Finally, McNeal (2015) suggests a five-factor test for compact breaches 
and degrees of disgorgement for the state that breaks compact rules. Both Draper 
and McNeal reference the Republican River Compact specifically. Draper does so as 
an interstate compact with no initial active administration: “It shall be the duty of 
the three States to administer this compact through the official in each State who is 
now or may hereafter be charged” (Article IX). McNeal uses it as a case study to 
illustrate the need for adherence incentives to avoid costly litigation and potentially 
damaging disgorgement. These and other methods deserve serious consideration in 
compact design and language to assist implementation. 
 As interstate compact negotiations have matured and evolved through time, 
new ones tend to avoid the pitfalls of the early and mid-20th century. McCormick 
(1994) offers several suggestions for transboundary water allocation compacts based 
on an analysis of 22 Western compacts. These include percentage allocations, 
minimum flows, dispute resolution mechanisms, a comprehensive scope that 
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includes groundwater, addressing federal claims, and federal policy protections. 
None of these options are without counterclaims, for example, what strategies are 
used during dry years to share in declines or how prior appropriation is represented. 
Of these 22 compacts, with ratification or amendments ranging from 1922 to 1992, 
12 have no dispute mechanism, three have some type of arbitration, and the 
remaining seven compacts employ voting systems. As to allocating water, other than 
one that has no method, six use a percentage method, and the rest have storage 
limitations, fixed quantities, priority rights, and other means that address the shared 
waters. 
 McCormick (1994) contrasts these compacts with the 1961 Delaware River 
Basin Compact that has empowered its compact commission to allocate water 
between the states and approve or deny in-state water projects that affect the 
Delaware River. Furthermore, the Delaware action was the first compact that ratified 
a regional administrative body that foregrounded the river basin itself as the most 
significant actor by giving management and enforcement powers to a commission 
that could disregard political boundaries (Delaware River Basin Commission 2017). 
It is in marked contrast to most of these western compacts that were devised at an 
earlier time, under different environmental conditions, and have a different view of 
property rights. Although McCormick’s work focused on select elements, it illustrates 
the need for a comprehensive approach to all the variables and factors identified by 






 Financial resources for the FSS and its associated model are adequately 
divided and assigned to the states and others as envisioned to meet included time 
constraints. It does not address continuing needs such as costs associated with 
model upgrades or physical surveys that could add to model accuracy. The FSS is 
more specific than the original Compact document that made no financial 
references, as if money was not, nor would be, a factor in ongoing compliance 
between the states. Not included in the FSS are litigation costs; they are assumed to 
be the responsibility of the states. 
 
HIERARCHICAL INTEGRATION 
 Hierarchical Integration still delays addressing veto points. Individual states 
maintain their power to check other Compact states especially if the other’s actions 
are seen as harmful to them. Failure to address veto points goes to the lack of 
cooperative and collaborative incentives rather than the stick — a lawsuit. 
Arbitration in the FSS simply requires the consent of the other state/s to engage in 
the process, and the arbitration ruling is not binding. One possible incentive to 
engage in arbitration is to negotiate solutions outside the courts, but that was not a 
successful strategy for Nebraska after their water overuse in 2005 and 2006. Their 
inability to reach an amenable solution with Kansas directly led to 2010’s Kansas v. 
Nebraska and Nebraska’s financial disbursement of $5.5 million dollars in addition 
to paying their own legal fees (Griggs 2017). A state could choose not to participate 
and avoid any potential consequences, despite being required by RRCA rules to 
report annual water usage. Furthermore, because the arbitration is not binding, 
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states can disregard the findings, and risk later litigation while in the meantime 
continue to breach the Compact. What state will choose binding arbitration if it did 
not have to, and does anyone have the power to force the choice upon them?  Not the 
RRCA, they do not have a stick. Possibly the Supreme Court, but their stick can have 
unexpected consequences for all parties. How arbitration might impact a State’s 
future compliance or prevent states from future action is completely unpredictable. 
One could argue that it is in the best interest for the states to work towards a 
common goal, since the tri-state basin is a reality that cannot be denied, but 
rationality and self-interest are often paramount. Such a solution would be difficult 
to achieve because no state will willingly give up power to another State or actor 
because it is not in the state’s interest to do so, or at least at the present time and 
current environmental and political conditions. A Supreme Court case is time 
consuming and expensive, which might cause a state to consider a limited 
alternative. However, the hierarchical integration is likely to remain low since it 
protects states’ rights through veto points, but there could be improvements in 
incentives and sanctions that might make more palliative a higher degree of  
DECISION RULES, COMMITMENT, ACCESS 
 With Decision Rules the number of model appointees, methodology, and 
reporting requirements are reasonable and representative of the number of states. 
By limiting the number of people for model development and state representation, 
the model was more likely to succeed particularly with technical and hydrological 
expertise from representatives. RRCA water accounting methods fall under the same 
auspices. States and the RRCA approve water use with a post-accounting method 
that gives states time to collect accurate seasonal data as well as averaging water use 
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over a period of years depending on conditions. Typically they approve water use at 
the annual RRCA meeting, for example, 2016 usage was approved in late summer or 
early fall 2017. Given these and related conditions, this statute implementation 
variable seems likely to succeed. 
 Generally an officials’ commitment is dependent on a number of motives and 
factors, such as bureaucratic structures, politics, and funding. If there is strong 
commitment to the statute and its ideal, Mazmanian and Sabatier project the time 
commitment to be at least 7 years for full implantation and likely closer to 10. 
 During the 1998-2016 period Nebraska had seven DNR directors or acting 
directors (Mike Jess, Roger Patterson, Brian Dunnigan, Don Blankenau, Ann Bleed, 
James Schneider, and Jeff Fassett) and two Supreme Court Compact lawsuits filed 
against them. State lawsuits are not included, and they are numerous. During the 
same period, two retirements took place between the four Nebraska NRDs and three 
irrigation districts, one at the Middle Republican River NRD and the other at Kansas 
Bostwick. Since 2004, when Colorado created the Republican River Water 
Conservation District it has had the same general manager. Both Kansas and 
Colorado have each gotten one new state engineer. These situations illustrate the 
difficulty of maintaining administrative consistency over time and the likelihood of 
successful statute implementation longevity especially in Nebraska. 
 Each federal legal action needed or resulted in some degree of cooperation 
and implementation among Nebraska actors. Nebraska DNR manages surface water, 
is directly involved with basin decision-making, and is tasked with making sure state 
allocation limits are not exceeded. At the largest scale, the states and the RRCA have 
a high degree of commitment, but it may not be the same at other bureaucratic 
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levels. Thus, overall commitment remains in flux. Another important component is 
the professional working environments and the influence they can have on 
administrative and Compact relationships. 
 As to Access, those outside the select modeling group have limited access to 
its meetings and materials. If someone is part of a state’s hierarchy, they may be able 
to observe at meetings, but not directly contribute at that time. Instead, it may occur 
behind the scenes. If a member of the general public such as an irrigation district 
member wished to observe or gain access to the committee’s work, they are barred 
from doing so because of confidentiality agreements. One interpretation could be 
that an irrigator or basin stakeholder would be denied access to the process because 
they aren’t officially recognized as a member, yet the work being undertaken will 
directly impact the irrigation district and the grower’s agricultural operations at a 
future point. Lack of access makes it very difficult to question or accuse the RRCA, or 
the states for that matter, of inaccuracies or wrong doings. Citizens and growers are 
dependent on publically available data that may be incomplete. If a lawsuit were filed 
to access all materials, the public would first need to prove that they have standing to 
file the suit, a legal bar that has at times proven difficult to overcome. 
 The groundwater model has been available to the public since 2006, but some 
information such as soil classification remains under a confidentiality agreement 
(David Barfield, Kansas Chief Engineer, pers. comm. 2016). As a researcher, I was 
unable to receive information about how the Compact’s model had set parameters 
for soil type and water holding capacity to use in my streamflow analysis 
comparisons. Inaccessible data restricts the opportunity to verify or compare 
Compact results with other methods. The need to limit access during development is 
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understandable given the technical and legal ramifications of the work. However, 
best practices, perceptions, and local buy-in might be more readily achieved when 
affected stakeholders are consulted and updated to ensure their understanding and 
continued support. I propose that transparency matters in implementation, an area 
that Mazmanian and Sabatier do not address directly. Without transparency, distrust 
and litigation are outcomes that are costly impediments to solving water conflicts in 
the basin.  
 
ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Implementation studies analyze statute and policy initiatives and their ability 
to successfully achieve their goals and objectives. In the case of the Compact and FSS 
each is attempting to regulate behavior like allocation compliance, rather than a 
specific service like infrastructure. My assessment emphasizes program performance 
based on the statutes’ objectives and the extent to whether they did or did not 
address problems and solutions, rather than outputs like agency regulations and 
outcomes like equitable water. Any assessment in essence is an examination of 
public policy and administrative performance (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). For 
the Compact and FSS this means that the states are obligated with implementation 
via internal action and power, some of which is undertaken in conjunction with the 
RRCA. Once written and approved, any statute’s oversight by Congress or state 
legislatures becomes much less trendy as the spotlight shifts to other crises or pet 
projects. In the Republican River basin, officials are elected and appointed. Elected 
officials include state legislators and irrigation board members, while appointed 
officials are irrigation district managers and state agency directors. Each group has 
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different priorities that color their attention and support for Compact oversight. 
Oversight then has a spectrum depending on immediacy. The basin growers and 
irrigation districts lavish the most oversight attention because if it does not work 
they will bear its socio-economic costs directly, as opposed to the other actors who 
have increasingly more programs to monitor and oversee and are not directly or 
economically tied to its success, unless there is a pending lawsuit. 
 It could be argued to some extent that the Compact and FSS have achieved 
their objectives, but the opposite equally could be said (Table 5.4). Impacts such as 
water usage limits are uneven across the basin, and technology is under considered. 
It in turn has led to stakeholder frustration and ennui regarding actual beneficial 
implementation. The angst experienced by the basin’s growers can be explained by a 
brief discussion of the three different perspectives that are important for 
implementation — the center, periphery, and target group (Mazmanian and Sabatier 
1981). 
 The center, the periphery, and target group each has different expectations 
and views. The center as the initial policy maker (here some combination of the U.S., 
states, and RRCA) is most focused on whether or not, and how, the Compact and FSS 
objectives have been met. They need to ensure that policy compliance takes place 
with the periphery and other actors in the form of service provisions like accounting 
protocols, or changed target group behaviors like using less water. The periphery is 
akin to field-level officials, such as local and state agency bureaucrats, and 
behavioral responses to the disruption a new outside policy (from the center) 
presents to them. In other words, how can or will the periphery achieve the new 
policy objectives and goals in light of current obligations. State agencies, such as the 
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Kansas Department of Agriculture, which includes the Division of Water Resources, 
are responsible for a vast number of local, state, and federal policies, so any new 
initiative like the FSS or model may strain current resources in time, employees, and 
costs. How they re-adjust and prioritize a new policy among other equal value 
priorities becomes paramount. Obviously, it is an administrative and managerial 
issue best discussed elsewhere. 
 
Table 5.4. Compact and FSS Summary: Conditions of Effective Implementation 


































Low to Moderate 






Low to Moderate 
Key  
High = stronger asset in effective implementation of legal objective 
Moderate = conducive to effective implementation, although some problems 
Low = notable obstacles to effective implementation  
Neutral = factor played little or no role in implementation role 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989) 
  
 Private actors most commonly make up the target group. If they will benefit 
from the statute’s goals, their perspective will be similar to the center’s views as long 
as policy outcomes and services are delivered (Schneider and Ingram 1993), such as 
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whether or not the model accurately represents reality. However, those services have 
to make a positive difference for the basin’s growers. For the FSS, it may be 
debatable given that the model has provided more detailed and accurate hydrological 
data than the Compact included, but neither have been able to ensure reliable water 
for the irrigation districts and their members in either short- or long-term scenarios. 
With the states’ ability to use 2- and 5-year water averages to meet water needs, they 
may argue differently than the irrigation districts. In particular, groundwater 
pumping, crop type, precipitation, and climate change impact water allocations on a 
yearly basis. If the NDNR determines whether or not a Compact Call Year goes into 
effect, at which point surface water appropriations are closed, it means Frenchman-
Cambridge and Nebraska Bostwick irrigators don’t receive any water, it is stored or 
sent to Kansas. In 2017, Nebraska issued its 5th year-in-a-row Compact Call (NDNR 
2016; McCook Gazette 2017). The two documents’ language and structure falls short 
of meeting this target group’s needs. Additionally, neither document calls for formal 
evaluation studies other than the required annual accounting; cooperative RRCA 
actions are voluntary. 
 A consensus exists of sorts between each group’s perspectives because the 
Compact binds them together — we have to be compliant. However, the target group 
can assert that their best interests are not being met because of vague language, 
differing interpretations between them and the periphery, and little to no input for 
policy outcomes, while the periphery can argue that they are constrained by state 
statutes, most prominently water laws. Conflict arises first at the local level, move 
upward internally at the state level, onto the RRCA, and then the U.S., all 
highlighting the inadequacies for both the Compact and the FSS. 
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 Possible solutions to basin conflicts include a temporary or permanent River 
Master (rejected by the 2015 Special Master), or a basin commission in the image of 
the Delaware Commission where representatives have one vote and the majority 
rules (Delaware River Basin Commission 2017), or some other independent entity. If 
the states either voluntarily or forcibly take one of these paths, jurisdictional power 
to level consequences or impose sanctions upon the States will be necessary. Such a 
path seems unlikely at the current time due to states’ rights, local attitudes towards 
regulation, a desire for local control, and historical perceptions surrounding water. 
Consensus between states to solve and address current and future potential 
problems (as noted above) through the RRCA has been a partial solution, as with the 
FSS and other agreements. Unless states agree to independent oversight, binding 
arbitration or some other legal resolution, conflicts and litigation at all scales will 
likely continue. 
 Utilizing Mazmanian and Sabatier’s policy implementation analysis 
methodology, specifically its structural implementation factors, led me to conclude 
unsurprisingly that while the language, goals, and objectives have improved since the 
original Compact was ratified and put into place, the FSS is an incomplete document 
even as it improves and clarifies the Compact. It allows states to continue to leverage 
their power against each other rather than working towards a common basin wide 
solution for the irrigators and waters of the basin. Furthermore, I suggest that 
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s policy implementation framework should consider 
adding transparency of purpose, development, and implementation as a factor to its 
statute structural implementation independent variable. Transparency can assist in 
addressing target group concerns, garnering additional data, recruiting supporters, 
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and adding clarity to frequently murky processes, thereby avoiding unnecessary 
challenges. 
 I began with two overarching questions as asked by Mazmanian and Sabatier 
(1981, 1989). First, are the statutes and agreements service or behavior oriented and 
second, do they attain their objectives. The legal documents are regulating a specific 
type of behavior, broadly, Compact compliance through the efficient and beneficial 
use of the waters equitably allocated to them from the Republican River. As has been 
demonstrated here and elsewhere, the upstream states of Colorado and Nebraska 
especially have struggled to stay within their equitable allotment at various points in 
time. Because they have not been able to regulate their behavior to the satisfaction of 
Kansas under Compact or FSS conditions, they were federally sued, twice. 
Regulating behavior for water is difficult and some of those pitfalls and gaps have 
been highlighted in the assessments. Second, the legal documents do not fully attain 
their objectives of efficiently and beneficially using the water allocated to them and 
avoiding controversies. The Compact in its original form is poorly conceived and 
executed for a variety of reasons already discussed. The FSS addressed some of those 
overlooked relational causes with the development of a groundwater model, but 
jurisdictional oversight remains opaque. From the perspective of the states and the 
irrigation districts, the FSS has made strides towards better guidance versus the 
Compact. They also acknowledge that the FSS is not perfect and may never be so, 
while also hoping for less litigation. 
 Both legal documents are rife with ambiguity, although less so with the FSS 
than the Compact, which has little chance of every being changed. It is then left to 
the States, the RRCA, the Supreme Court, and state district courts to resolve future 
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conflicts whether through direct litigation or other means. No two compacts will be 
the same because the conditions under which they derive are unique to their time, 
place, and space. However, lessons, practices, means, and solutions can be garnered 
from other compacts, their challenges, and their decisions. The Republican River 
states would be wise to pro-actively attend “to remove all causes, present and future, 




Republican River Streamflow Scenarios 
 
 
 The Republican River Compact is centered on two basic ideas: one, to 
discourage conflict between the states over the river’s water, and two, to share that 
water equitably. Neither of those two goals has been without challenges. The 
Compact has been challenged twice by Kansas in lawsuits against Colorado and 
Nebraska for overuse of the water, thereby depriving Kansas of their legal share and 
causing harm to their irrigators at KBID. While equitable allocation of the river’s 
water divides its virgin water (surface and groundwater), “water supply within the 
Basin undepleted by the activities of man” (Article II), the Compact did not foresee 
how people and climatic events would vastly change the waterscape of the basin. The 
advent of submersible pumps and center pivot irrigation systems in the late 1950s in 
conjunction with periodic drought clusters (mid-1950s, late 1970s and 80s, early 
1990s and 2000s) (Wilhite 2011) and climate change have shifted power away from 
surface water irrigators to groundwater irrigators, from a river with adequate surface 
flows under normal climate conditions at the time of the Compact to one that can 
have no visible surface flows and decreased base flows. 
 The river as an ecosystem service (ESS) is changing, and so too as part of the 
region’s larger socio-ecological system (SES). Residents of the basin rely on its water; 
their relationship with it is a symbiotic one. Their use and management decisions 
impact the river and themselves, so how goes the river, goes their growing season, 
income, schools, and communities. Whether the water is accessed as surface or 
groundwater makes a difference. Those who have surface water rights do not 
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experience the same water reliability as those with groundwater rights, and some 
parts of the basin have no access to groundwater at all. Under these conditions, it is 
important to understand the socio-hydrological relationships that define the basin 
and to analyze its elements. I present streamflow scenarios as a component of my 
socio-hydrological profile.  
 With 2.7 million irrigated surface and groundwater acres in the basin (1.6 
million in Nebraska, 435,000 in Kansas, and 550,000 in Colorado) (Brookfield and 
Wilson 2015), knowing how much growing season water is available to irrigation 
districts for surface water irrigation is important. Irrigated Nebraska acreages of the 
basin generate nearly $35 million in tax revenue that support local governance and 
infrastructure (Your NRD Basin: Republican River 2015). Under simulated natural 
(unmanaged) and managed conditions, annual streamflow data is analyzed to reveal 
society’s role in the Republican River system, its socio-hydrology. I explore how 
decision-making and Compact allocations could be met or have been met under 
those conditions with three data sources and two models. I am guided by two 
questions. One, how are management decisions presented in the instrumental 
record?  In particular, what management decisions are evident (and which are not) 
from observational records? Two, can simple models provide additional mechanistic 
insight into the observed streamflow dynamics? 
 The chapter addresses sources for observational and instrumental data 
acquisition, the models and methods used with the data to develop streamflow 
scenarios, the model results as time series, and a discussion of model effectiveness 




OBSERVATIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL DATA SOURCES 
 Data were gathered for an upper and lower basin site from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Centers for 
Environmental Information Cooperative Observer Network (COOP) for hydro-
meteorological data, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) stream gauge 
network, and the Republican River Compact Administration’s (RRCA) groundwater 
model. Sources report weather and streamflow data in daily, monthly, or annual 
periods. Longevity and completeness of record was of primary importance. 
 
COOP DAILY WEATHER DATA 
 For the upper basin location, I use St. Francis, Cheyenne County, Kansas and 
for the lower basin location, Red Cloud, Webster County, Nebraska (hereafter St. 
Francis or Red Cloud, respectively). With daily hydro-meteorological (precipitation 
and temperature) input from the instrumental record, I constructed climatic trends 
for temperature, precipitation, and streamflow with a water balance model. Red 
Cloud and St. Francis were selected as representative of the basin’s climatic and 
physical conditions, along with length and completeness of daily weather records 
(Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1). Required input variables for the water-balance model are 
daily high (Tmax) and low (Tmin) temperatures and total daily precipitation 
(Precip). 
 St. Francis and Red Cloud’s hydro-meteorological data was sourced from the 
COOP network and the High Plains Regional Climate Center (HPRCC), who use 
COOP data for research, monitoring, and other services. COOP data is a primary 
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data source for U.S. climate analysis with an extensive observer network for over 100 
years (Kunkel et al. 2013). Missing COOP data points are filled by HPRCC using a 
weighted average of the nearest five stations (HPRCC 2015). Similar techniques are a 
common practice among climatologists and modelers (Jeffrey et al. 2001; Wang et 
al. 2012).  
Table 6.1. Cooperative Weather Stations and USGS Stream Gauges  
STATE COUNTY COOP ID; LATITUDE & LONGITUDE 







































(High Plains Regional Climate Center Station Tool 2017; USGS National Water 
Information System 2017a.) 
 
 St. Francis, located on the South Fork of the Republican River in the upper 
western half of the basin, represents the basin’s semi-arid conditions. Red Cloud, on 
the main stem and at the lower eastern end of the basin, is less arid, and closer to a 
Great Plains semi-humid climatic zone. In Nebraska and Kansas, precipitation 
increases to the east around 5 cm (or 2 inches) for about every half-degree change in 
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longitude (Kansas State University n.d.; UNL Water 2017; Prism Climate Group 
2017). Colorado’s portion of the basin is similar in temperature and precipitation to 
western Nebraska and Kansas (WRCC 2016).  
 
Figure 6.1. Republican River Basin: Sub-Basins and Data Sites. USGS and COOP 




 The USGS stream gauge data was acquired from the National Water 
Information System web page (USGS 2017a). It allows users to select their gauge site 
as well as the time series and variable or statistics such as discharge, gauge height, or 
sediment concentration. Gauges were selected based on their proximity to the COOP 
weather stations and record length. I use the annual (calendar year) time series for 
streamflow for each of the two basin locations. The USGS has two drainage basin 
options; I use the regular area drainage area option (area above the gauge). The 
USGS gauge data represents a managed streamflow scenario.  
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 The USGS Benkelman, Dundy County, Nebraska gauge (hereafter Benkelman) 
on the Republican River’s South Fork was selected to pair with the nearby St. Francis 
COOP weather station (Table 6.1); the site is also near its confluence with the main 
stem Republican River. As a sub-basin, it allows for smaller areal comparisons that 
may more readily show water management decisions especially because it is 
downstream from Bonny Reservoir and is in the more arid western region (Figure 
6.1). At the present time (2017), no federal Colorado or Kansas irrigation districts in 
this sub-basin use the river’s surface water.  
 The USGS gauge near Hardy, Nuckolls County, Nebraska (hereafter Hardy) 
was selected as a match for Red Cloud’s COOP weather site based on drainage area 
size, length of record, and location to the COOP station. The Hardy site is adjacent to 
the state border between Kansas and Nebraska.  
 
RRCA DATA 
 Through an open records request made to the Kansas Department of 
Agriculture, Division of Water Resources (KDWR), I received RRCA base flow 
stream calculations from 1918-2015 for both pre- (no irrigation) and post-
development (irrigation) conditions for the upstream Benkelman and downstream 
Hardy location (Appendix B). Base flow is a fraction of streamflow that originates 
with groundwater, while streamflow includes base, surface, and groundwater flow 
among other components. The RRCA groundwater model is a modified version of 
USGS’s MODFLOW and simulates base flow conditions (RRCA n.d.a.). MODFLOW 
is a modular hydrologic model used to simulate and predict various water 
interactions including surface water-groundwater relationships and groundwater 
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conditions (USGS 2017b). The RRCA uses the finite-difference version of 
MODFLOW (RRCA n.d.a.) and as such would not be considered a traditional water 
budget model that is focused on conservation of mass.  
 
MODELS AND METHODS 
 Water balance models are highly idealized representations of processes such 
as precipitation and evapotranspiration that govern the exchange of water across the 
land–atmosphere interface. These water balance models are fundamentally local and 
do not explicitly account for horizontal transports of water. Despite their simplicity, 
water balance models are useful to help identify conditions of water availability and 
stress, such as lack of soil water for cultivated and irrigated crops, the risk of fire, 
groundwater recharge, soil degradation, and possible impacts to different climate-
change scenarios (Mather 1979; Sophocleous 1991; Feddema 1998; Maxwell and 
Condon 2016; Mackenzie and Littell 2017; Rolim et al. 2017). 
 I use two models, a water bucket balance model (WB) with the COOP hydro-
meteorological data, and the RRCA’s groundwater model (Model) to undertake an 
analysis of how streamflow in the basin differs by data source and location. The 
RRCA model is more complex, but both can be considered low-dimensional models 
since they are being applied to a relatively localized, finite area, the river basin, over 
a specified time. The RRCA model is designed specifically for the Republican River 
basin, and even though WBs aren’t typically applied as I am using it here, it still 




WATER  BALANCE BUCKET MODEL 
 Water balance calculations came from a water balance model written in Excel 
by Feddema (n.d.). A water bucket model assumes that a bucket fills by precipitation 
and empties by evaporation much like a rain barrel or stock tank left out in a treeless 
field. A full bucket means there is extra water for deeper water drainage into soils 
and aquifers, an empty bucket implies no water for plants, animals, or subsurface 
water recharge. The bucket model required three inputs: daily high temperature 
(Tmax), daily low temperature (Tmin), and daily total precipitation (Precip). Using 
those inputs, it calculated potential annual basin streamflow, among other possible 
outputs. Mather’s The Climatic Water Budget in Environmental Analysis (1978) 
guided parameter settings, for example, soil water holding capacity (Table 6.2). I 
choose Thornthwaite’s evapotranspiration method because it is based on a 
watershed and can be applied in irrigated settings (Thornthwaite 1948; 
Thornthwaite and Mather 1955), as well as being well tested and frequently used for 
water resources studies (see Ward 1972; Feddema 1998; Singh et al. 2004; Sridhar et 
al. 2006; Sridhar and Hubbard 2009). I used the full basin size for the water bucket 
scenarios, and readily acknowledge the inherent problems of doing so, mainly, 







Table 6.2. Major Water Input and Parameter Settings 
VARIABLE SETTING 
Evapotranspiration Thornthwaite Method 
Water Holding Capacity 133 mm 
Growing Degree Days 180 
Run-Off On (for overland and infiltrated water) 
Location COOP weather station latitude  
Growing Season start/end Day 122 (May 5) to Day 300 (October 26) 
Temperature Daily Tmax and Tmin oC 
Precipitation Daily total mm 
Drainage Area* Basin: 64490 km2; USGS Benkelman: 7097 km2; 
USGS Hardy: 58,018 km2. 
*Some water balance scenarios were matched to USGS drainage areas (Mather 1978). 
 
RRCA GROUNDWATER MODEL 
 The RRCA Groundwater Model was developed as part of the 2002 Supreme 
Court Final Settlement Stipulation to identify and address streamflow depletions in 
the river and imported water accretions in the basin (FSS 2002). Conceptually and 
mathematically it includes recharge sources, irrigated acres, streams, reservoirs, and 
other variables that contribute to the amount, location, and timing of the river’s 
water and the states’ use of water (FSS 2002). 
 The Model simulates calculations for base flows under one of two conditions: 
pre-development and post-development. Pre-development conditions mean that 
irrigation is turned off in the model, “All Off.”  Post-development conditions have 
irrigation turned on, “All On” or historical conditions. The post-development option 
includes groundwater pumping and irrigation return flow, for example; Appendix B 
includes the model conditions. In this way, the Model can calculate each state’s 
respective impact on the stream because it can be set to turn on or off each state’s 
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irrigation impacts (FSS 2002). The “All On” historical conditions represent managed 
streamflow relative to irrigation activity. “All Off” is equivalent to the water bucket 
model streamflow calculation for natural or unmanaged streamflow. 
 There are three additional points about the Model’s application to my 
research question. I acquired output data from two locations or segments, the South 
Fork of the Republican River and the main stem at Hardy. An RRCA schematic 
illustrates specific model segments in Appendix B. Two, the Model’s simulation is for 
base flow; both the WB and USGS show surface flows. Three, due to the hydrology of 
the basin and negotiations between the states, the Model uses a larger drainage area 
than does either the WB or the USGS. In this instance, I am more interested in the 
patterns and trends, rather than a comparison of absolute flow rates, although these 
are certainly a consideration for meeting the Compact requirements. 
 
METHODS 
 I took several steps with the acquired data to illustrate climatic and 
streamflow trends for the upper (west) and lower (east) basin locations in order to 
discuss management strategies and Compact compliance. I also did analysis at two 
scales, the full basin and a sub-basin, the South Fork. At this smaller scale, 
streamflow differences between sources could be more apparent if they exist. 
Further, water in Bonny Reservoir on the South Fork has been stored for Compact 
use, so water releases could show up on the USGS gauge and in the RRCA data. 
 First, I designated the WB output streamflow data as one of three scenarios, 
dry (west), wet (east), or hybrid. The dry scenario is equivalent to the St. Francis 
data, the wet scenario is identified with the Red Cloud data, and the hybrid scenario 
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was a weighted average (two-thirds St. Francis (west) data and one-third Red Cloud 
(east) data). As most of the basin lies west of the 100th meridian (Figure 6.2), a 
frequent marker for the 20” (50 cm) isohyet and some row crop water needs, it was a 
reasonable apportionment to represent the differing annual precipitation totals 
within the basin. The hybrid’s weighted average offered another opportunity to 
simulate possible basin streamflow.  
 Second, for all three data sources as independent sites, I computed and 
plotted streamflow centered running means for 5- and 29-year periods. A five-year 
mean is centered on year three plus the two previous and two following years; 
likewise for 29-year periods centered on year 15. 
 Third, to assess trends and identify management decisions in streamflow 
patterns, I made comparisons across locations with each source (USGS Benkelman 
and USGS Hardy) and between sources for the nearby location (WB St. Francis and 
USGS Benkelman). Since the RRCA uses USGS stream gauge data, I expect 
similarities in their streamflow patterns and trends.  
 Time series results are presented next. I start with WB hydro-meteorological 
data at St. Francis and Red Cloud for a general overview of the region and basin. 
Temperature and precipitation anomalies based on the 1981-2010 climate normal 
period for St. Francis and Red Cloud are found in Appendix B. The remainder of the 
results section is focused on streamflow. 
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Figure 6.2. The Republican River Basin with the 100th meridian. (Bauer 2017) 
 
TIME SERIES RESULTS  
HYDRO-METEOROLOGICAL DATA 
 Annual temperature means from 1909-2015 between St. Francis and Red 
Cloud are nearly the same, as is their range, highs and lows (Table 6.3). Precipitation 
is a bit more diverse for its descriptive statistics. On average, St. Francis receives 
about 25% less precipitation than Red Cloud, so there could be a greater impact on 
surface flows and the need for supplemental water, irrigation, in that western region 
of the basin. For the Great Plains (1981-2010), past annual average temperature 




Table 6.3. Historical Annual Precipitation and Temperature Means, Red 
Cloud, Nebraska and St. Francis, Kansas.	
 RED CLOUD, NEBRASKA ST. FRANCIS, KANSAS 




13.7  (1934) 
 8.7   (1993) 
 5    (~250F) 
11    (~520F) 
13.5      (1954) 
  9.2      (1993) 
    4.7   (~240F) 
  11.3   (~520F) 




1,026.9    (1973) 
   303.8    (1934) 
   723.1    (~30”) 
   625.6    (~25”) 
595.9    (1920) 
254.2    (1954) 
371.7     (~15”) 
470.7    (~19”) 
(NOAA COOP n.d.a.)   
 
 Running means for temperatures at each location are displayed in Figure 6.3. 
Based on the 29-year mean, temperatures show a slight downward trend for this 
time period from annual high mean temperatures around 120C during the mid-20th 
century to somewhere around 100C in the early 21st century. Climate change 
predictions by the North American Regional Climate Change Assessment Program 
(Mearns et al. 2012) project an increase of temperature and a shift in precipitation, 
impacting evaporation rates, crop water needs and surface water flows (IPCC 2007, 
2013, 2014; Mearns et al. 2012; Mearns et al. 2013; Melillo et al. 2014).  
 Plotting mean precipitation trends for St. Francis and Red Cloud (Figure 6.4) 
paints a picture similar to their descriptive statistics. Between 1920 and 1940 their 
29-year precipitation patterns are similar, but undergo different trajectories from the 








Figure 6.3. Annual Temperature Means for St. Francis, KS (top) and Red Cloud, 
NE (bottom), 1909-2015. (Author) 
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STREAMFLOW 
 Streamflow annual running means present averages over time in acre-
feet/year (AFY); these units are common to Compact language and documents. One 
acre-foot is equivalent to an acre of water one foot deep, about the length of two 
football fields. Scenario graphics will generally display 5-year annual running means 
with some 29-year running means included. Additional scenario graphics and log 
versions for sources and locations are in Appendix B. My discussion will use 
“streamflow” as a single point in time for situational and event examples, knowing 
that the actual streamflow value at that point in time may be greater or smaller than 
the average. Additionally, the FSS accounting procedure has built-in 2- and 5-year 
averages for states to meet their Compact obligations depending on annual water 
conditions. Using 5-year running means with my data allows for some alignment 
with the RRCA. The WB and USGS results are for surface flow, the RRCA for base 
flow. As a point of reference, the original Compact calculations for annual virgin 
water in the South Fork are 57,200 AFY; for the entire basin, it is 478,900 AFY 
(Compact Article III).  
 
COOP WATER BALANCE BUCKET MODEL RESULTS 
 Twenty-nine-year running means for the hybrid, wet (east), and dry (west) 
scenarios are found in Figure 6.5. Essentially all the scenarios display precipitation 
differences as streamflow volume, but their patterns can still be useful. They display 
data for a 106-year period.  
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Figure 6.5. Simulated Water Balance Streamflow Scenario 29-Year Means, 1910-
2015. Hybrid, Wet (east), and Dry (west) based on Red Cloud, NE and St. Francis, KS 
COOP data (Author). 
 
 The hybrid streamflow pattern illustrates a fairly consistent 29-year running 
mean with flows generally between 2 million and 2.75 million AFY. There is an 
upward bump from the late 1960’s until the mid-1990s. The wet and dry scenarios 
diverge beginning in the 1940s. The dry scenario has a noticeable downward trend, 
but flows appear fairly consistent at around 1 million AFY beginning in the 1970s for 
the long-term 29-year trend. An upward trend begins almost immediately for the 
wet scenario and gains some consistency about 1970 onward with streamflows 
hovering around 5 million AFY. Its gains were about 2 million AFY for a 30-year 
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local weather data from two basin locations; slope, local events, soil type, irrigation, 
groundwater extraction, and other factors impact actual streamflow.  
 
RRCA GROUNDWATER MODEL RESULTS 
 Figure 6.6 illustrates annual base flow 5-year running mean results from the 
acquired RRCA groundwater model data for both the western Benkelman site (on 
the South Fork) and the eastern Hardy site (on the main stem). The On/Off 
(irrigation/no irrigation) option simulates what impact groundwater irrigation 
pumping has on base flows and potentially on surface flows. 
 The western Benkelman site, with a 5-year mean for both conditions prior to 
the construction of Bonny Dam and Reservoir, shows virtually identical base flow; 
these are lines near the bottom of the graph (Figure 6.6, left dashed line). After 
Bonny’s 1951 completion, there’s a quick parallel drop in base flow by 50% (~4o,ooo 
AFY to < 20,ooo AFY). Beginning shortly after 1955, separation between the two 
conditions is apparent and achieves some consistency in AFY after the 1970s. On/Off 
conditions mimic each other’s upward or downward movement. The upward tick 
around 2010 represents draining Bonny Reservoir (Figure 6.6, right dashed line). 
 The eastern Hardy site pattern is not very different from the Benkelman site 
(see Figure 6.6). The AFY volume is considerably more at Hardy; peak volume for 
either On/Off is over 250,000 AFY compared to Benkelman’s 50,000 AFY. 
Separation between On/Off occurs a little later and draining Bonny Reservoir is also 
present in the record. 
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Figure 6.6. RRCA Historical and Pre-Development Annual Base Flow Means, 1918-
2015. The South Fork Republican River at Benkelman (bottom) and the Republican 
River at Hardy (top). Vertical lines represent the completion of Bonny and Harlan 
Dams (1951 and 1952, left) and draining Bonny (2010-2011, right) (Author). 
 
USGS RESULTS 
 Figure 6.7 shows USGS Benkelman and Hardy hydrograph annual streamflow 
results. These graphs are a historical instrumental record compared to the earlier 
model simulations for the WB and RRCA. Steep declines in streamflow are obvious 
with the 29-year running mean at Benkelman but not as severe at Hardy. 
 The Hardy streamflow gauge data has a different trajectory in part due to its 
shorter record (57 years, versus Benkelman 77 years). The 5-year means illustrate 
local climate variability, basin size, and basin location; at some periods Hardy has 
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Figure 6.7. USGS Annual Streamflow Means, 1938-2015. The South Fork 
Republican River at Benkelman (top) and the Republican River at Hardy (bottom). 
Vertical lines represent the completion of Bonny and Harlan Dams (1951 and 1952, 
left) and draining Bonny (2010-2011, right) (Author). 
 
COMPARISON RESULTS 
 Figure 6.8 compares all three sources for each of the two basin locations, west 
and east. The 5-year running mean is displayed in AFY. Other pairings such as COOP 
WB Red Cloud versus the USGS for Hardy are in Appendix B. 
 The largest issue for these comparisons is the vastly smaller volume that the 
USGS instrumental record and RRCA groundwater model show compared to the 
large volume WB streamflow simulations. I consider the RRCA model a hybrid of 
sorts since it incorporates instrumental data along with simulating various 
conditions; it also differs by showing base flow and not streamflow. Those strictures 
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include simulation assumptions like even temperature distribution or soil type, 
length of record, local variability, gauge locations, and the role of people. To 
meaningfully compare these three sources and their results is challenging but 
possible because the patterns and trends tell a story about the physical dynamics of 
the basin under differing conditions, a component of the basin’s socio-hydrology. 
 Overall, Figure 6.8 reiterates what the individual graphics have already 
illustrated between the locations: AFY is climatically and spatially driven, upstream 
versus downstream or west versus east. Here it is differences between the sources 
that are foregrounded. A few select highlights between the sources provide some 
context for their similarities and differences.  
 Between the COOP WB and the USGS with the 5-year mean in 1983 at Red 
Cloud/Hardy, there’s a 96% difference in AFY (6,268,794 AFY v. 270,430 AFY). 
Even though the pattern around that time is a bit different at St. Francis/Benkelman, 
the difference in AFY is 95% (919,778 AFY v. 394,272 AFY). It suggests that despite 
differences in actual volume, those differences are consistent between the sources 
regardless of location. They are not realistic. Nonetheless they portray an alternative 






Figure 6.8. Simulated and Actual Streamflow Scenario Means, 1910-2015. St. 
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The RRCA patterns and results display negative trajectories for base flow, and differ 
from the USGS’s instrumental record for surface flows. (The RRCA calculations 
include other variables that impact its pattern and trend that are not relevant to the 
discussion here.)  The same can be said for the relationship between the RRCA and 
the COOP WB results. At times the WB streamflow outpaces the RRCA base flow by 
90% at St. Francis/Benkelman, and shows a nearly 70-fold increase in AFY in 1971 
(4,800,000 v. 70,000).  
 Visually examining these three different data sources and the two locations, 
along with their running means over nearly 100 years highlights and reinforces one 
point quite readily — the simulated natural (unmanaged) surface streamflow results 
are considerably different from those of the USGS and the RRCA. The implications of 
these differences relative to Compact compliance, the guiding questions, and the 
basin’s socio-hydrology are discussed next. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Human activity has profoundly shaped the basin’s ecological and hydrological 
systems to the extent that very little if any area remains unchanged. While many of 
the basin’s physical characteristics remain intact like slope, soil type, and 
topography, human and social structures such as dams, reservoirs, diversion canals, 
wells, irrigation systems, state borders, and jurisdictional control have redirected 
and shifted the basin’s hydrological cycle to the extent that surface water no longer 
flows freely and unimpeded downstream. Re-examining the benefits of dams and 
reservoirs came to the fore with William Graf’s seminal “Dam Nation” (1999) article 
that documents impacts on rivers across the U.S.. He argues that their impact on 
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annual discharge is greater than climate change impacts, and the Great Plains region 
is one area where the greatest river flow impacts occur. He offers context for policy 
and science, restoration and economics (Graf 1993, 2001, 2005). For Great Plains’ 
rivers including the Republican, Costigan and Daniels (2012) have documented the 
need to maintain current hydrological connectivity and encourage natural 
streamflow regimes especially for rivers that have reservoirs. On the Republican 
River, their calculations show a negative 65% decline in total annual stream 
discharge pre- and post-impact at Harlan County Lake Dam. Much of my time series 
data revealed a similar trend relative to dams and other management decisions on 
the Republican River. 
 In the remainder of the discussion, I turn to the guiding questions, how 
are management decisions presented in the instrumental record?  In particular, what 
management decisions are evident (and which are not) from observational records, 
and two, can simple models provide additional mechanistic insight into the observed 
streamflow dynamics? 
 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS IN THE INSTRUMENTAL RECORD 
 Based on the presented scenarios with the USGS data and the RRCA data, 
three management decisions are easily identified. The first is the impact on 
streamflow with the completion of dams and reservoirs in the basin. On the South 
Fork tributary and the Republican River main stem, the completion of Bonny Dam in 
1951 and Harlan County Dam in 1952 are distinct. Streamflows decline precipitously 
after these events. The second is draining Bonny Reservoir in 2010-2011. Each of the 
management decisions is present in the USGS instrumental record and the RRCA 
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data. A third management decision is more difficult to ascertain, but present none-
the-less: groundwater pumping. Cumulative groundwater impacts have directly 
impacted surface flows of the river and its tributaries (FSS 2002; Kansas v. 
Nebraska 2010; Traylor and Zlotnik 2016). These are evident in the RRCA 
groundwater model scenarios that depict river system base flows with and without 
irrigation; irrigation that is largely groundwater generated. Variability between them 
is obvious and so are the declining base flows; the USGS data shows the same 
pattern and trends. Although the visual, graphic impact is not as dramatic as the 
singular dam and reservoir events, its impact through time and space is just as 
significant to surface water irrigators: less streamflow surface water to use. 
 What’s more difficult to discern with these results i.e., annual running means, 
are smaller scale choices that irrigation district managers and growers make on a 
more daily, monthly, or seasonal basis. Some of these decisions may be present in 
instrumental records depending on data collection practices. Lag times are similarly 
important as to their direct impact on surface flows. Further, localized extreme 
weather events can skew the record, masking some water management decisions. 
Additionally, irrigation district operations and maintenance decisions don't appear 
either, such as burying irrigation pipe or lining canals and laterals to preserve water 
and reduce transit losses due to evapotranspiration and seepage; these choices 
impact streamflow as well. Augmentation plans (pumping groundwater for surface 
water commitments) are another management decision that is not obviously visible 
because they can occur over longer periods of time at lower volume, rather than 
singular large events. A more in-depth spatial and temporal analysis might reveal 
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these choices and events and their impact on the river, its irrigators, and Compact 
compliance.  
 The impact of other dam and reservoir completions on upstream tributaries 
and the main stem don’t appear in the instrumental record (USGS or RRCA) at the 
Hardy site. Not visible at my research scale are the completion of Trenton, Enders, 
Medicine Creek, and Red Willow Creek Dams. They do not appear at the Hardy 
gauge because the water is used by upstream FCID, and Harlan County Lake would 
absorb those events. It is more likely that they would appear in other upstream sub-
basin records and gauging sites. Nonetheless, it is unusual that their presence is not 
recorded farther downstream in the instrumental record. 
 When policy or management decisions aren’t present in an instrumental 
record, it does not necessarily mean that there is no impact. Rather, those impacts 
may be smaller than possibly expected, require greater time to appear, or need other 
tools and techniques to detect changes to the system. In a contemporary world of 
near instant gratification, waiting for results can be a journey of heroic proportions if 
it means decades. One irrigation manager commented that had Nebraska begun 
programs like the IMPs in the 1970s and1980s their irrigation district and farming 
outlook would be better. “We’re down to our last straw for us. We’re doing the best 
we can with what water we do get now, and 10 years from now we don’t even know if 
that’s going to be there” (Manager 18). Their observation points out just how difficult 
it can be to not only implement policy, but also design it and give it time to take root. 
The Compact statute identifies the ends — equitable allocation and compliance, but 
the states determine the means. How successful they are relies on their foresight and 
choices. 
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SIMPLE MODELS AND MECHANISTIC INSIGHTS 
 A water balance bucket model and a groundwater model provided data for 
streamflow scenarios. The scenarios they depict are distinctly different due to their 
design and purpose, yet provide insights to the rivers’ viability and streamflow 
dynamics. Table 6.4 shows how the water balance and the RRCA groundwater 
model, along with the USGS data, diverge relative to streamflow on the South Fork of 
the Republican River. According to the table’s data, there was only one 5-year period 
when the water budget streamflow “matched” observational USGS data, 1970 (1968-
1972). The only other similarity between those two is that they both indicate 
declining streamflows at different volumetric rates. At no time were the WB 
simulated AFY streamflows similar to any of the RRCA base flow calculations. The 
disparities between them are large. Even contrasting the RRCA On/Off scenarios 
illustrate what some may consider stark differences as time moves forward. After 
1960 (1958-1962) those differences are significant purely from a base flow 
perspective let alone for surface flows. Using the RRCA Off scenario and comparing 
it to the USGS observational record gives two similar periods (1980 and 1990), but it 
is unlikely that those periods are realistic given the fact that the On scenario is 
standard operating procedure in the basin, barring a Water Short or Water Call Year 
by the Nebraska DNR on basin surface water irrigators. Even then, groundwater 
irrigators outnumber surface water irrigators by a factor of 9:1. 
 These examples question the ability of the states to meet Compact water 
minimum allocations. At its ratification, the Compact calculated annual AFY on the 
South Fork at 57,200 (Article III) and the USGS instrumental record in Table 6.4 
ranges from 54,442 to 7,788. Original Compact calculations total 478,900 AFY basin 
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wide for virgin water, surface, and groundwater. The water balance scenarios offer a 
tease, suggesting that there could be between 47% and 120% more surface water 
available. Undoubtedly that would be a boon to surface water irrigators and the 
states if true. 
 The insights that these models present for the basin’s socio-hydrology and 
streamflows is that people, through water management decisions (particularly 
infrastructure), have profoundly impacted and changed the river as a natural system 
and as an ESS and SES component. Despite draw backs and the assumptions 
necessary to implement these models, they tell us that the river has changed and is 
likely to continue its current declining trajectory into the foreseeable future without 
drastic changes to irrigation practices and state water policies. 


















1950 207,794 54,442 35,498 37,260 34.89 / 13.736 
1960 132,628 41,396 12,513 16,308 41.03 / 16.153 
1970 21,436 21,414 3,076 11,415 30.38 / 11.960 
1980 282,956 18,417 4,977 15,949 58.10 / 22.874 
1990 99,571 14,653 3,071 13,548 55.90 / 22.007 
2000 47,189 5,697 1,141 10,863 36.89 / 14.523 
2010 180,883 7,788 5,859 12,123 44.58 / 17.551 
*1943 Republican River Compact Computed Average of Annual Virgin Water 
Supply for the South Fork of the Republican River: 57,200 AFY 





 Three conclusions can be drawn from the streamflow analyses using 
instrumental records and (simple) models. One, water management decisions are 
present in the instrumental record, especially for large scale infrastructure projects 
and Compact water compliance obligations. Two, river surface and base flows are 
declining spatially and temporally as documented with USGS instrumental and 
RRCA model results. Three, simple models like a water balance model serve as a 
counterweight to instrumental records by presenting simulations that challenge the 
value of streamflow management.  
 Regional climatic outlooks are not particularly favorable for water users, crop 
impacts, and aquifer recharge with increasing temperatures, higher evaporation 
rates, and shifting precipitation delivery timing that can impact irrigation user 
decisions (Brown and Rosenburg 1999; Rosenberg et al. 1999; IPCC 2007, 2013, 
2014; Mearns et al. 2012; Mearns et al. 2013). Irrigation itself can have an impact on 
regional climate (Huber et al. 2014). Water demands and stresses are likely to 
accelerate and pressure local water boards, state legislatures, and the judiciary to 
provide political fixes that protect uses and users; solutions that could be politically 
contentious. 
 In the Republican River basin, irrigation district surface water users who 
depend solely on streamflow are becoming a threatened and endangered species 
whether they farm in Nebraska or Kansas. Colorado surface water irrigators are 
already on the endangered list with fewer and fewer using it (Deb Daniels, Manager 
RRWCD, pers. comm. 2016). Declining streamflows and surface water jeopardizes 
their livelihoods and those of their rural agricultural communities, their region, and 
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their state. Alternative methods and technologies will be needed to address these 
declines, provide water to surface water users, and keep upstream Colorado and 
Nebraska Compact-compliant with Kansas. Farmers are resilient and innovative, but 
without the supplemental irrigation water from the river, their economic 




COMPACT AND WATER PERCEPTIONS 
 
 
 Interviews can be a powerful voice for participants and researchers alike. 
With well thought out questions and a skillful interviewer, they can offer personal 
insights, experiences, and context that are difficult to convey with quantitative data 
(Drever 1995; Dunn 2010). Statistical data from the USDA Agricultural Census, the 
U.S. Census, or the National Weather Service tell a story at a specific scale, for a 
specific place, and for specific phenomena that may obscure underlying motivations 
and decision-making by individuals or groups. Interviews can foreground those 
reasons and led to a richer understanding of a situation, contrast interpretations, as 
well as engage both parties in unexpected manners (Dunn 2010; Delyser and Sui 
2013; Dowling et al. 2016). Take this interview comment from a Republican River 
basin stakeholder about water augmentation plans by Nebraska to meet its Compact 
requirements: 
The key to water law is to protect existing users …. There was no permit given 
to N-CORPE …. They have pumped a heck of a lot of water, [but] say in public 
that we’re not going to pump any more than was consumptively used before 
they retired those wells …. Well, they clearly have in the last few years …. 
There’s no assurance that in fact they aren’t over pumping. That’s my 
problem. Manager 1.  
 
It clearly illustrates how some stakeholders question the legitimacy of the Nebraska 
augmentation plans and a desire for transparency. It is necessary to understand state 
and NRD management decisions. Context for discord between basin actors about the 
augmentation process, and its potential long-term use and impact, is provided by the 
comment. Simply compiling a list of lawsuits or acre-feet/year pumped would not be 
 207 
an accurate picture as to why augmentation is being used and why it is being 
challenged.  
 Few scholarly resources regarding actor engagement and opinions in the 
Republican River basin exist (Woudenberg 2007; Sambol 2010; NRD Oral History 
Project n.d.) with a far greater number focused on hydrological or economic impacts 
(Johnson 1960; Perkins and Sophocleous 1999; Szilagyi 1999, 2001; Sophocleous 
2000; Sophocleous and Perkins 2000; Szilagyi et al. 2003, 2005; Wen and Chen 
2005; Choodegowda 2009; Brosovic and Islam 2010; Crosbie et al. 2013; Juchems et 
al. 2013; Brookfield and Wilson 2015). I determined that more focused research was 
needed on human actors in the basin and interviews were a viable tool to achieve 
that goal. Interview results can be allied with other components like policy and 
streamflow assessment as part of the basin’s profile to lend greater depth and 
understanding to water management decision-making in the Republican River basin 
and under Compact provisions and requirements. 
 The remainder of the chapter is divided into interview methods, results, and 
conclusion. Methods and results are further subdivided into more specific sub-
topics. The methods section begins with a general overview and rationale for semi-
structured interviews, my pre-interview methods, the interviews, and post-interview 
methods. Results include question responses, themes, and limitations and 
recommendations. 
 
RESEARCH INTERVIEW METHODS 
 Interviews may occur as structured, semi-structured, or unstructured and be 
placed on a continuum for organization and format. Structured interviews tend to be 
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highly formulated, with predetermined questions and presentation order, as opposed 
to unstructured interviews that take a more free-form approach with each 
interviewee. Semi-structured interviews are fluid conversations like unstructured 
interviews, while at the same time designed to elicit responses to key questions or 
words that were selected based on background information or associated research 
literature (Drever 1995; Dunn 2010). Structured interviews take a positivist 
approach while the others may fit better within more post-positivist epistemologies 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Furthermore, Denzin and Lincoln (1998) emphasize that 
qualitative research tackles socially constructed realities, situational constraints, and 
relationships between researcher and the researched; components of my research 
and interview methodology. 
 A well thought out purpose and series of questions can assist in answering a 
research question particularly for structured and semi-structured situations (Drever 
1995; Dunn 2010). Questions may be described as primary, centered on a specific 
topic, or secondary, such as clarification questions. In any case, simple unambiguous 
wording that is respectful and non-leading is best used during interviews (Dunn 
2010). Use of semi-structured interviews have a long history of use in qualitative 
(human) geography research and enhances how we understand how people relate to 
and shape place (Dowling et al. 2016). Dowling et al. (2016) contend that interviews 
enhance qualitative human geography because they can enfold “the socio-materiality 
of human life and interrogation of the concept of representation in constructing 
knowledge” (684). 
 Semi-structured interviews have been used to understand water transfers in 
southern Nevada (Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017a), water resource management and 
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governance in the U.S., Canada and elsewhere (Noble et al. 2014; Franzen et al. 
2015; Mees et al. 2017), ecosystem services in Australia and Spain (Macdonald, Bark, 
and Coggan 2014; Felipe-Lucia et al. 2015), Spanish irrigation sustainability (Ricart 
et al. 2016) and climate and water in North and South American case studies (Farley 
et al. 2011; Hurlbert and Gupta 2016). 
 I chose semi-structured interviews as the best method to solicit information 
and perspectives about the basin from irrigation district managers, growers, and 
other relevant actors. They can provide insights about their motivations and 
concerns regarding water management decision-making at multiple hierarchical 
levels. The format allowed me to focus on key topics like water management and the 




 Based on my basin research readings from peer-reviewed journals, public 
documents, and other sources, I made a list of potential questions for the 
stakeholders about the basin, the Compact, and water. I pre-tested the questions 
with a knowledgeable individual who had previously worked within the Republican 
River basin. Questions were re-worked and re-focused from their input in response 
to pre-testing. The initial questions were winnowed to six that focused on key topics 
that I felt would best shed light on the actors’ relationships with water, the Compact, 
and between each other. Questions were designed with a semi-structured format, 
interviews were anticipated to take about an hour, and results would be both 
anonymous and confidential to safeguard individuals’ participation, along with 
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fostering trust. All research interviews adhere to the University of Kansas Office of 
Research guidelines, which included training, material submission, and evaluation. 
Approved questions are listed in Table 7.1.  
 Once I received approval, I identified the specific people and groups in the 
basin who I felt could directly address the questions based on their profession and 
personal experiences with water and the Compact. Primarily these individuals were 
water managers at local, state, and federal entities, along with agricultural growers. 
They were contacted either via email or phone to solicit their participation or take 
recommendations for someone who they felt might be equally or more helpful to my 
research, a common referral methodology known as a snowball technique. Once 
participation was confirmed, we set up a date, time and place to meet, so that I could 
conduct their interview. None of the contacted participants declined interviews. 
Table 7.1. Interview Questions  
1. Could you tell me about the short- and long-term water management challenges you 
have in your district for your users, and the impact those may have on receiving water 
plus meeting the Republican River Compact requirements? 
2. Augmentation plans in Colorado and Nebraska have been implemented to ensure that 
water is available and deliverable to downstream users. How do you perceive their short- 
and long-term augmentation viability for your district and the Compact? 
3. What steps has your district considered in response to predicted temperature 
increases and precipitation decreases, e.g., higher temperature minimums and less water 
during the growing season for the region and basin?  What kind of response have they 
received? 
4. What kind of collaboration has your district participated in to manage water in the 
basin?  Has it been beneficial to your district and its ability to meet Republican River 
Compact requirements? 
5. Have conjunctive use and correlative rights changed water management in the basin 
generally and in your district specifically?  If so, in what way? 
6. What else would you like me to know about your district, the basin or the Compact 
regarding water or its management? 
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POSITION STATEMENT 
 As an academic, a resident of south central Nebraska and a temporary 
resident of Kansas, and a woman, my positionality plays a role in my research about 
the Republican River basin and Compact. Any research process seeks to answer 
questions; in turn confirming or refuting assumed answers and checking biases. I 
discuss my positions next relative to the interview process. 
 First, I am both an insider and an outsider to the Republican River basin. I am 
an insider because I live in Nebraska within a short distance of the river basin, and 
therefore I am aware of regional events in a general sense. I am an outsider because I 
am not a farmer nor directly connected to the agricultural economy of the basin, 
including how the irrigators and the irrigation districts manage water. Second, I am 
an academic approaching highly personal issues in the form of water shortages, legal 
disputes, and intra-agency relationships for the residents and irrigators of the basin 
from a critical, objective position. Maintaining objectivity when faced by people with 
real and legitimate concerns about their livelihoods is a tight rope act. In particular, 
building rapport and trust with key basin stakeholders in order to solicit honest 
answers about their relationships and perspectives about water, legal issues, and 
agricultural practices requires flexibility and honesty on my side, too. Third, as a 
woman and academic researcher, I explored an area largely dominated by men. How 
my gender may or may not influence my research could have a bearing on data 
collection and interpersonal relationships with the interviewees and other people. 
Except for two interviews, all my participants were men. In each instance, I felt that 
they accepted me as a knowledgeable person and were respectful and helpful as I 
pursued my research, either in person, on the phone, or by email. As an in-person 
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interviewer, I learned to listen more and talk less. By the end of my dissertation 
research and writing, I gained new insights into the basin’s management and social 
complexity, garnered a deeper appreciation of the decision challenges facing 
irrigators, and discovered that legal decisions have a far greater impact on water 




 Interviews took place between January and June 2016, and occurred at the 
participants’ convenience for time and location. All interviews were in-person except 
for one phone interview. I began the interviews by introducing myself, telling them 
about the project, and giving them a chance to ask their own questions in order to 
help them feel comfortable and build a level of trust and rapport (Drever 1995; Dunn 
2010). Interviews were recorded with a digital recorder with the participant’s 
consent along with their verbal acceptance of the interview conditions of 
confidentiality and anonymity (Appendix C). Questions were not necessarily asked in 
numerical order depending on the conversation. Responses to the questions were 
scattered throughout, as were follow-up and corollary questions and answers. 
Periodically during the interview, I would check the question list to verify that 
answers had been given in response to either direct questions from me, had already 
been answered as part of the conversation, or had not yet been addressed. In the last 
case, I would insert it during an appropriate moment. Conversations tended to take 
on a rather free flowing and informal air. In this way, I was able to gather 
information that addressed my research agenda, but was also able to acquire 
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commentary on issues and experiences that were important to them and their 
relationship to the basin and other actors. 
 I provided each participant my business card for contact information if they 
later had other questions or comments to share. At the conclusion of our 
conversation, I thanked them for their time and participation, offering to share my 
results and conclusions with them either in person, at a public meeting, or through 
published reports and articles. I have continued to be in contact with many of the 
participants via email or phone calls as well as various relevant Republican River 
meetings. My interest in the basin remains unabated, and I believe that continued 




 To ensure confidentiality, interview recordings were saved to a secure and 
encrypted computer software file. I listened to the interviews and took notes, 
identifying common themes, points of conflict or consensus, responses to the semi-
structured interview questions, and select quotations that could be useful in the 
analysis and to the dissertation. Because interviews were anonymous and 
confidential, full transcripts are not included in my dissertation. Select quotes are 
used to support arguments and provide motivational insights and are anonymously 
attributed as a grower or manager. 
 Interviews were assigned to one of four categories based on the stakeholders’ 
identification to create a cohort of like basin actors who have perspectives and 
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experiences that reflect the basin’s water management history and current water 
situation.  
• Contextual interviews provided historical background from the Compact’s 
beginnings, past activity, and legal issues, for example. Interviews with 
retired or former employees typically fell here. 
• Special initiatives were non-state and non-federal groups or organizations 
and their members who were engaged in some type of basin activity 
including field and technical experiments. NEWBA, the Nebraska Water 
Balance Alliance, who promotes a basin-wide approach to water 
management throughout Nebraska, allowed me to attend a few grower 
meetings and was assigned here.  
• Regional managers and director’s interviews focused on those individuals 
who may occupy management positions at the state or federal level. State 
level bureaucrats were classed, here, for example.  
• Irrigation district interviews were exclusive to irrigation growers and 
irrigation district managers, since they are at the front line of water use 
and management decision impacts. 
A few individuals fell into more than one category, such as contextual and special 
initiatives, but I placed them by their primary role. A second step was coding 
interviews for themes. I listened to each interview, identified key topics from it 
including augmentation plans, pivots, and taxes, and collated all the interviews to 





 In total, twenty-one interviews were completed with current and former basin 
stakeholders that included local area growers and irrigation district managers, and 
local, state, and federal agencies. Interviews were either done with individuals or 
with groups, as was the case with the irrigation district boards. The actual number of 
individual participants is greater than the number of interviews. They were placed 
into one of the four interview categories: contextual (three interviews), special 
initiatives (three interviews), regional managers and directors (eight interviews), and 
irrigation districts (seven interviews with 13 people).  
 My analysis focuses on the irrigation district interviews because these 
stakeholders are the most directly impacted by water fluctuations, hierarchical 
management decisions, and meeting Compact compliance at the river. The irrigation 
district interviews included current and former managers and district board 
members, all local growers and land owners. The other interviews are equally 
valuable and provide additional context for current and past basin activity, but were 
not analyzed in-depth at this time. Irrigation districts and their members are the 
dissertation’s emphasis. 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTION RESPONSES 
 Short- and long-term water management challenges (question 1) were 
answered at length by all the participants, often in conjunction with augmentation 
plan viability (question 2) and relative to the Compact itself. Generally, respondents 
indicated a desire for longer-term stability, equitable treatment, and clear channels 
of authority. Climate change (question 3) had very limited voluntary responses, with 
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stakeholders downplaying its immediate role in the basin. Collaborative measures 
(question 4) were discussed in all the interviews, but with varying intensity 
depending on the stakeholders and their participation in such activities. All the 
districts apply for and have received grants from various entities, often state or 
federal programs that could fall under collaborative measures. The Bureau of 
Reclamation’s 2012 Water SMART grant program was one such activity. All three 
states contributed to understanding current and future water use demands and 
decisions, and explored alternative strategies for the Republican River basin 
(Shellpeper 2012). Another was the Republican River Basin Study completed with 
the Bureau of Reclamation. Conjunctive and correlative rights (question 5) were only 
mentioned once in the interviews, and in a follow-up phone call, the participants 
agreed that they had little direct impact on the irrigation districts at this time. Based 
on the conversations, the topic did not warrant special attention. Additional 
information about their district and specific situation (question 6) varied by group, 
and depended on what had been discussed previously along with the duration of the 
interview itself. Most reiterated the need for equity, sustainability, and having a 
voice in the larger basin ecosystem, especially governance decisions beyond their 
irrigation districts. 
 For most of the interviews, unless one of the questions was asked and 
answered specifically, it was difficult to definitively capture direct answers in 
reviewing the tape, particularly because the questions and topics overlapped so 
closely and were focused on broad management issues relative to meeting Compact 
requirements in one form or another. Thus, any answer could address short- and 
long-term challenges, augmentation plans, collaborative planning, or any other 
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combination. Further, follow-up or clarifying questions to stakeholder comments 
provide information about a topic important to them. No discernable difference was 
apparent between the Kansas and Nebraska interview responses, other than the 
acknowledgement that some locations were either upstream or downstream of other 
users and that each state has their own water policy and practices. Current events at 
the time of the interviews in Spring 2016 (multiple lawsuits by the Nebraska 
irrigation districts against the Nebraska DNR), colored their responses to some 
extent, although I believe that they were open and honest to the degree they felt 
comfortable. I was not asking them about the lawsuits or to disclose privileged 
information. In particular, this was the case for one irrigation district when I 
interviewed them shortly after the district had filed a lawsuit. 
 
INTERVIEW RESPONSE THEMES 
 Themes are a common way of grouping participant responses to quantify a 
topic’s consistency, show assimilation or divergence between stakeholders or places, 
or highlight unique situations. I evaluated interview responses based on key words 
or phrases like augmentation, taxes, pivots, or water, to identify common 
stakeholder themes and concerns. 
 Six broad themes emerged throughout the interviews: Governance, 
Conservation, Water, Economics, Legal, and Miscellaneous. Some themes were more 
robust in terms of time allocated to their discussion, but these six appeared 
consistently. Each theme is built on key words and phrases that support the larger 
scale picture. For example, the comment “For the farmers, if surface is turned off, 
then tax us as dry, but it will wreck the counties to do it” (Manager 5) would 
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primarily fall under the Economics theme, specific to tax, a key word, but could also 
be important to a discussion on Water or Governance, depending on the discussion’s 
context. Major themes and key words are found in Table 7.2, and Table 7.3 presents 
select quotes for each of the six key questions and matches them to major themes; 
the primary theme is listed first. 
 
TABLE 7.2. Interview Themes with Key Words and Phrases 
GOVERNANCE 
Republican River Compact, irrigation district board of directors, 
irrigation districts, state agencies, statues and policies, federal 
agencies, states 
WATER 
Surface water, groundwater, irrigation pivots, wells, project water, 
Warren Act water, water storage, water competition, equitable 
allocations, storage, augmentation, Rock Creek, N-CORPE, Colorado, 
trans-basin diversion 
CONSERVATION 
Irrigation pipe (surface and buried), irrigation pivots, reduced use, 
technology (soil probes, ET gauges, drones, GPS), sustainability, 
storage 
ECONOMICS Taxes (occupation and property), costs, inputs, community 
LEGAL Republican River Compact, water law, lawsuits, state statutes 
MISCELLANEOUS Media coverage, basin vision, specially organized groups or meetings 
 
 Governance broadly covered how policy at multiple scales was enacted and 
enforced and who had the authority or power to do so. What was most concerning to 
stakeholders was the lack of a clear hierarchy outside their irrigation district, 
especially in Nebraska. Who is in charge? Is it Reclamation, the State, the NRD? Are 
we going to get our water? Anything water associated counted as the Water theme. 
Here participants expressed a broad spectrum of opinion that was usually centered 
on allocations, usage, augmentation, and every other theme. The Conservation 
theme was closely related to water and economics, but more often focused on 
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reduced use and sustainability from a technological perspective as well as associated 
costs to achieve greater efficiency. 
 Economics tended to lean primarily towards taxes at the county and irrigation 
district level, particularly occupation and property taxes as they relate to irrigated 
acres and whether they were surface or groundwater, since the taxable values 
differed. At KBID, they 
have a per acre charges and it has nothing to do with how much water you get, 
whether we are at a full supply or a zero supply, they’re charged. If you’re in 
an irrigation district and you have classed acres, you’re classed acres. Classed 
acres are irrigable acres …. You pay about $44.50 and $43.75 per acre. That’s 
two different charges because one is for Class I and II acres, and the other one 
is for Class III and IV …. I and II is supposedly premium and III and IV is 
maybe not as east to irrigate, so it’s a little bit cheaper (Pete Giles, KBID 
Manager, pers. comm. 2016).  
 
In Nebraska, rural and urban taxpayers are assigned to and pay an NRD tax; as an 
irrigator with FCID or NBID, the grower pays an irrigation district tax, too.  
 The Legal theme focused explicitly on legal conflicts, most specifically 
lawsuits at the federal and state level as they related to over-use and “takings,” 
denying irrigators their water so that it could be sent to Kansas and not being 
economically compensated by the state. The Miscellaneous theme was a catch-all of 
sorts, collecting topics that the participants addressed during the interview, may not 
have been present in other interviews, or did not fit easily into one of the other 






Table 7.3. Select Question Responses and Their Themes 
QUESTION AND RESPONSE THEME 
1. Water management challenges 
• “We have a religious problem. God gave us the rain 
and the water, but we don’t have Jesus but we have 
a hell of a lot of disciples running around. We need 
the Jesus to coordinate these people. And that’s 
what we’re missing.”  Manager 4. 
 
• “We want a full supply-we’d love to have a larger 
supply. The Compact protects for so much water. 
The districts wouldn’t be here without the Compact 
…. We as Kansas Bostwick, we should get whatever 
the Compact allows and it’s up to us to take care of 










2. Augmentation plan viability 
• “The augmentation plans are dancing around 
rather than saying [we] have to cut 10%.” Manager 
4 
 
• “We suffer depletions because of over pumping [in 
Nebraska] …. directly related to groundwater 
depletions. Precipitation amounts haven’t changed 
much. We have to look long-term to see any 
amount of change …. more groundwater change 
than weather.”  Manager 7 
 
• “[It’s a] helpful tool [N-CORPE] if not abused, but 
there’s no statute in place to prevent abuse.” 
Grower 9 “Okay as a band aid, ….”  Manager 3 “but 
using 10 0f 10 [years], still pumping 30,000 acre 













• Water, Legal 
 
3. Climate change impacts 
• “Tree ring data tells use we’re in a wet period with 
average rainfalls.” Manager 4  
 
• “They’ve made some grant money available [for 
climate]. We’ve had three grants the last four years. 
More efficiency helps, but that’s some [garbled] 
reasoning to be prepared for climate change going 












Table 7.3. (continued) 
QUESTION AND RESPONSE THEME 
4. Collaborative measures 
• “In 2013, our users wanted a community forum [to 
talk about who is in charge], so we invited the DNR 
and the NRDs. The DNR does not want to come 
because they’re afraid of libel. NRD says DNR runs 
it, DNR says NRDs run it.”  Manager 4   
 
• “I was part of the [Nebraska] Water Sustainability 
Task Force two years? four years ago? and at the 
last meeting we had to define sustainability. They 
wanted consensus and I said no because 
groundwater augmentation was included. I said if 
they took it off then I’d say yes, so they took it off, 
but by October it was back on. The same thing will 

















5. Conjunctive and correlative rights 
• Conjunctive use and correlative rights were not 
directly addressed, and if asked about them, 
participants indicated they were unimportant at 
this time. 
 
6. Additional information 
• “If they [media] try to impartially evaluate, I think 
the NRDs would sue because they want control of 
what comes out.” Manager 4 
 
• “Water is our lifeblood here. We still have two 
schools and the next county over they’ve got one. If 
it wasn’t for the irrigation we wouldn’t have a 
tractor dealership…Courtland would look different. 
Just our lifeblood. The feedlot, ethanol plant —






• Water, Economics 
 
RESEARCH INTERVIEW LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 As with any research endeavor, limitations and shortfalls are inevitable. Due 
to the nature of semi-structured interviews and my rather freeform approach, some 
topics and opinions may have been overlooked. However, ample opportunities were 
present for sharing ideas, especially with the concluding question. Particularly in the 
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group interviews, some participants might have felt either more or less comfortable 
speaking in a group or were restrained because I was unfamiliar. I would encourage 
other researchers who want to use an interview methodology to build early 
relationships with potential interviewees by talking with them on the phone, 
emailing them for information, and attending meetings and introducing yourself to 
them. By showing an interest in their livelihoods and profession, people are more 
willing to participate, especially if it can help them. Everyone was more than happy 
to speak with me, but in a few cases, it was initially a bit awkward.  
 The interviews served their intended purpose of gaining stakeholder 
perspectives about their experiences and expectations in the basin, and how those 
viewpoints contribute to actor relationships and the basin’s socio-hydrology. 




 My overwhelming impression after speaking with the managers, boards, and 
growers of the three irrigation districts was their strong desire for reliable water over 
the long-term, a time that was not identified. In Nebraska, many of the interviewees 
had both surface and groundwater rights, as opposed to KBID where they only have 
surface water rights. Regardless of the location or type of water right, these growers, 
and the managers who work for them, want to know that they are going to have 
enough water to grow a viable crop and meet their financial commitments. If they 
could, they would want their irrigation water number in late fall or early winter, so 
that they can make input decisions about seed when the seed companies offer their 
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best discounts. However, climatically that is not possible. They also believe that all 
the growers in the basin need to abide by rules and regulations equally; there cannot 
be one standard for surface water and another one for groundwater. Grower 7 said 
that, 
the argument for guys west 80-100 miles say they need more water because 
they get less rain. Maybe they shouldn’t grow such high water use crops in an 
arid region. Allowing them to pump more water reduces our streamflows 
downstream. If we all went to equal amounts for groundwater pumping… 
eventually land value would adjust and reflect that.   
 
When there is equity there can be reliability and sustainability, at least from the 
perspective presented here. 
 Governance was equally important to them, specifically authority and 
oversight as it related to legal issues. The bureaucratic hierarchy appears 
straightforward, but it is not. The Nebraska DNR can make a Water Call or designate 
a Water Short Year that declares limits on the amount of water available to the 
irrigation districts. That action directly impacts the Frenchman-Cambridge and 
Nebraska Bostwick districts. Confusion arises when there are competing policies and 
obligations between the states, Reclamation, and NBID over water accessibility. 
From 2004-2007 NBID received no outflows from Harlan County Lake, while KBID 
received none for 2004 and 2005 (Manager 4 and Manager 6). NBID therefore saw 
water flow past their irrigators to KBID irrigators for two years in order to make sure 
that the state was compliant with Kansas and the Compact (Manager 4). Kansas’s 
2010 lawsuit claimed that Nebraska had overused water in 2005 and 2006 by 
35,000 AFY each year. NBID was not getting water from Harlan in either of those 
years and Kansas was getting some water in 2006. Thus, the confusion over who gets 
water when, and by what regulation.  
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 Adding another layer to the irrigation districts’ uncertainty is the fact that 
they are not directly named in the Compact. Although most of the parties would 
agree that these three are the beneficiaries of the basin’s water, the states technically 
may be under no obligation to provide it. Reclamation has to follow state laws, but at 
the same time they have an obligation to provide some level of support and 
protection to their irrigation projects. These circumstances put the irrigation 
districts, particularly FCID and NBID in Nebraska, in difficult water and legal limbo, 
thus their ongoing demand for clear jurisdictional authority.  
 The people who I interviewed were largely interested in pursuing solutions, 
independently or in partnership, as long as they believe there is a level of trust and 
both parties are acting in good faith. They see lawsuits as a last resort when all other 
avenues have been blocked and/or agencies and actors have been unresponsive to 
their concerns. Ironically the Compact itself states that one of its purposes is “to 
remove all causes, present and future, which might lead to controversy” (Article I). 
One manager colorfully described the basin as a religious problem where “God gave 
us the rain and the water, but we don’t have a Jesus, but we have a hell of a lot of 
disciples running around” (Manager 4). 
 The growers are interested in long-term sustainability, especially for surface 
water. As groundwater pumping affects surface flows and available water for surface 
irrigators both in the present and the future, they want measures and policy 
implementation that can support some degree of an annual reliable and usable 
volume of water. It means groundwater regulation and enforcement, something that 
Nebraska is loath to do for groundwater because of the contingent’s political clout; 
with 90% groundwater irrigators compared to 10% surface irrigators, their collective 
 225 
political power is considerable (Griggs 2017). Yes, if a grower has groundwater 
rights, they can adjust which fields are irrigated, eliminate marginal acreage, and 
concentrate on the most productive fields, but it still limits their production capacity; 
the same holds true for surface irrigators. For those growers with groundwater 
irrigation wells in Nebraska’s Rapid Response area, they question just how beneficial 
a well shut down can be in its various zones (Figure 7.1). First, there’s a fairly 
significant lag time between well shut down and surface flow rebound. Second, they 
want to know if their well is hydrologically connected before they are shut down and 
stop pumping. Surface water irrigators contend that well shut downs may not be very 
practical in the short-term. For longer projections, the shut downs remain a 
possibility. Growers will continue to innovate, adapt, and deploy new technology that 
allows them to maintain harvest yields with less water especially when their 
allocations continue to shrink. If no water comes through the diversions and ditches 
due to a water call, low precipitation, or drought, those steps are not enough.  
 The basin stakeholders want to be heard. They want the larger public and all 
state representatives to understand the challenges in the basin and to support them 
beyond transitory news headlines that pop up when a new lawsuit is filed or a water 
call is put into place (Knapp 2013, 2015; Baker 2016; Bergin 2016; McCook Gazette 
2017). They want the urban cores to know that they use water wisely, they support 
the state economy, and they are an important part of their state’s social fabric. State 
agriculture generally in Kansas is the largest percentage of the state’s economy at 
~44.5% contributing nearly $67.5 billion (KDA 2017a). For Nebraska, agricultural 
jobs are 25% of its workforce, and farm marketing cash receipts were over $23 
billion in 2015, which is 6.1% of the U.S. total (Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
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2017). These are smart people who are knowledgeable and well versed in their area 
of expertise, agriculture, pay attention to state and federal legislation that will impact 
their businesses, have internet access, use the newest technologies to monitor their 
fields, and travel internationally. I have the utmost respect for the businesses they 
run and the conditions under which they operate them. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Nebraska Republican River Basin Irrigation Well Density. Rapid 




 Irrigated agriculture is the backbone of the Republican River basin whether it 
is Colorado, Kansas, or Nebraska. In 2016, harvested irrigated corn in bushels/acre 
was 211.7 in Nebraska’s upper basin Perkins County (a northwestern county) while 
non-irrigated corn was 83.3 bushels/acre, a difference of 128.4 bushels/acre that is 
nearly 54% more than the non-irrigated harvest average. In Nebraska’s lower basin 
Franklin County, the difference was 78.4 bushels/acre (206.6 irrigated v. 128.2 non-
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irrigated) and in Kansas’s Republic County harvested corn was 156.5 bushels/acre 
(irrigated and non-irrigated values were not given) (USDA 2017), almost 30% less 
than Perkins County. Impact to Republic County from agriculture and related 
activities has an added value of over $73 million and an output of over $250 million 
(KDA 2017b). These sample production differences and economic impacts are not 
insignificant for the national, regional, or state economies. Much of it would not exist 
without irrigation water, and it adds another layer to understanding the basin’s 
socio-hydrology. 
 Without irrigation, banks, churches, schools, grocery stores, health clinics, 
implement dealers, and local diners wither and eventually cease to exist. One 
stakeholder observed that,  
Ultimately the longer you continue to focus the local economy and the local 
welfare on this fantasy [of endless water] the worse it gets ….  you have built 
this infrastructure out there that is built number one on money that's 
dependent upon water and [two] it’s all mortgaged. And when water isn’t 
there you can’t pay the mortgage and the infrastructure begins to collapse. 
(Manager 2).  
 
On the other hand, the bars usually find a way to survive. Economic innovation 
outside the agricultural sector can help. Red Cloud, Nebraska (population 948) is 
undergoing a renaissance of sorts with the rejuvenation of its downtown, the 
National Willa Cather Center, the restored Opera House, and a child-care center 
(Hansen 2017), but that is the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, Grand 
Island, Nebraska (population 51,000) offers non-agricultural employment and is 
only an hour away. For these irrigation communities and the growers who live there, 





A SOCIO-HYDROLOGY PROFILE AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Understanding that the value of water has more than one answer is important 
since the value of water is not necessarily the cost of water. Shown throughout my 
dissertation are various values of water expressed as ways of knowing from the 
historical to the hydrological to the personal. My research illustrates how the 
Republican River, its irrigation districts, and the Compact that ties them together 
reflect the socio-hydrology of the Great Plains. I have two major outcomes. First, I 
identify four themes that help to explain the historical socio-hydrology of the 
irrigation districts and basin’s co-evolution with water through time and space with a 
descriptive profile. Second, I identify 10 thematic categories that socio-hydrology 
should explicitly include in their discussion and research for values and norms 
within its organizational framework. These topics are discussed first in the chapter.  
The dissertation conclusion explores society’s enduring and persistent questions 
about nature by examining whether society has gained a greater understanding of 
nature and its systems, people’s interactions with nature, and how those interactions 
transcend time and place specifically for the Republican River basin and its environs. 
 
A SOCIO-HYDROLOGY PROFILE FOR THE IRRIGATION DISTRICTS  
 The socio-hydrology of the three irrigation districts and the Republican River 
basin is a socially constructed space. It is based on physical and social realities, 
perceptions, and experiences that people have encountered in those spaces. Water 
must be the foundation upon which everything else is constructed. The four themes 
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ebb and flow throughout the basin, often concurrently. Those themes are droughts 
and floods, science and technology, litigation, and future adaptations and 
interpretations. I discuss each in turn. 
 
One: Droughts and Floods 
 The basin is essentially a place with low stream densities, a semi-arid climate, 
subject to periodic drought, and with initially inaccessible groundwater. Into this 
landscape came migrants from the Eastern U.S. whose expectations for economic 
stability were challenged by harsh physical conditions for agricultural pursuits. 
Important key events that led to the settlement of the Great Plains were the 1841 
Pre-Emption and 1862 Homestead Acts that encouraged settlement and 
development of federally purchased land. River valleys usually have fertile land and 
access to streams, so those places were often settled and developed first, as is true in 
the Republican River basin. If a family farmed, surface water could be diverted by 
hand dug irrigation canals to water adjacent fields during growing seasons for a 
harvestable crop. Despite periodic droughts throughout the mid- to late-1800s and 
early 1900s, many settlers chose to stay on the Great Plains. Then came the 1930s, a 
prolonged drought that decimated the region and forced innumerable families to 
abandon their property for the chance of better opportunities elsewhere. In the 
Republican River basin, hardy settlers eked out a living as best they could under 
difficult conditions, at least until the 1935 flood. It created a tsunami of destruction 
made all the worse because of the drought (Manly 1993). Over 100 people lost their 
lives and economic damages totaled over $13 million Depression era dollars (Manley 
1993; Hayden 2015; Figure 8.1). These two events, perhaps more than any other, 
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began to reframe the socio-hydrology of the basin into what residents of the basin 




Figure 8.1. 1935 Dust Storm, Naponee, NE (top) and 1935 Flood Cambridge, NE 
(bottom) (Nebraska State Historical Society n.d.). 
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 Afterwards residents of the basin demanded flood protect from the federal 
government and wanted irrigation projects to help mitigate water scarcity. The 
earlier 1902 Newlands Act and the establishment of the Bureau of Reclamation were 
there to see those needs come to fruition in the establishment of irrigation divisions 
made possible by the 1944 Flood Control Act and the Pick-Sloan Plan. Throughout 
settlement, territories and states had developed and enacted water laws and policies 
that defined how water could be used. Kansas and Colorado codified prior 
appropriation for all its water. Nebraska took a different path that used prior 
appropriation with surface water and reasonable use/correlative rights practices for 
groundwater. Together the development of physical infrastructure for the irrigation 
districts and the water laws of the states helped to support agricultural economics 
and create a socially constructed and commodified market-culture value for water. 
An associated outcome of the flood and water scarcity was the 1943 Republican River 
Compact. Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska negotiated an agreement to equitably 
allocate the virgin water of the river, thereby supplying farmers of the basin with 
reliable water via Reclamation’s irrigation divisions and districts. A 1950s drought 
and subsequent later ones like the 2012 flash drought are persistent reminders about 
the unpredictability of the region’s climate. Local floods occurred later as well, but 
none equal the magnitude of 1935. Similar hydro-meteorological events will continue 
to affect the region into the future. 
 
Two: Science and Technology 
 Once the infrastructure of the federal irrigation districts was visible on the 
landscape, the social and water realms became ever more tied to each other. Much of 
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the development during this period can be attributed to scientific and technical 
advances. Engineering made possible the construction of dams, reservoirs, canals, 
and diversions that would supply water to basin irrigators. The Compact made sure 
that the states would have enough water to help power their agricultural economic 
growth and development of the small communities that followed the river’s path. 
Each state believed that comity was achieved and controversies avoided. My 
simulated streamflow analysis show that adequate surface water supplies were 
probable on the South Fork and the main stem prior to the construction of Bonny 
Dam and Reservoir and Harlan County Dam and Lake. Other tributaries likely saw 
similar conditions pre- and post-Compact and construction. 
 
Figure 8.2. U.S. Highway 385 between Wray and Holyoke, Colorado (Author). 
 
 Initially all was well for surface water users in the alluvial basin and on the 
adjacent fields. It got better in the mid-1950s when submersible pumps became 
more readily available and were installed. It got even better for dryland farmers on 
the basin’s upland areas who heretofore had difficulty accessing groundwater for 
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either agriculture or domestic purposes (Figure 8.2). Suddenly wells blossomed 
everywhere in Colorado, Nebraska, and the upper western basin of Kansas. The 
Great American desert had become an Eden. The lower Kansas basin was not so 
fortunate since they are not atop the High Plains Aquifer. Not only were there 
submersible pumps for the irrigators, the invention of center pivot irrigation 
technology at the same time meant that fields could be irrigated more efficiently, and 
what were once considered marginal acres for irrigation were now under the pivot 
with groundwater. In addition, understanding the hydrological connection between 
surface and groundwater had been expanded.  
 Biological genetics has come to play a role as well, especially for seeds.  Seed 
researchers have used genetic engineering to introduce select genes into a plant 
species or introduce genes from any species into a plant species (Ronald 2011). Crops 
can then become resistant to insects or viruses and tolerate herbicides and drought 
(Ronald 2011; Plumer 2012). These benefits can improve agricultural production, 
soils, biodiversity, nutrition, and reduce negative health effects such as exposure to 
harsh chemicals (Ronald 2011). 
 On the Great Plains, drought resistant seed varieties lengthen the amount of 
time between a plant’s need for water because the roots draw water more slowly 
from the soil (Plumer 2012). Even though universities and private companies invest 
in drought tolerant seed varieties, no two droughts are alike. Some droughts may 
occur early or late in a season, some may be driven by less precipitation or extreme 
heat, and climate change is expected to complicate genetic engineering (Plumer 
2012). Benefits to date are modest compared to development timeframes of 10-15 
years; plus, the seeds can be expensive (Plumer 2012). Genetically engineered seed 
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must be viewed as a tool that may be most effective in combination with ecological 
practices, farming practices like no-till, and a move away from mono-cropping, 
technical changes, and government policy (Ronald 2011; Plumer 2012). 
 The convergence of submersible pumps, center pivots, hydrological 
connectivity, and later improved seed genetics amended the basin’s socio-hydrology 
to reflect new relationships between people and water. It also began bringing to the 
fore tensions between the three states about surface water flows. 
 The language of the Compact is “virgin waters of the basin undepleted by the 
activities of man.” Kansas interpreted that phrase to mean both surface and 
groundwater and encouraged the other states, especially Nebraska, to do the same as 
early as the 1960s, but was rebuffed by the states and the RRCA. Groundwater wells 
in the upper basin states continued to be drilled and surface flows began to 
noticeably decline, as demonstrated with the USGS streamflow data. Further, the 
insertion of dams and reservoirs impacted the river’s temporal rhythms and 
hydrology. The groundwater explosion and disagreement about its role initiates the 
next theme, litigation (Figure 8.3). 
 
Three: Litigation 
 For 55 years the states managed to work together, but in 1998 Kansas sued 
Nebraska in the U.S. Supreme Court for overusing water and breaking the terms of 
the contract. At the center of the suit was the intent of the Compact framers. Did 
“virgin waters of the basin” imply both surface and groundwater as Kansas 
contended or only surface water as Nebraska argued? Controversy had found its way 
to the basin and to reshape the socio-hydrology. An assigned Special Master oversaw 
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negotiations among the states as they worked towards settling the conflict. The 
resolution saw the Court assert that groundwater was implicitly included, and a joint 
development of a hydrological groundwater accounting model. The model is used by 
the RRCA and the states to quantify each state’s annual water use, state water 
account surpluses and deficits can be identified in a timely manner, and 
compensatory adjustments enacted. The states agreed to begin using the model in 
2006. 
 
Figure 8.3. Nebraska Irrigated Acres and Harlan County Lake Inflows, 1948-2012 
(in Griggs 2017). 
 
 Nebraska had been taking steps internally to address groundwater issues with 
the early formation of Natural Resource Districts (1969) to manage groundwater and 
later Integrated Management Plans (2005) for joint surface and groundwater 
planning. The first took place amidst the groundwater revolution, and the second as 
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a way to balance concerns between surface and groundwater irrigators, as well as 
provide some measure of reassurance to Kansas that Nebraska was serious about 
delivering water. Surface flows had continued to decline over the decades in the 
Republican River and both FCID and NBID were increasingly concerned. Those 
trends are visible in the RRCA base flow and USGS streamflow analyses I undertook; 
groundwater pumping was having an impact. Despite these and other efforts made 
by Nebraska, they did not meet their 2005 and 2006 obligation to Kansas. Unable to 
find common ground, in 2010 Kansas sued Nebraska for a second time. Both 
Colorado and Nebraska developed groundwater augmentation pipelines as 
alternative measures to closing water rights, reducing irrigated acres, and being in 
compliance. These actions were undertaken while the 2010 suit was moving its way 
through the court system. The pipelines supplement surface water flows to Kansas, 
and all were operational by 2014. Colorado also voluntarily chose to empty Bonny 
Reservoir in 2010-2011 on the South Fork of the river to decrease its Compact water 
deficits. In 2015 the case was resolved. Nebraska disbursed $5.5 million to Kansas, 
did not have to shut down wells or remove irrigated acres, and was allowed to receive 
100% credit for its augmentation water transit; a temporary River Master and pre-
determined fines were rejected by the Court. Transit losses due to canal seepage and 
evapotranspiration are common, reducing the actual volume of water.  
 Furthermore, FCID and NBID had been increasingly subjected to decreasing 
irrigation allocations to ensure that the state was Compact compliant. Those actions 
reflect a number of realities and possibilities. One, water availability for the year was 
expected to be below average due to physical conditions like drought. Two, 
groundwater pumping had reduced surface flows to the extent that any flows present 
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needed to go to Kansas. Or three, both conditions existed. The NDNR issues Water 
Short or Compact Call Year notices restricting access or allocations for FCID and 
NBID when surface flows are low or inadequate for Kansas’ allocation. As a result, 
both irrigation districts and their members have filed multiple lawsuits against the 
NRDs and the NDNR over closings and claimed economic damages due to their 
perceptions of mismanagement by the NRDs, NDNR, and legislative inaction. 
Interviewed stakeholders are particularly offended by their perceived continued 
sacrifices and inequities, since they feel that groundwater users have made fewer 
concessions. Additionally, their legal standing in court is precarious in light of the 
Compact’s language, overriding authority, and Nebraska’s legal obligation to it. The 
Bureau of Reclamation tended to remain on the sidelines even though they have a 
vested interest in the outcome at the state and federal level. 
 These intra- and inter-state lawsuits continued to expand and define the 
basin’s socio-hydrology, particularly because established water systems are so 
entrenched in American politics and institutional histories (Welsh and Endter-Wada 
2017a). Value trade-offs that balance efficiency, equity and effectiveness for water 
allocation practices are often the result (Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017a) which 
Nebraska has obviously embraced in order to be compliant, but to the detriment of 
the federal irrigation divisions and projects within the Republican River basin. 
 
Four: Future Adaptations and Interpretation 
 The socio-hydrology for FCID, NBID, and KBID has revolved around 
infrastructure that came about due to initial settlement incentives and flood 
protection. It reflects the Compact language and how it has been interpreted and 
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enacted upon the landscape. Just beginning to touch the districts are global and 
regional climatic changes as a result of anthropogenic activity (Figure 8.4). In 
concert with surface and groundwater depletions, those climate changes have the 
potential to significantly alter the basin’s socio-hydrology once again. Should 
predictions for increasing temperatures and changing water delivery timing hold 
true, along with a water table that continues to decline, the irrigators, the districts 
and the states will need to find and develop new adaptation and management 
strategies that protect their water and economic interests. Protecting the socially 
constructed market-culture value of water is the defining feature of FCID, NBID, 
KBID, and the basin’s socio-hydrology. What its future iteration becomes will largely 
depend on unintended consequences and unknown circumstances that will require 
social decisions that in turn impact hydrological responses. 
            
Figure 8.4. Historical and Potential Dry Days for the U.S. Great Plains. Days 
receiving less than 0.01” of precipitation with the IPCC A1 scenario; historical 1971-
2000 (left) and projected 2041-2071 (right) (NCA 2014). 
 
PROPOSED SOCIO-HYDROLOGICAL THEMATIC CATEGORIES 
 I propose ten thematic categories that future researchers can employ singly or 
in combination (Table 8.1). While appearing rather commonplace, the literature to 
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date is limited (Sivapalan et al. 2012; Gober and Wheater 2014), and has not 
discussed at length what categories should be used, how to define them, or how to 
use them.  
Table 8.1. Socio-Hydrology Profile Thematic Categories 
THEMATIC CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
WATER  Types and uses of water including quantity and quality– 
groundwater, surface water, recharge; agricultural, municipal, 
industrial, and ecological. 
WEATHER AND CLIMATE Local, regional, and global phenomena that impact the 
hydrology of the area and the people who live there as well as 
the larger hydrological cycle and climate change. 
ETHICS, VALUES, AND 
PERCEPTIONS 
Inter- and intra-group relationships and interactions that 
influence water management decisions. 
LEGAL Federal and state statutes that regulate water; jurisdictional 
agencies and control; local municipal codes or zoning. 
POWER AND POLITICS Legal hierarchies; collective group influence — economic, 
water managers, coalitions. 
BORDERS Physical and political borders that mark the spatial extent of 
water’s types and uses, an agency, or a state. 
HISTORY Regional and local settlement, economics, cultures and 
notable events to include the physical landscape. 
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE Advances in hydrology, engineering, chemistry, geology and 
other fields that address hydrological connectivity, water 
access, delivery, and use.  
ECONOMICS Macro- and micro-economics that impact water development 
and use such as industrial uses, cost-benefit ratios, 
commodities, trade agreements, and globalization. 






 The Republican River basin’s irrigation districts were a mechanism to develop 
a socio-hydrological methodology that could incorporate social science and human 
elements not typically used in coupled models and address water management 
(Sivapalan et al. 2012; Castree 2016, 2017). Socio-hydrology is centered on three 
ideas or goals: structure and dynamics, outcomes in terms of well-being, and values 
and norms. It pursues those goals along three research avenues: historical, 
comparative, and process. My research uses a historical socio-hydrology and values 
and norms approach with the basin irrigation districts. Future historical and/or 
values and norms research will need to incorporate thematic categories that can 
illuminate more clearly a locale’s water relationships. The thematic categories also 
add to socio-hydrology’s organization structure (Figure 8.5). 
 The descriptions in Table 8.1 are representative of how a theme may be 
defined or used. However, a few observations may be helpful. Local users and 
decision makers determine what ‘fact,’ social and/or environmental, counts when 
choosing how and when to use water. Those choices influence short- and long-term 
goals. Advances in science and technology can improve quality of life and water 
efficiencies while also creating unknown and unexpected consequences. Those may 
lead to dilemmas in areas where water is naturally scarce, but has since become 
available. Many areas of the Great Plains and Mountain West would have dryland 
farming if it were not for diverted surface water and groundwater aquifers. Added to 
those dynamics are the legal boundaries put in place by state and local actors that 
govern water’s jurisdiction and beneficial uses. The borders imposed upon water are 
mechanisms that groups use to inform and support their way of knowing, and in turn 
can lead to conflict and power struggles. Power, politics, and their hierarchies direct 
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choices, too, so they must be understood when interrogating the relationship 
between people on the landscape (Swyngedouw 1997). Schneider and Ingram (1997) 
specifically discuss the social construction and political power that groups have 
relative to their position to either receive a benefit or a burden by water management 
decisions. Further, group benefits and burdens are calculated by the political risk or 
opportunity they afford to policy makers.  
 




 Circumstances and situations determine which categories and elements are 
emphasized. Except for water, no one category is considered more important than 
another, since together they compose a place’s socio-hydrology. The borders between 
them are porous, particularly in the case of trans-border water conflicts of which the 
Republican River basin is one example. Socio-hydrology must consider water users 
and importantly water policies (Feldman and Ingram 2009; Gober and Wheater 
2014). Water conflicts in particular are about different ways of knowing and 
beneficial use (Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017b). To understand those different ways 




 The profile tells a story about a place that has changed through time and 
space. Today farmers and irrigation districts are using even more technology on the 
ground and in their combines and tractors in the form of GPS systems; variable rate 
seed, fertilizer, and water application methods; field weather stations; remote field 
monitoring through satellites, their cell phones, and the internet; and TCC, total 
canal control. TCC uses radio signals, computers, and software to control the amount 
of water in an irrigation canal to reduce water losses.  The radio signals connect 
canal gates and a central server to monitor activity. FCID began using the technology 
in 2017 on part of its canal system and has been able to reduce losses by 50% 
compared to losing 4,000 AF a year ago (Brad Edgerton, FCID Manager, pers. 
comm. 2017). 
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 Farmers and growers have agri-businesses, but know that some of their input 
factors are beyond their control because of the Compact and state regulations. For 
example, permitting systems have specific conditions and requirements such as 
water quantity, a legal description of the area, the purpose and so forth. Application 
fees for agricultural irrigation in Kansas and Nebraska begin at $200, and Colorado 
charges a non-refundable $100 filing fee (KDA 2016c; CDWR n.d.a.; NDNR n.d.b.).  
 The empirical knowledge added by my research in the form of a profile and 
thematic categories expands scholarly research for the Republican River, interstate 
compacts, and transboundary conflicts.  
 
DISSERTATION CONCLUSION (OR HOW TO AVOID LAWSUITS) 
 The concerns and practices of those who live in the Republican River basin 
echo centuries old searches for holistic and simple answers to what is nature, what is 
human, and how are we connected. The reflexive hydrological responses of 
decreasing streamflows, losing streams, and groundwater declines are clear 
consequences in the basin for the social and hydrological decisions people have 
made. My research and socio-hydrological profile narrative adds qualitative 
empirical data to the discussion and development of theoretical socio-hydrological 
models that can if not accurately, at least pragmatically reflect the human-water 
interface.  
 The binary construction of human-nature has given way to alternative 
discourses like hybrids, cyborgs, and Actor-Network theory that ascribe equal value 
to humans and non-humans alike. Whether binary, hybrid, or other, the human-
water cycle is wracked with challenges for quantity, quality, over-use, over-
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allocation, and scarcity, not to mention trans-border and legal conflicts. Disciplines 
simultaneously converge and diverge to address these challenges, much like socio-
hydrology or hydrosocial research. At their cores they are focused on the relationship 
between people and water rendering a binary with or without a hyphen obsolete. 
While cross-currents can revive, and refresh an ontology or epistemology, how we 
look at the world and what we can know about it, it does not necessarily make 
answering the complex questions about nature and our relationship any easier. 
 
CHALLENGES 
 In the Republican River basin, the human imprints on the natural 
hydrological system are both visible, such as irrigation infrastructure, and invisible, 
such as a lowered water table. When corn prices are high irrigating marginal acres 
goes up, and during droughts pumping groundwater takes precedence. Those 
management choices have contributed to economic advantages and hardships, but at 
a cost to the river basin’s hydrological system, especially surface streamflows. It has 
led to individual users and decision-makers confronting complex and competing 
policies for public and private users and natural ecosystems; should water be 
available for wildlife, irrigators, or cities during periods of scarcity. The Republican 
River basin and its irrigation districts is an area where many of these conflicts 
converge in the form of legal disputes, droughts, diminished streamflow, and 
changing social values about water. It can pit water resource maximizers against 
generational farmers who want irrigation water for their children and grandchildren 
to use, as is the case in some instances in the Republican River basin. My research 
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has helped to unravel and shed light on the intricate relationship between water and 
people, the research itself a hybridity. 
 From a hydrosocial perspective, Swyngedouw (1997, 1999) posits that an 
ecological frontier and waterscape can be completely enfolded into the social (urban) 
setting, where water loses its identity as a unique element or component, instead 
becoming endogenous within society. I expand the idea of an ecological frontier and 
apply it to agricultural settings, themselves an urban sphere according to 
Fitzsimmons (1989), particularly those that depend on irrigation practices. The 
ecological frontier of the Republican River basin has been wholly consumed by the 
market-culture values of the irrigators themselves, to the extent that streamflow and 
water tables are nearly exclusively controlled by management decisions in the form 
of accumulated surface water in reservoirs, mined groundwater, and yearly irrigation 
water allocations. There is nothing ‘natural’ remaining in the basin other than 
precipitation, because once it is on the ground, it is measured and manipulated to 
serve social and economic needs. 
 As surface water becomes less reliable and secure through either human use 
or climatic change, it is necessary to acquire water from other spaces, primarily 
groundwater and aquifers. What was once an insurance policy against dry conditions 
has since become the status quo. Irrigation well drilling and capping technology 
breaches the hydrological boundary by enfolding the frontier into the social rather 
than pushing the hydrological frontier outward and reducing its spatiality. With 
groundwater irrigation there is no boundary that technology seemingly cannot 
surpass. Instead, water frontiers disappear, and boundaries are reached when the 
resource is depleted and replenishment is impossible, exorbitantly expensive, or too 
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untimely. Although I take a different, more socio-hydrological approach than does 
Swyngedouw, I still consider relationships produced relative to power, control, and 
agency important to the discourse. 
 I focused on historical relationships in examining the Republican River 
basin’s three irrigation districts relative to their hydrological location, the basin’s 
water management decision-making processes, and how water surpluses and deficits 
impact them. It differs from the majority of socio-hydrology research done to date in 
that I am not using a hydrological modeling approach. I am incorporating social 
science methods advocated by Sivapalan et al. (2012), Castree (2016) and others to 
assist geo-science research and the conversation around global climate changes. I 
focus on the social interactions — the Compact, water policies, and agencies — that 
occur in the basin and how they impact the hydrological systems and most obviously 
declining streamflows. The research extends the hypothetical concept of socio-
hydrology beyond modeling into a (or to include a) more comprehensive approach 
by emphasizing the social element. It is these social elements that are most 
bothersome in developing workable mathematical models. Troy et al. (2015) state 
that in some cases their inclusion will be impractical due to data size and their 
qualitative form. The social variables that I examined (perceptions, language, and 
history) will be very difficult to integrate. Nonetheless they inform choices that 
people make about water, and should not be minimized or ignored. A future avenue 
of pursuit could be the use of agent-based modeling that includes water-use 
decisions. 
 Independent systems like climate or technology are significant actors in social 
and water relations. The Republican River basin has semi-arid climatic conditions 
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that can support rain-fed agriculture, changing surface and groundwater conditions 
due to irrigation activity, and policy constraints because it crosses political borders. 
These factors and others have important roles for its future socio-hydrological 
character. Bengali (2003) and Sivakumar (2011) say that holistic, creative, non-
linear thinking and solutions are necessary in both technological and sociological 
thinking. They stress the importance of development, management, and 
conservation relative to society, culture, and lifestyle for achieving workable 
solutions. Along with their states, all the Compact basin residents will need to 
collectively evaluate and choose a watercourse that helps to sustain its overall 
economic viability using various tools, techniques, and policies. 
 My research and socio-hydrology profile of the basin offers an opportunity to 
begin discussions about the present and the future. During interviews and at local 
Republican River meetings, participants have stated their desire for the basin to look 
the same. They want agriculture and their communities to take a central position, 
and water will be a necessity to achieve that goal. Whether or not it is possible within 
the boundaries of the Compact and current declining water trends may largely be 
determined by the future. Discussions and decisions made at the local level are 
usually low risk or maintain the current standards by gently reducing irrigation 
allocations (Manager 13). Well-designed and applied technology can support and 
extend the use and life expectancy of water, but if there is no water to use, technology 
may not be a savior people expect. 
 Three important variables need special consideration: Reclamation, the 
Compact and FSS, and federalism. Reclamation has moved away from infrastructure 
projects towards a water management-oriented mission. They will need to navigate 
 248 
potential revenue losses if the irrigation districts have no water to use and therefore 
no money to pay for structural maintenance or water storage fees at Reclamation 
reservoirs. If streamflow declines continue, low reservoir storage volumes will 
impact water recreation and associated user fees as well. Black swan or wicked 
problem events cannot be discounted, and foresight can have positive dividends. 
 Second, the Compact and FSS language will not change. What could change 
are RRCA rules, future state and federal lawsuits, and state legislative actions that 
redefine statues, terms and policies. The odds favor both occurrences. Individual 
state waterscapes will shift in time as a response to water availability, management, 
and climate change. Third may be a need to modify, suspend, or overcome 
federalism in the case of trans-basin and trans-border rivers in order to rationally 
and efficiently manage the joint resource. Watershed management plans (Shrubsole 
2004; Roy et al. 2009; Commonwealth of Australia 2017) for interstate river 
compacts could potentially be another avenue to follow, but it would be a politically 
risky choice. The success of integrated water resources management has also been 
questioned (Biswas 2004, 2008). To date, Nebraska and Colorado have not exhibited 
long-term confidence in their ability to manage their portion of the watershed and 
maintain downstream Kansas’s water allocation. The pipeline solution while a 
reasonable short-term solution, could itself become obsolete if water table levels 
precipitously decline and become too expensive to access. Should that happen, the 
RRCA and the states may have no recourse, but to consider retiring significant 




SOLUTIONS AND THE FUTURE 
 Approaches for the basin that incorporate fast and slow processes with 
unpredictable results due to human activities (Sivapalan et al. 2012), will have to 
consider changing environmental conditions, competition between surface and 
groundwater users, transboundary conflicts, policy changes, and economic and 
global forces. These current and potential future situations originating from 
independent systems, stakeholders may have to make bold and difficult choices 
whose results may be uncertain and temporally distant and or imprecise. Ceola et al. 
(2016) suggest a paradigm shift to low regret solutions based on problem 
identification, design solutions, and resilience as avenues of pursuit in socio-
hydrology. Adaptations are a key component for change. Irrigators have already 
learned how to maintain productivity with less water, better seeds, soil moisture 
probes, and field weather stations. Within the basin, a low risk path may be more 
palatable than other choices stakeholders consider extreme responses, such as 
permanently reducing irrigation water allocations or un-permitting wells. Chosen 
solutions will need to fully recognize that not all actors will be appeased, since the 
basin is a heterogeneous space. 
 A last approach needs to be considered, the basin’s identification as a green 
society or a technical society. Green societies typically adapt to changing 
environmental conditions, and technical societies use structural fixes. After the 1935 
flood, efforts were undertaken to prevent future loss of life and livelihood with the 
construction of dams and reservoirs in the basin, a technical response. Other major 
technical responses include wells, pivots, tractors, GPS and a host of other devices 
ranging in scale. 
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 Conversely, the Republican River basin is a green society, reflecting 
adaptability. Through time, especially droughts, they have adapted their agricultural 
and economic practices to reflect environmental conditions. Until the advent of 
center pivot irrigation and groundwater access in the 1950s and later, dry land 
farmers were dependent on timely and adequate precipitation, and irrigation district 
members were reliant on surface water management by their irrigation districts. 
With improved agricultural methods including no-till field practices, seed hybrids, 
timed fertilizers, access to agronomy or university extension services, and other 
tools, growers were able to adapt to changing environmental conditions on a nearly 
continuous basis — assess and adjust. It means that their memory is at the forefront, 
so resilience is high, but technology plays a role in resilience. How long and to what 
degree a green and/or technological society can flourish without incorporating 
components from the other depends on a number of factors such as legal challenges, 
changed environmental conditions, technical developments, and political stability. 
That merger will by necessity be a hybrid or all encompassing enfolding, a move 
away from the binary, creating a new iteration of socio-hydrology. People in the 
Republican basin incorporate both methods to maintain their livelihood. Responding 
to changing circumstances requires foresight, holistic, interdisciplinary approaches 
and solutions. Furthermore, courage and political willpower for water management 
solutions is as transitory as water in places where water is scarce. Other Great Plains 
socio-hydrologies may demonstrate these same practices and attitudes; further 
research can explore that possibility. Socio-hydrology is but one means in the search 
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TRACTABILITY AND NON-STATUTORY VARIABLE ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT AND FINAL SETTLEMENT STIPULATION 
 
 Tractability is all about the ease or difficulty of solving a problem; the more 
complex the problem the greater its tractability. Technical difficulty is asking how 
much does it cost and is it available with regard to performance indicators or models 
that are used on behalf of a statute. Thus dis/agreement about these two questions 
can help or hinder forward movement. 
 In its original form, the Compact itself indicates very little in regard to 
technical implementation or means. The FSS and subsequent model stand in stark 
contrast due to the Model’s high reliance on hydrological modeling and required 
technological expertise to design the tool itself. In turn, this led to extensive 
consultations among the States in order to reach an agreement for the design and 
use of the model, along with its data and how it should be shared. The essential 
target group are the two irrigation districts and their members, which are a very 
small percentage of the basin’s and each states’ populations. The irrigation district 
members are relatively homogeneous with little diversity in core behavior, so 
theoretically it should be easy to implement the Compact, FSS and other related 
documents. 
 For the first 50 years or so little to no behavior change was expected by the 
growers in the basin, but with the advent of groundwater pumping, subsequent 
declining surface flows, and current climate changes, surface water users have had to 
periodically curtail their district water use and individual allocation. Particularly in 
Nebraska as an upstream state, this has often meant more adaptations than their 
Kansas brothers, as they refer to themselves among the districts. In part it can be 
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attributed to differences in Nebraska water law and spatial districting i.e., natural 
resource districts, along with groundwater users who have had fewer usage 
restrictions. Therefore, the tractability rating for the Compact, FSS, and Model are 
low (difficult) rather than high (easy) at the current time. Tractability will ebb and 
flow due to changes in climatic conditions, state laws, irrigation practices, and other 
factors, but the end goal is to bring longer-term stabilization to the basin. How 
achievable it may be under dynamic climatic and legal conditions is uncertain, 
especially since time is a significant factor for behavioral change, and technological 
advances are unknown and initially expensive. 
 The non-statutory variables can be condensed into socio-economic 
conditions, support, and leadership. Socio-economic conditions are subject to 
perceptions that wax and wane, local economic variation, a group’s economic 
importance, and technological change. In the Republican River basin, irrigation 
districts and users are significant contributors to local economies generating millions 
of dollars, so economic variation as a result of increasing or decreasing irrigation 
water availability, drought, or farm subsidies for these agricultural producers can 
cause a ripple effect that in turn influences socio-economic perceptions. 
Technological changes in irrigation delivery systems e.g., nozzles and droplet size or 
soil moisture probes, can result in changed economics for the producer and their 
community. It may be especially true with new technologies that are often expensive 
and require substantial capital investment, therefore potentially decreasing a 
producer’s discretionary income. In turn, state and national economic variation can 
further influence public support, attitudes and resources at the local scale. Although 
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not mentioned specifically by Mazmanian and Sabatier, geographic location and 
place has a role, too. 
 The Basin States are subject to internal state pressures that can draw needed 
attention away from the Republican River basin. For example, Kansas is working to 
solve significant and critical reservoir infilling that threatens municipal water 
supplies, Colorado is grappling with water demands by growing population centers 
on the Front Range, and Nebraska’s largest metropolitan area, Omaha, faces aging 
infrastructure along with increased need due to population growth. Thus, statewide 
perceptions and support may be more transitory than local support and supersede 
local crises. Leadership can take the form of financial support, oversight and legal 
actions. What makes the Basin and Compact different is its complex governance. 
 The Supreme Court is the ultimate authority, but on a day-to-day basis it is 
the irrigation district. However, districts are subject to local, state, and federal 
guidelines and policies. These may be contradictory rather than parallel, so 
leadership falls first on the irrigation districts’ governing boards and managers, 
moving upward to state agencies, legislatures and governors, all of whom have 
multiple priorities and objectives that can take precedence over the Compact and 
FSS as long as the statutes are not being challenged. Therefore, it behooves state 
actors and bureaucrats to show continued commitment, effective support, and 
consistent enforcement so as to avoid unnecessary leadership challenges i.e., 






STREAMFLOW ANALYSIS MATERIALS AND ADDITIONAL GRAPHICS 
 
B1. OPEN RECORDS REQUEST 
 
Kansas Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources Interstate Rivers 
and Compacts, Republican River Compact 
I would like to obtain: 
1. Monthly and annual base flow for the Republican River and its tributaries computed 
by the Republican River Compact Administration groundwater model for the years of 
simulation 1918-2015 in the Republican River basin, under both historical conditions 
(with irrigation) and predevelopment conditions (without irrigation). 
2. A list or table of the model gages used to calculate depletions, the accounting points, 
special definitions, model conditions, and so forth. 
3. A model stream network diagram or a link to its online location. 
4. An input file to the account program (RRCA) that specifies how each accounting 
point's impact is calculated as a sum of terms corresponding to model gages. 
5. If data could be dispersed in spreadsheet/Excel format, I would appreciate it. 
 
 
B2. RRCA GROUNDWATER MODEL CONDITIONS 
 





Groundwater pumping and 
return flow 
Yes No 
Surface water irrigation 
pumping 
No No 




Mound imports (irrigation 
return flow from Platte) 
Yes No 
Irrigation canal seepage Yes Yes 
Reservoirs Yes Yes 
Dam Seepage (Bonny) Yes Yes 
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B3. HYDRO-METEOROLOGICAL ANOMALIES 
 
 
Figure B3.1. St. Francis, KS and Red Cloud, NE Temperature Anomalies, 1909-
2015, Climate Normal 1981-2010 (Author). 
 
 
Figure B3.2. St. Francis, NE and Red Cloud, KS Precipitation Anomalies, 1909-
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B4.3. AFY Streamflow Scenario Comparison 29-Year Means, 1908-2015. Water 
Balance, USGS, and RRCA On and Off. St. Francis and Benkelman top, Red Cloud 
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B4.4. AFY Simulated Streamflow and USGS Streamflow 5- and 29-Year Means, 
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Figure B5.1. Log 10 Simulated Water Balance Streamflow 5- (top) and 29-Year 
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Figure B5.2. Log 10 RRCA Benkelman and Hardy Streamflow 5- (top) and 29-Year 
(bottom) Means, 1918-2015 (Author). Vertical lines on the 5-year graph represent 
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Figure B5.3. Log 10 USGA Hardy and Benkelman 5- and 29-Year Means, 1938-
2015 (Author). Vertical lines represent the completion and emptying of Bonny Dam 
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Figure B5.4. Log 10 Streamflow Scenario Comparison 5-Year Means, 1908-2015 
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Figure B5.5. Log 10 Streamflow Scenario Comparison 29-Year Means, 1908-2015 
(Author). St. Francis and Benkelman, top, Red Cloud and Hardy, bottom. The 
vertical line for the St. Francis and Benkelman locations shows the completion of 
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Figure B5.6. Log 10 Simulated Streamflow and USGS Streamflow 5- (top) and 29-
Year (bottom) Means, 1910-2015. St. Francis and Benkelman top, Red Cloud and 
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B6. SOIL MOISTURE SURPLUS AND DEFICIT GRAPHS 
 
 
Figure B6.1. Water Balance Soil Moisture for COOP Stations St. Francis, KS (top) 
and Red Cloud, NE (bottom) (WebWIMP n.d.). Water holding capacity 150mm. 
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Figure B7.1. RRCA Republican River Basin Stream Diagram (RRCA n.d.c.). 
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Other Stream Reaches (Names may not be exact)
Kansas 
Bow Creek                            Segment(54)
North Fork Solomon River     Segment(57)
South Fork Solomon River    Segment(82) 
Smoky Hill Creek                   Segment(89)
Smoky Hill Creek                   Segment(90)
Saline River                           Segment(91)
Hackberry Creek                   Segment(92)
South Fork Solomon River     Segment(99)
North Fork Smoky Hill Creek Segment(113)
South Fork Solomon River     Segment(128)
Nebraska 
Elk Creek             Segment(100)
North Dry Creek   Segment(116)
Plum Creek          Segment(117)
Little Blue River   Segment(257) 
Dry Creek           Segment(258)
13
14
   Ground Water
Accounting Location
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B8. RRCA GROUNDWATER MODEL SOIL TYPES 
 
 
Figure B8.1. RRCA Groundwater Model Soil Types. The geographic boundaries 

















































C2. INTERVIEW CONTACT MATERIALS 
 
Phone Contact For Interview Participation 
 
 Hello, my name is Jean Eichhorst and I am a University of Kansas Geography 
doctoral graduate student conducting research in the Republican River basin 
exploring water resource managers’ decision-making based on environmental 
conditions and the need to maintain compliance with the Republican River Compact. 
 I am interested in conducting an interview with you about your experiences 
and views about water management in the basin. An interview would take about an 
hour, be 6 questions long, and be confidential and anonymous. Would you be willing 
to meet with me? If you can’t is there someone you could refer me to as an alternate? 
 I appreciate your help. 
You can contact me at (phone number) or email me at (email address). 




Email Contact For Interview Participation 
 
 Hello, my name is Jean Eichhorst and I am a University of Kansas Geography 
doctoral graduate student conducting research in the Republican River basin 
exploring water resource managers’ decision-making based on environmental 
conditions and the need to maintain compliance with the Republican River Compact. 
 I am contacting you because you are directly involved with water management 
in the basin, and I am interested in conducting an interview with you about your 
experiences and views. Interviews would last about an hour and consist of 6 
questions. Your responses would be recorded (and later destroyed), will be 
confidential and anonymous, and you’re under no obligation to participate. 
Preferably I would like to conduct a face-to-face interview, but if this isn’t possible, 
we can make other arrangements. 
 Since your time is valuable, I appreciate your consideration of my request. 
Please let me know about your willingness to participate, and we can make 
arrangements to meet. If you are unable to do the interview, but know someone else 
who would be helpful, please pass my contact information along to them. You can 
also contact my advisor, Barney Warf (email) or the KU Human Subjects Protection 




PhD Candidate, Geography 







C3. ORAL CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
 Before we start the interview, I need to read an oral consent statement to you, 
so that you understand the purpose of the interview and your rights as a participant. 
A verbal response at the end of the statement will signify your participation status. 
 
 I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Kansas’s Geography 
Department conducting research in the Republican River basin exploring water 
resource managers’ decision-making based on environmental conditions and the 
need to maintain compliance with the Republican River Compact. 
 
 I will be asking you about short- and long-term challenges in the basin for 
water managers, water users, the Compact, and related water issues. Anonymity and 
confidentiality will be maintained. You have no obligation to participate and you may 
discontinue your involvement at any time today or after the interview. Participation 
in the interview indicates your willingness to take part in this study and that you are 
at least 18 years of age.  
 
 The interview will last approximately an hour and consist of 6 questions, with 
the possibility of a few follow up questions. With your consent, I would like to record 
it for research purposes. Recording is not required to participate. You may stop the 
recording at any time. The recordings will be transcribed and translated. Recording 
access will be limited to me and my faculty supervisor. They will be password 
protected and destroyed/deleted following transcription and analysis. Do you have 
any questions? 
 
 If you have later questions, I can provide you with contact information for me, 
my advisor or KU’s Human Subjects Protection Office. 
 



















C4. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
These questions were adapted throughout the interviews depending on the 
individual and group. 
 
1. Could you tell me about the short- and long-term water management challenges 
you have in your district for your users, and the impact those may have on receiving 
water plus meeting the Republican River Compact requirements? 
  
 
2. Augmentation plans in Colorado and Nebraska have been implemented to ensure 
that water is available and deliverable to downstream users. How do you perceive 
their short- and long-term augmentation viability for your district and the Compact? 
 
 
3. What steps has your district considered in response to predicated temperature 
increases and precipitation decreases, e.g., higher temperature minimums and less 
water during the growing season for the region and basin?  What kind of response 
have they received? 
 
 
4. What kind of collaboration has your district participated in to manage water in 
the basin?  Has it been beneficial to your district and its ability to meet Republican 
River Compact requirements? 
  
 
5. Have conjunctive use and correlative rights changed water management in the 
basin generally and in your district specifically?  If so, in what way?   
  
 
6. What else would you like me to know about your district, the basin or the 
Compact regarding water or its management? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
